Pascal's Pensées
thus related to the life of man, etc. Flame cannot exist without air;
therefore to understand the one, we must understand the other.
Since everything then is cause and effect, dependent and supporting,
mediate and immediate, and all is held together by a natural though
imperceptible chain, which binds together things most distant and most
different, I hold it equally impossible to know the parts without
knowing the whole, and to know the whole without knowing the parts in
detail.
[The eternity of things in itself or in God must also astonish our
brief duration. The fixed and constant immobility of nature, in
comparison with the continual change which goes on within us, must have
the same effect.]
And what completes our incapability of knowing things, is the fact that
they are simple, and that we are composed of two opposite natures,
different in kind, soul and body. For it is impossible that our rational
part should be other than spiritual; and if any one maintain that we are
simply corporeal, this would far more exclude us from the knowledge of
things, there being nothing so inconceivable as to say that matter knows
itself. It is impossible to imagine how it should know itself.
So if we are simply material, we can know nothing at all; and if we are
composed of mind and matter, we cannot know perfectly things which are
simple, whether spiritual or corporeal. Hence it comes that almost all
philosophers have confused ideas of things, and speak of material things
in spiritual terms, and of spiritual things in material terms. For they
say boldly that bodies have a tendency to fall, that they seek after
their centre, that they fly from destruction, that they fear the void,
that they have inclinations, sympathies, antipathies, all of which
attributes pertain only to mind. And in speaking of minds, they consider
them as in a place, and attribute to them movement from one place to
another; and these are qualities which belong only to bodies.
Instead of receiving the ideas of these things in their purity, we
colour them with our own qualities, and stamp with our composite being
all the simple things which we contemplate.
Who would not think, seeing us compose all things of mind and body, but
that this mixture would be quite intelligible to us? Yet it is the very
thing we least understand. Man is to himself the most wonderful object
in nature; for he cannot conceive what the body is, still less what the
mind is, and least of all how a body should be united to a mind. This is
the consummation of his difficulties, and yet it is his very being.
_Modus quo corporibus adhærent spiritus comprehendi ab hominibus non
potest, et hoc tamen homo est_.[35] Finally, to complete the proof of
our weakness, I shall conclude with these two considerations....
73
[But perhaps this subject goes beyond the capacity of reason. Let us
therefore examine her solutions to problems within her powers. If there
be anything to which her own interest must have made her apply herself
most seriously, it is the inquiry into her own sovereign good. Let us
see, then, wherein these strong and clear-sighted souls have placed it,
and whether they agree.
One says that the sovereign good consists in virtue, another in
pleasure, another in the knowledge of nature, another in truth, _Felix
qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas_,[36] another in total ignorance,
another in indolence, others in disregarding appearances, another in
wondering at nothing, _nihil admirari prope res una quæ possit facere et
servare beatum_,[37] and the true sceptics in their indifference, doubt,
and perpetual suspense, and others, wiser, think to find a better
definition. We are well satisfied.
_To transpose after the laws to the following title._
We must see if this fine philosophy have gained nothing certain from so
long and so intent study; perhaps at least the soul will know itself.
Let us hear the rulers of the world on this subject. What have they
thought of her substance? 394.[38] Have they been more fortunate in
locating her? 395.[39] What have they found out about her origin,
duration, and departure? 399.[40]
Is then the soul too noble a subject for their feeble lights? Let us
then abase her to matter and see if she knows whereof is made the very
body which she animates, and those others which she contemplates and
moves at her will. What have those great dogmatists, who are ignorant of
nothing, known of this matter? _Harum sententiarum_,[41] 393.
This would doubtless suffice, if reason were reasonable. She is
reasonable enough to admit that she has been unable to find anything
durable, but she does not yet despair of reaching it; she is as ardent
as ever in this search, and is confident she has within her the
necessary powers for this conquest. We must therefore conclude, and,
after having examined her powers in their effects, observe them in
themselves, and see if she has a nature and a grasp capable of laying
hold of the truth.]
74
A letter _On the Foolishness of Human Knowledge and Philosophy_.
This letter before _Diversion_.
_Felix qui potuit ... Nihil admirari._[42]
280 kinds of sovereign good in Montaigne.[43]
75
Part I, 1, 2, c. 1, section 4.[44]
[_Probability._--It will not be difficult to put the case a stage lower,
and make it appear ridiculous. To begin at the very beginning.] What is
more absurd than to say that lifeless bodies have passions, fears,
hatreds--that insensible bodies, lifeless and incapable of life, have
passions which presuppose at least a sensitive soul to feel them, nay
more, that the object of their dread is the void? What is there in the
void that could make them afraid? Nothing is more shallow and
ridiculous. This is not all; it is said that they have in themselves a
source of movement to shun the void. Have they arms, legs, muscles,
nerves?
76
To write against those who made too profound a study of science:
Descartes.
77
I cannot forgive Descartes. In all his philosophy he would have been
quite willing to dispense with God. But he had to make Him give a fillip
to set the world in motion; beyond this, he has no further need of God.
78
Descartes useless and uncertain.
79
[_Descartes._--We must say summarily: "This is made by figure and
motion," for it is true. But to say what these are, and to compose the
machine, is ridiculous. For it is useless, uncertain, and painful. And
were it true, we do not think all philosophy is worth one hour of pain.]
80
How comes it that a cripple does not offend us, but that a fool
does?[45] Because a cripple recognises that we walk straight, whereas a
fool declares that it is we who are silly; if it were not so, we should
feel pity and not anger.
Epictetus[46] asks still more strongly: "Why are we not angry if we are
told that we have a headache, and why are we angry if we are told that
we reason badly, or choose wrongly?" The reason is that we are quite
certain that we have not a headache, or are not lame, but we are not so
sure that we make a true choice. So having assurance only because we see
with our whole sight, it puts us into suspense and surprise when another
with his whole sight sees the opposite, and still more so when a
thousand others deride our choice. For we must prefer our own lights to
those of so many others, and that is bold and difficult. There is never
this contradiction in the feelings towards a cripple.
81
It is natural for the mind to believe, and for the will to love;[47] so
that, for want of true objects, they must attach themselves to false.
82
_Imagination._[48]--It is that deceitful part in man, that mistress of
error and falsity, the more deceptive that she is not always so; for she
would be an infallible rule of truth, if she were an infallible rule of
falsehood. But being most generally false, she gives no sign of her
nature, impressing the same character on the true and the false.
I do not speak of fools, I speak of the wisest men; and it is among them
that the imagination has the great gift of persuasion. Reason protests
in vain; it cannot set a true value on things.
This arrogant power, the enemy of reason, who likes to rule and dominate
it, has established in man a second nature to show how all-powerful she
is. She makes men happy and sad, healthy and sick, rich and poor; she
compels reason to believe, doubt, and deny; she blunts the senses, or
quickens them; she has her fools and sages; and nothing vexes us more
than to see that she fills her devotees with a satisfaction far more
full and entire than does reason. Those who have a lively imagination
are a great deal more pleased with themselves than the wise can
reasonably be. They look down upon men with haughtiness; they argue with
boldness and confidence, others with fear and diffidence; and this
gaiety of countenance often gives them the advantage in the opinion of
the hearers, such favour have the imaginary wise in the eyes of judges
of like nature. Imagination cannot make fools wise; but she can make
them happy, to the envy of reason which can only make its friends
miserable; the one covers them with glory, the other with shame.
What but this faculty of imagination dispenses reputation, awards
respect and veneration to persons, works, laws, and the great? How
insufficient are all the riches of the earth without her consent!
Would you not say that this magistrate, whose venerable age commands the
respect of a whole people, is governed by pure and lofty reason, and
that he judges causes according to their true nature without considering
those mere trifles which only affect the imagination of the weak? See
him go to sermon, full of devout zeal, strengthening his reason with the
ardour of his love. He is ready to listen with exemplary respect. Let
the preacher appear, and let nature have given him a hoarse voice or a
comical cast of countenance, or let his barber have given him a bad
shave, or let by chance his dress be more dirtied than usual, then
however great the truths he announces. I wager our senator loses his
gravity.
If the greatest philosopher in the world find himself upon a plank wider
than actually necessary, but hanging over a precipice, his imagination
will prevail, though his reason convince him of his safety.[49] Many
cannot bear the thought without a cold sweat. I will not state all its
effects.
Every one knows that the sight of cats or rats, the crushing of a coal,
etc. may unhinge the reason. The tone of voice affects the wisest, and
changes the force of a discourse or a poem.
Love or hate alters the aspect of justice. How much greater confidence
has an advocate, retained with a large fee, in the justice of his cause!
How much better does his bold manner make his case appear to the judges,
deceived as they are by appearances! How ludicrous is reason, blown with
a breath in every direction!
I should have to enumerate almost every action of men who scarce waver
save under her assaults. For reason has been obliged to yield, and the
wisest reason takes as her own principles those which the imagination of
man has everywhere rashly introduced. [He who would follow reason only
would be deemed foolish by the generality of men. We must judge by the
opinion of the majority of mankind. Because it has pleased them, we must
work all day for pleasures seen to be imaginary; and after sleep has
refreshed our tired reason, we must forthwith start up and rush after
phantoms, and suffer the impressions of this mistress of the world. This
is one of the sources of error, but it is not the only one.]
Our magistrates have known well this mystery. Their red robes, the
ermine in which they wrap themselves like furry cats,[50] the courts in