Politics: A Treatise on Government
not choose to be obedient to the laws, and how he is to support his
government? for if he is to govern according to law and do nothing of
his own will which is contrary thereunto, at the same time it will
be necessary to protect that power with which he guards the law, This
matter however may not be very difficult to determine; for he ought to
have a proper power, and such a one is that which will be sufficient
to make the king superior to any one person or even a large part of the
community, but inferior to the whole, as the ancients always appointed
guards for that person whom they created aesumnetes or tyrant; and some
one advised the Syracusians, when Dionysius asked for guards, to allow
him such.
CHAPTER XVI
[1287a] We will next consider the absolute monarch that we have just
mentioned, who does everything according to his own will: for a king
governing under the direction of laws which he is obliged to follow does
not of himself create any particular species of government, as we have
already said: for in every state whatsoever, either aristocracy or
democracy, it is easy to appoint a general for life; and there are many
who entrust the administration of affairs to one person only; such is
the government at Dyrrachium, and nearly the same at Opus. As for an
absolute monarchy as it is called, that is to say, when the whole state
is wholly subject to the will of one person, namely the king, it seems
to many that it is unnatural that one man should have the entire rule
over his fellow-citizens when the state consists of equals: for nature
requires that the same right and the same rank should necessarily take
place amongst all those who are equal by nature: for as it would be
hurtful to the body for those who are of different constitutions to
observe the same regimen, either of diet or clothing, so is it with
respect to the honours of the state as hurtful, that those who are equal
in merit should be unequal in rank; for which reason it is as much
a man's duty to submit to command as to assume it, and this also by
rotation; for this is law, for order is law; and it is more proper that
law should govern than any one of the citizens: upon the same principle,
if it is advantageous to place the supreme power in some particular
persons, they should be appointed to be only guardians, and the servants
of the laws, for the supreme power must be placed somewhere; but they
say, that it is unjust that where all are equal one person should
continually enjoy it. But it seems unlikely that man should be able to
adjust that which the law cannot determine; it may be replied, that the
law having laid down the best rules possible, leaves the adjustment and
application of particulars to the discretion of the magistrate; besides,
it allows anything to be altered which experience proves may be better
established. Moreover, he who would place the supreme power in mind,
would place it in God and the laws; but he who entrusts man with it,
gives it to a wild beast, for such his appetites sometimes make him; for
passion influences those who are in power, even the very best of men:
for which reason law is reason without desire.
The instance taken from the arts seems fallacious: wherein it is said to
be wrong for a sick person to apply for a remedy to books, but that it
would be far more eligible to employ those who are skilful in physic;
for these do nothing contrary to reason from motives of friendship
but earn their money by curing the sick, whereas those who have the
management of public affairs do many things through hatred or favour.
And, as a proof of what we have advanced, it may be observed, that
whenever a sick person suspects that his physician has been persuaded by
his enemies to be guilty of any foul practice to him in his profession,
he then rather chooses to apply to books for his cure: and not only this
[1287b] but even physicians themselves when they are ill call in other
physicians: and those who teach others the gymnastic exercises,
exercise with those of the same profession, as being incapable from
self-partiality to form a proper judgment of what concerns themselves.
From whence it is evident, that those who seek for what is just, seek
for a mean; now law is a mean. Moreover; the moral law is far superior
and conversant with far superior objects than the written law; for the
supreme magistrate is safer to be trusted to than the one, though he is
inferior to the other. But as it is impossible that one person should
have an eye to everything himself, it will be necessary that the supreme
magistrate should employ several subordinate ones under him; why then
should not this be done at first, instead of appointing one person in
this manner? Besides, if, according to what has been already said, the
man of worth is on that account fit to govern, two men of worth are
certainly better than one: as, for instance, in Homer, "Let two together
go:" and also Agamemnon's wish; "Were ten such faithful counsel mine!"
Not but that there are even now some particular magistrates invested
with supreme power to decide, as judges, those things which the law
cannot, as being one of those cases which comes not properly under its
jurisdiction; for of those which can there is no doubt: since then laws
comprehend some things, but not all, it is necessary to enquire and
consider which of the two is preferable, that the best man or the best
law should govern; for to reduce every subject which can come under the
deliberation of man into a law is impossible.
No one then denies, that it is necessary that there should be some
person to decide those cases which cannot come under the cognisance of
a written law: but we say, that it is better to have many than one;
for though every one who decides according to the principles of the law
decides justly; yet surely it seems absurd to suppose, that one person
can see better with two eyes, and hear better with two ears, or do
better with two hands and two feet, than many can do with many: for we
see that absolute monarchs now furnish themselves with many eyes and
ears and hands and feet; for they entrust those who are friends to
them and their government with part of their power; for if they are not
friends to the monarch, they will not do what he chooses; but if they
are friends to him, they are friends also to his government: but a
friend is an equal and like his friend: if then he thinks that such
should govern, he thinks that his equal also should govern. These are
nearly the objections which are usually made to a kingly power.
CHAPTER XVII
Probably what we have said may be true of some persons, but not of
others; for some men are by nature formed to be under the government of
a master; others, of a king; others, to be the citizens of a free state,
just and useful; but a tyranny is not according to nature, nor the other
perverted forms of government; for they are contrary to it. But it
is evident from what has been said, that among equals it is neither
advantageous nor [1288a] right that one person should be lord over all
where there are no established laws, but his will is the law; or where
there are; nor is it right that one who is good should have it over
those who are good; or one who is not good over those who are not good;
nor one who is superior to the rest in worth, except in a particular
manner, which shall be described, though indeed it has been already
mentioned. But let us next determine what people are best qualified
for a kingly government, what for an aristocratic, and what for a
democratic. And, first, for a kingly; and it should be those who are
accustomed by nature to submit the civil government of themselves to a
family eminent for virtue: for an aristocracy, those who are naturally
framed to bear the rule of free men, whose superior virtue makes them
worthy of the management of others: for a free state, a war-like people,
formed by nature both to govern and be governed by laws which admit the
poorest citizen to share the honours of the commonwealth according
to his worth. But whenever a whole family or any one of another shall
happen so far to excel in virtue as to exceed all other persons in the
community, then it is right that the kingly power should be in them, or
if it is an individual who does so, that he should be king and lord of
all; for this, as we have just mentioned, is not only correspondent
to that principle of right which all founders of all states, whether
aristocracies, oligarchies, or democracies, have a regard to (for
in placing the supreme power they all think it right to fix it to
excellence, though not the same); but it is also agreeable to what
has been already said; as it would not be right to kill, or banish, or
ostracise such a one for his superior merit. Nor would it be proper
to let him have the supreme power only in turn; for it is contrary to
nature that what is highest should ever be lowest: but this would be
the case should such a one ever be governed by others. So that there can
nothing else be done but to submit, and permit him continually to
enjoy the supreme power. And thus much with respect to kingly power in
different states, and whether it is or is not advantageous to them, and
to what, and in what manner.
CHAPTER XVIII
Since then we have said that there are three sorts of regular
governments, and of these the best must necessarily be that which is
administered by the best men (and this must be that which happens to
have one man, or one family, or a number of persons excelling all the
rest in virtue, who are able to govern and be governed in such a manner
as will make life most agreeable, and we have already shown that the
virtue of a good man and of a citizen in the most perfect government
will be the same), it is evident, that in the same manner, and for those
very qualities which would procure a man the character of good, any
one would say, that the government of a state was a well-established
aristocracy or kingdom; so that it will be found to be education and
[1288b] morals that are almost the whole which go to make a good man,
and the same qualities will make a good citizen or good king.
These particulars being treated of, we will now proceed to consider
what sort of government is best, how it naturally arises, and how it
is established; for it is necessary to make a proper inquiry concerning
this.
BOOK IV
CHAPTER I
In every art and science which is not conversant in parts but in some
one genus in which it is complete, it is the business of that art alone
to determine what is fitted to its particular genus; as what particular
exercise is fitted to a certain particular body, and suits it best: for
that body which is formed by nature the most perfect and superior to
others necessarily requires the best exercise-and also of what one kind
that must be which will suit the generality; and this is the business of
the gymnastic arts: and although any one should not desire to acquire
an exact knowledge and skill in these exercises, yet it is not, on that
account, the less necessary that he who professes to be a master and
instruct the youth in them should be perfect therein: and we see that
this is what equally befalls the healing, shipbuilding, cloth-making,
and indeed all other arts; so that it evidently belongs to the same art
to find out what kind of government is best, and would of all others be
most correspondent to our wish, while it received no molestation from
without: and what particular species of it is adapted to particular
persons; for there are many who probably are incapable of enjoying the
best form: so that the legislator, and he who is truly a politician,
ought to be acquainted not only with that which is most perfect