Politics: A Treatise on Government
debate, they can choose whether they will bring it before the people or
no; but if they disagree, it is to these they must appeal, who are not
only to hear what has been approved of by the senate, but are finally
to determine upon it; and whosoever chooses it, has a right to speak
against any matter whatsoever that may be proposed, which is not
permitted in other cases. The five, who elect each other, have very
great and extensive powers; and these choose the hundred, who are
magistrates of the highest rank: their power also continues longer than
any other magistrates, for it commences before they come into office,
and is prolonged after they are out of it; and in this particular the
state inclines to an oligarchy: but as they are not elected by lot, but
by suffrage, and are not permitted to take money, they are the greatest
supporters imaginable of an aristocracy.
The determining all causes by the same magistrates, and not orae in one
court and another in another, as at Lacedaemon, has the same influence.
The constitution of Carthage is now shifting from an aristocracy to an
oligarchy, in consequence of an opinion which is favourably entertained
by many, who think that the magistrates in the community ought not to
be persons of family only, but of fortune also; as it is impossible
for those who are in bad circumstances to support the dignity of their
office, or to be at leisure to apply to public business. As choosing men
of fortune to be magistrates make a state incline to an oligarchy,
and men of abilities to an aristocracy, so is there a third method of
proceeding which took place in the polity of Carthage; for they have
an eye to these two particulars when they elect their officers,
particularly those of the highest rank, their kings and their generals.
It must be admitted, that it was a great fault in their legislator not
to guard against the constitution's degenerating from an aristocracy;
for this is a most necessary thing to provide for at first, that those
citizens who have the best abilities should never be obliged to do
anything unworthy their character, but be always at leisure to serve the
public, not only when in office, but also when private persons; for if
once you are obliged to look among the wealthy, that you may have men at
leisure to serve you, your greatest offices, of king and general,
will soon become venal; in consequence of which, riches will be more
honourable than virtue and a love of money be the ruling principle in
the city-for what those who have the chief power regard as honourable
will necessarily be the object which the [1273b] citizens in general
will aim at; and where the first honours are not paid to virtue,
there the aristocratic form of government cannot flourish: for it
is reasonable to conclude, that those who bought their places should
generally make an advantage of what they laid out their money for; as
it is absurd to suppose, that if a man of probity who is poor should be
desirous of gaining something, a bad man should not endeavour to do the
same, especially to reimburse himself; for which reason the magistracy
should be formed of those who are most able to support an aristocracy.
It would have been better for the legislature to have passed over the
poverty of men of merit, and only to have taken care to have ensured
them sufficient leisure, when in office, to attend to public affairs.
It seems also improper, that one person should execute several offices,
which was approved of at Carthage; for one business is best done by one
person; and it is the duty of the legislator to look to this, and not
make the same person a musician and a shoemaker: so that where the state
is not small it is more politic and more popular to admit many persons
to have a share in the government; for, as I just now said, it is not
only more usual, but everything is better and sooner done, when one
thing only is allotted to one person: and this is evident both in the
army and navy, where almost every one, in his turn, both commands and
is under command. But as their government inclines to an oligarchy, they
avoid the ill effects of it by always appointing some of the popular
party to the government of cities to make their fortunes. Thus they
consult this fault in their constitution and render it stable; but
this is depending on chance; whereas the legislator ought to frame his
government, that there the no room for insurrections. But now, if there
should be any general calamity, and the people should revolt from their
rulers, there is no remedy for reducing them to obedience by the laws.
And these are the particulars of the Lacedaemonian, the Cretan, and the
Carthaginian governments which seem worthy of commendation.
CHAPTER XII
Some of those persons who have written upon government had never any
share in public affairs, but always led a private life. Everything
worthy of notice in their works we have already spoke to. Others
were legislators, some in their own cities, others were employed in
regulating the governments of foreign states. Some of them only composed
a body of laws; others formed the constitution also, as Lycurgus; and
Solon, who did both. The Lacedaemonians have been already mentioned.
Some persons think that Solon was an excellent legislator, who could
dissolve a pure oligarchy, and save the people from that slavery which
hung over them, and establish the ancient democratic form of government
in his country; wherein every part of it was so framed as to be well
adapted to the whole. In the senate of Areopagus an oligarchy was
preserved; by the manner of electing their [1274a] magistrates, an
aristocracy; and in their courts of justice, a democracy.
Solon seems not to have altered the established form of government,
either with respect to the senate or the mode of electing their
magistrates; but to have raised the people to great consideration in the
state by allotting the supreme judicial department to them; and for this
some persons blame him, as having done what would soon overturn that
balance of power he intended to establish; for by trying all causes
whatsoever before the people, who were chosen by lot to determine them,
it was necessary to flatter a tyrannical populace who had got this
power; which contributed to bring the government to that pure democracy
it now is.
Both Ephialtes and Pericles abridged the power of the Areopagites, the
latter of whom introduced the method of paying those who attended
the courts of justice: and thus every one who aimed at being popular
proceeded increasing the power of the people to what we now see it. But
it is evident that this was not Solon's intention, but that it arose
from accident; for the people being the cause of the naval victory
over the Medes, assumed greatly upon it, and enlisted themselves
under factious demagogues, although opposed by the better part of the
citizens. He thought it indeed most necessary to entrust the people
with the choice of their magistrates and the power of calling them to
account; for without that they must have been slaves and enemies to the
other citizens: but he ordered them to elect those only who were persons
of good account and property, either out of those who were worth five
hundred medimns, or those who were called xeugitai, or those of the
third census, who were called horsemen.
As for those of the fourth, which consisted of mechanics, they were
incapable of any office. Zaleucus was the legislator of the Western
Locrians, as was Charondas, the Catanean, of his own cities, and those
also in Italy and Sicily which belonged to the Calcidians. Some persons
endeavour to prove that Onomacritus, the Locrian, was the first person
of note who drew up laws; and that he employed himself in that business
while he was at Crete, where he continued some time to learn the
prophetic art: and they say, that Thales was his companion; and that
Lycurgus and Zaleucus were the scholars of Thales, and Charondas of
Zaleucus; but those who advance this, advance what is repugnant to
chronology. Philolaus also, of the family of the Bacchiades, was a
Theban legislator. This man was very fond of Diocles, a victor in
the Olympic games, and when he left his country from a disgust at an
improper passion which his mother Alithoe had entertained for him, and
settled at Thebes, Philolaus followed him, where they both died, and
where they still show their tombs placed in view of each other, but so
disposed, that one of them looks towards Corinth, the other does not;
the reason they give for this is, that Diodes, from his detestation of
his mother's passion, would have his tomb so placed that no one could
see Corinth from it; but Philolaus chose that it might be seen from his:
and this was the cause of their living at Thebes. [1274b]
As Philolaus gave them laws concerning many other things, so did he upon
adoption, which they call adoptive laws; and this he in particular did
to preserve the number of families. Charondas did nothing new, except
in actions for perjury, which he was the first person who took into
particular consideration. He also drew up his laws with greater elegance
and accuracy than even any of our present legislators. Philolaus
introduced the law for the equal distribution of goods; Plato that for
the community of women, children, and goods, and also for public tables
for the women; and one concerning drunkenness, that they might observe
sobriety in their symposiums. He also made a law concerning their
warlike exercises; that they should acquire a habit of using both hands
alike, as it was necessary that one hand should be as useful as the
other.
As for Draco's laws, they were published when the government was already
established, and they have nothing particular in them worth mentioning,
except their severity on account of the enormity of their punishments.
Pittacus was the author of some laws, but never drew up any form of
government; one of which was this, that if a drunken man beat any person
he should be punished more than if he did it when sober; for as
people are more apt to be abusive when drunk than sober, he paid no
consideration to the excuse which drunkenness might claim, but regarded
only the common benefit. Andromadas Regmus was also a lawgiver to the
Thracian talcidians. There are some laws of his concerning murders and
heiresses extant, but these contain nothing that any one can say is new
and his own. And thus much for different sorts of governments, as well
those which really exist as those which different persons have proposed.
BOOK III
CHAPTER I
Every one who inquires into the nature of government, and what are its
different forms, should make this almost his first question, What is a
city? For upon this there is a dispute: for some persons say the city
did this or that, while others say, not the city, but the oligarchy,
or the tyranny. We see that the city is the only object which both the
politician and legislator have in view in all they do: but government
is a certain ordering of those who inhabit a city. As a city is a
collective body, and, like other wholes, composed of many parts, it is
evident our first inquiry must be, what a citizen is: for a city is a
certain number of citizens. So that we must consider whom we ought to
call citizen, and who is one; for this is often doubtful: for every one
will not allow that this character is applicable to the same person; for
that man who would be a citizen in a republic would very often not be
one in an oligarchy. We do not include in this inquiry many of those who
acquire this appellation out of the ordinary way, as honorary persons,
for instance, but those only who have a natural right to it.
Now it is not residence which constitutes a man a citizen; for in this