Politics: A Treatise on Government
it is better to guard against such excesses in the founding of a state,
than when they have been permitted to take place, to correct them
afterward. Those who have been guilty of crimes will be the cause of
sedition, through fear of punishment; as will those also who expect an
injury, that they may prevent it; as was the case at Rhodes, when the
nobles conspired against the people on account of the decrees they
expected would pass against them. Contempt also is a cause of sedition
and conspiracies; as in oligarchies, where there are many who have
no share in the administration. The rich also even in democracies,
despising the disorder and anarchy which will arise, hope to better
themselves by the same means which happened at Thebes after the battle
of Oenophyta, where, in consequence of bad administration, the democracy
was destroyed; as it was at Megara, where the power of the people was
lost through anarchy and disorder; the same thing happened at Syracuse
before the tyranny of Gelon; and at Rhodes there was the same sedition
before the popular government was overthrown. Revolutions in state will
also arise from a disproportionate increase; for as the body consists
of many parts, it ought to increase proportion-ably to preserve its
symmetry, which would otherwise be destroyed; as if the foot was to
be four cubits long, and the rest of the body but two palms; it might
otherwise [1303a] be changed into an animal of a different form, if it
increase beyond proportion not only in quantity, but also in disposition
of parts; so also a city consists of parts, some of which may often
increase without notice, as the number of poor in democracies and free
states. They will also sometimes happen by accident, as at Tarentum, a
little after the Median war, where so many of the nobles were killed in
a battle by the lapygi, that from a free state the government was turned
into a democracy; and at Argos, where so many of the citizens were
killed by Cleomenes the Spartan, that they were obliged to admit several
husbandmen to the freedom of the state: and at Athens, through the
unfortunate event of the infantry battles, the number of the nobles was
reduced by the soldiers being chosen from the list of citizens in
the Lacedaemonian wars. Revolutions also sometimes take place in
a democracy, though seldomer; for where the rich grow numerous or
properties increase, they become oligarchies or dynasties. Governments
also sometimes alter without seditions by a combination of the meaner
people; as at Hersea: for which purpose they changed the mode of
election from votes to lots, and thus got themselves chosen: and by
negligence, as when the citizens admit those who are not friends to
the constitution into the chief offices of the state, which happened
at Orus, when the oligarchy of the archons was put an end to at the
election of Heracleodorus, who changed that form of government into a
democratic free state. By little and little, I mean by this, that very
often great alterations silently take place in the form of government
from people's overlooking small matters; as at Ambracia, where the
census was originally small, but at last became nothing at all, as if a
little and nothing at all were nearly or entirely alike. That state
also is liable to seditions which is composed of different nations, till
their differences are blended together and undistinguishable; for as a
city cannot be composed of every multitude, so neither can it in every
given time; for which reason all those republics which have hitherto
been originally composed of different people or afterwards admitted
their neighbours to the freedom of their city, have been most liable
to revolutions; as when the Achaeans joined with the Traezenians
in founding Sybaris; for soon after, growing more powerful than the
Traezenians, they expelled them from the city; from whence came the
proverb of Sybarite wickedness: and again, disputes from a like cause
happened at Thurium between the Sybarites and those who had joined with
them in building the city; for they assuming upon these, on account of
the country being their own, were driven out. And at Byzantium the new
citizens, being detected in plots against the state, were driven out of
the city by force of arms. The Antisseans also, having taken in those
who were banished from Chios, afterwards did the same thing; and
also the Zancleans, after having taken in the people of Samos. The
Appolloniats, in the Euxine Sea, having admitted their sojourners to
the freedom of their city, were troubled with seditions: and the
Syracusians, after the expulsion of their tyrants, having enrolled
[1303b] strangers and mercenaries amongst their citizens, quarrelled
with each other and came to an open rupture: and the people of
Amphipolis, having taken in a colony of Chalcidians, were the greater
part of them driven out of the city by them. Many persons occasion
seditions in oligarchies because they think themselves ill-used in not
sharing the honours of the state with their equals, as I have already
mentioned; but in democracies the principal people do the same because
they have not more than an equal share with others who are not equal
to them. The situation of the place will also sometimes occasion
disturbances in the state when the ground is not well adapted for one
city; as at Clazomene, where the people who lived in that part of the
town called Chytrum quarrelled with them who lived in the island, and
the Colophonians with the Notians. At Athens too the disposition of the
citizens is not the same, for those who live in the Piraeus are more
attached to a popular government than those who live in the city
properly so called; for as the interposition of a rivulet, however
small, will occasion the line of the phalanx to fluctuate, so any
trifling disagreement will be the cause of seditions; but they will not
so soon flow from anything else as from the disagreement between virtue
and vice, and next to that between poverty and riches, and so on in
order, one cause having more influence than another; one of which that I
last mentioned.
CHAPTER IV
But seditions in government do not arise for little things, but from
them; for their immediate cause is something of moment. Now, trifling
quarrels are attended with the greatest consequences when they arise
between persons of the first distinction in the state, as was the
case with the Syracusians in a remote period; for a revolution in the
government was brought about by a quarrel between two young men who were
in office, upon a love affair; for one of them being absent, the other
seduced his mistress; he in his turn, offended with this, persuaded his
friend's wife to come and live with him; and upon this the whole city
took part either with the one or the other, and the government was
overturned: therefore every one at the beginning of such disputes ought
to take care to avoid the consequences; and to smother up all quarrels
which may happen to arise amongst those in power, for the mischief lies
in the beginning; for the beginning is said to be half of the business,
so that what was then but a little fault will be found afterwards to
bear its full proportion to what follows. Moreover, disputes between men
of note involve the whole city in their consequences; in Hestiaea,
after the Median war: two brothers having a dispute about their paternal
estate; he who was the poorer, from the other's having concealed part
of the effects, and some money which his father had found, engaged the
popular party on his side, while the other, who was rich, the men of
fashion. And at Delphos, [1304a] a quarrel about a wedding was the
beginning of all the seditions that afterwards arose amongst them; for
the bridegroom, being terrified by some unlucky omen upon waiting
upon the bride, went away without marrying her; which her relations
resenting, contrived secretly to convey some sacred money into his
pocket while he was sacrificing, and then killed him as an impious
person. At Mitylene also, a dispute, which arose concerning a right
of heritage, was the beginning of great evils, and a war with the
Athenians, in which Paches took their city, for Timophanes, a man
of fortune, leaving two daughters, Doxander, who was circumvented in
procuring them in marriage for his two sons, began a sedition, and
excited the Athenians to attack them, being the host of that state.
There was also a dispute at Phocea, concerning a right of inheritance,
between Mnasis, the father of Mnasis, and Euthucrates, the father of
Onomarchus, which brought on the Phoceans the sacred war. The government
too of Epidamnus was changed from a quarrel that arose from an intended
marriage; for a certain man having contracted his daughter in marriage,
the father of the young person to whom she was contracted, being archon,
punishes him, upon which account he, resenting the affront, associated
himself with those who were excluded from any share in the government,
and brought about a revolution. A government may be changed either into
an oligarchy, democracy, or a free state; when the magistrates, or any
part of the city acquire great credit, or are increased in power, as the
court of Areopagus at Athens, having procured great credit during the
Median war, added firmness to their administration; and, on the other
hand, the maritime force, composed of the commonalty, having gained the
victory at Salamis, by their power at sea, got the lead in the state,
and strengthened the popular party: and at Argos, the nobles,
having gained great credit by the battle of Mantinea against the
Lacedaemonians, endeavoured to dissolve the democracy. And at Syracuse,
the victory in their war with the Athenians being owing to the common
people, they changed their free state into a democracy: and at Chalcis,
the people having taken off the tyrant Phocis, together with the nobles,
immediately seized the government: and at Ambracia also the people,
having expelled the tyrant Periander, with his party, placed the
supreme power in themselves. And this in general ought to be known,
that whosoever has been the occasion of a state being powerful, whether
private persons, or magistrates, a certain tribe, or any particular part
of the citizens, or the multitude, be they who they will, will be the
cause of disputes in the state. For either some persons, who envy them
the honours they have acquired, will begin to be seditious, or they,
on account of the dignity they have acquired, will not be content with
their former equality. A state is also liable to commotions when those
parts of it which seem to be opposite to each other approach to an
[1304b] equality, as the rich and the common people; so that the part
which is between them both is either nothing at all, or too little to be
noticed; for if one party is so much more powerful than the other, as
to be evidently stronger, that other will not be willing to hazard the
danger: for which reason those who are superior in excellence and virtue
will never be the cause of seditions; for they will be too few for that
purpose when compared to the many. In general, the beginning and the
causes of seditions in all states are such as I have now described, and
revolutions therein are brought about in two ways, either by violence or
fraud: if by violence, either at first by compelling them to submit to
the change when it is made. It may also be brought about by fraud in
two different ways, either when the people, being at first deceived,
willingly consent to an alteration in their government, and are
afterwards obliged by force to abide by it: as, for instance, when the
four hundred imposed upon the people by telling them that the king
of Persia would supply them with money for the war against the