Politics: A Treatise on Government
imaginable, but also that which is the best suited to any given
circumstances. There is, moreover, a third sort, an imaginary one, and
he ought, if such a one should be presented to his consideration, to be
able to discern what sort of one it would be at the beginning; and, when
once established, what would be the proper means to preserve it a long
time. I mean, for instance, if a state should happen not to have the
best form of government, or be deficient in what was necessary, or not
receive every advantage possible, but something less. And, besides all
this, it is necessary to know what sort of government is best fitting
for all cities: for most of those writers who have treated this subject,
however speciously they may handle other parts of it, have failed in
describing the practical parts: for it is not enough to be able to
perceive what is best without it is what can be put in practice. It
should also be simple, and easy for all to attain to. But some seek only
the most subtile forms of government. Others again, choosing [1289a]
rather to treat of what is common, censure those under which they live,
and extol the excellence of a particular state, as the Lacedaemonian,
or some other: but every legislator ought to establish such a form of
government as from the present state and disposition of the people who
are to receive it they will most readily submit to and persuade the
community to partake of: for it is not a business of less trouble to
correct the mistakes of an established government than to form a new
one; as it is as difficult to recover what we have forgot as to learn
anything afresh. He, therefore, who aspires to the character of a
legislator, ought, besides all we have already said, to be able to
correct the mistakes of a government already established, as we have
before mentioned. But this is impossible to be done by him who does
not know how many different forms of government there are: some persons
think that there is only one species both of democracy and oligarchy;
but this is not true: so that every one should be acquainted with the
difference of these governments, how great they are, and whence they
arise; and should have equal knowledge to perceive what laws are best,
and what are most suitable to each particular government: for all
laws are, and ought to be, framed agreeable to the state that is to be
governed by them, and not the state to the laws: for government is a
certain ordering in a state which particularly respects the magistrates
in what manner they shall be regulated, and where the supreme power
shall be placed; and what shall be the final object which each community
shall have in view; but the laws are something different from what
regulates and expresses the form of the constitution-it is their office
to direct the conduct of the magistrate in the execution of his office
and the punishment of offenders. From whence it is evident, that the
founders of laws should attend both to the number and the different
sorts of government; for it is impossible that the same laws should be
calculated for all sorts of oligarchies and all sorts of democracies,
for of both these governments there are many species, not one only.
CHAPTER II
Since, then, according to our first method in treating of the different
forms of government, we have divided those which are regular into three
sorts, the kingly, the aristocratical, the free states, and shown
the three excesses which these are liable to: the kingly, of becoming
tyrannical; the aristocratical, oligarchical; and the free state,
democratical: and as we have already treated of the aristocratical and
kingly; for to enter into an inquiry what sort of government is best
is the same thing as to treat of these two expressly; for each of
them desires to be established upon the principles of virtue: and as,
moreover, we have already determined wherein a kingly power and an
aristocracy differ from each other, and when a state may be said to be
governed by a king, it now remains that we examine into a free state,
and also these other governments, an oligarchy, a democracy, and a
[1289b] tyranny; and it is evident of these three excesses which must be
the worst of all, and which next to it; for, of course, the excesses of
the best and most holy must be the worst; for it must necessarily happen
either that the name of king only will remain, or else that the king
will assume more power than belongs to him, from whence tyranny will
arise, the worst excess imaginable, a government the most contrary
possible to a free state. The excess next hurtful is an oligarchy; for
an aristocracy differs much from this sort of government: that which is
least so is a democracy. This subject has been already treated of by one
of those writers who have gone before me, though his sentiments are not
the same as mine: for he thought, that of all excellent constitutions,
as a good oligarchy or the like, a democracy was the worst, but of all
bad ones, the best.
Now I affirm, that all these states have, without exception, fallen into
excess; and also that he should not have said that one oligarchy was
better than another, but that it was not quite so bad. But this question
we shall not enter into at present. We shall first inquire how many
different sorts of free states there are; since there are many
species of democracies and oligarchies; and which of them is the most
comprehensive, and most desirable after the best form of government; or
if there is any other like an aristocracy, well established; and also
which of these is best adapted to most cities, and which of them is
preferable for particular persons: for, probably, some may suit better
with an oligarchy than a democracy, and others better with a democracy
than an oligarchy; and afterwards in what manner any one ought to
proceed who desires to establish either of these states, I mean every
species of democracy, and also of oligarchy. And to conclude, when we
shall have briefly gone through everything that is necessary, we will
endeavour to point out the sources of corruption, and stability, in
government, as well those which are common to all as those which are
peculiar to each state, and from what causes they chiefly arise.
CHAPTER III
The reason for there being many different sorts of governments is this,
that each state consists of a great number of parts; for, in the first
place, we see that all cities are made up of families: and again, of
the multitude of these some must be rich, some poor, and others in the
middle station; and that, both of the rich and poor, some will be used
to arms, others not. We see also, that some of the common people are
husbandmen, others attend the market, and others are artificers. There
is also a difference between the nobles in their wealth, and the dignity
in which they live: for instance, in the number of horses they breed;
for this cannot be supported without a large fortune: for which reason,
in former times, those cities whose strength consisted in horse became
by that means oligarchies; and they used horse in their expeditions
against the neighbouring cities; as the Eretrians the Chalcidians, the
Magnetians, who lived near the river Meander, and many others in Asia.
Moreover, besides the difference of fortune, there is that which arises
from family and merit; or, if there are any other distinctions [1290a]
which make part of the city, they have been already mentioned in
treating of an aristocracy, for there we considered how many parts each
city must necessarily be composed of; and sometimes each of these have a
share in the government, sometimes a few, sometimes more.
It is evident then, that there must be many forms of government,
differing from each other in their particular constitution: for the
parts of which they are composed each differ from the other. For
government is the ordering of the magistracies of the state; and these
the community share between themselves, either as they can attain them
by force, or according to some common equality which there is amongst
them, as poverty, wealth, or something which they both partake of. There
must therefore necessarily be as many different forms of governments as
there are different ranks in the society, arising from the superiority
of some over others, and their different situations. And these seem
chiefly to be two, as they say, of the winds: namely, the north and
the south; and all the others are declinations from these. And thus in
politics, there is the government of the many and the government of
the few; or a democracy and an oligarchy: for an aristocracy may be
considered as a species of oligarchy, as being also a government of the
few; and what we call a free state may be considered as a democracy: as
in the winds they consider the west as part of the north, and the east
as part of the south: and thus it is in music, according to some, who
say there are only two species of it, the Doric and the Phrygian, and
all other species of composition they call after one of these names; and
many people are accustomed to consider the nature of government in the
same light; but it is both more convenient and more correspondent to
truth to distinguish governments as I have done, into two species: one,
of those which are established upon proper principles; of which there
may be one or two sorts: the other, which includes all the different
excesses of these; so that we may compare the best form of government to
the most harmonious piece of music; the oligarchic and despotic to the
more violent tunes; and the democratic to the soft and gentle airs.
CHAPTER IV
We ought not to define a democracy as some do, who say simply, that it
is a government where the supreme power is lodged in the people; for
even in oligarchies the supreme power is in the majority. Nor should
they define an oligarchy a government where the supreme power is in the
hands of a few: for let us suppose the number of a people to be thirteen
hundred, and that of these one thousand were rich, who would not permit
the three hundred poor to have any share in the government, although
they were free, and their equal in everything else; no one would say,
that this government was a democracy. In like manner, if the poor, when
few in number, should acquire the power over the rich, though more than
themselves, no one would say, that this was an oligarchy; nor this, when
the rest who are rich have no share in the administration. We should
rather say, that a democracy is when the supreme power is in the [1290b]
hands of the freemen; an oligarchy, when it is in the hands of the rich:
it happens indeed that in the one case the many will possess it, in
the other the few; because there are many poor and few rich. And if the
power of the state was to be distributed according to the size of the
citizens, as they say it is in Ethiopia, or according to their beauty,
it would be an oligarchy: for the number of those who are large and
beautiful is small.
Nor are those things which we have already mentioned alone sufficient
to describe these states; for since there are many species both of a
democracy and an oligarchy, the matter requires further consideration;
as we cannot admit, that if a few persons who are free possess the
supreme power over the many who are not free, that this government is a
democracy: as in Apollonia, in Ionia, and in Thera: for in each of these
cities the honours of the state belong to some few particular families,
who first founded the colonies. Nor would the rich, because they are
superior in numbers, form a democracy, as formerly at Colophon; for
there the majority had large possessions before the Lydian war: but a
democracy is a state where the freemen and the poor, being the majority,