Politics: A Treatise on Government
Lacedaemonians; and after they had been guilty of this falsity, they
endeavoured to keep possession of the supreme power; or when they are
at first persuaded and afterwards consent to be governed: and by one of
these methods which I have mentioned are all revolutions in governments
brought about.
CHAPTER V
We ought now to inquire into those events which will arise from these
causes in every species of government. Democracies will be most subject
to revolutions from the dishonesty of their demagogues; for partly, by
informing against men of property, they induce them to join together
through self-defence, for a common fear will make the greatest enemies
unite; and partly by setting the common people against them: and this is
what any one may continually see practised in many states. In the island
of Cos, for instance, the democracy was subverted by the wickedness
of the demagogues, for the nobles entered into a combination with
each other. And at Rhodes the demagogues, by distributing of bribes,
prevented the people from paying the trierarchs what was owing to them,
who were obliged by the number of actions they were harassed with to
conspire together and destroy the popular state. The same thing was
brought about at Heraclea, soon after the settlement of the city, by
the same persons; for the citizens of note, being ill treated by them,
quitted the city, but afterwards joining together they returned and
overthrew the popular state. Just in the same manner the democracy
was destroyed in Megara; for there the demagogues, to procure money by
confiscations, drove out the nobles, till the number of those who were
banished was considerable, who, [1305a] returning, got the better of the
people in a battle, and established an oligarchy. The like happened at
Cume, during the time of the democracy, which Thrasymachus destroyed;
and whoever considers what has happened in other states may perceive the
same revolutions to have arisen from the same causes. The demagogues,
to curry favour with the people, drive the nobles to conspire together,
either by dividing their estates, or obliging them to spend them on
public services, or by banishing them, that they may confiscate the
fortunes of the wealthy. In former times, when the same person was both
demagogue and general, the democracies were changed into tyrannies; and
indeed most of the ancient tyrannies arose from those states: a reason
for which then subsisted, but not now; for at that time the demagogues
were of the soldiery; for they were not then powerful by their
eloquence; but, now the art of oratory is cultivated, the able speakers
are at present the demagogues; but, as they are unqualified to act in
a military capacity, they cannot impose themselves on the people as
tyrants, if we except in one or two trifling instances. Formerly, too,
tyrannies were more common than now, on account of the very extensive
powers with which some magistrates were entrusted: as the prytanes at
Miletus; for they were supreme in many things of the last consequence;
and also because at that time the cities were not of that very great
extent, the people in general living in the country, and being employed
in husbandry, which gave them, who took the lead in public affairs, an
opportunity, if they had a turn for war, to make themselves tyrants;
which they all did when they had gained the confidence of the people;
and this confidence was their hatred to the rich. This was the case of
Pisistratus at Athens, when he opposed the Pediaci: and of Theagenes in
Megara, who slaughtered the cattle belonging to the rich, after he
had seized those who kept them by the riverside. Dionysius also, for
accusing Daphnseus and the rich, was thought worthy of being raised to a
tyranny, from the confidence which the people had of his being a popular
man in consequence of these enmities. A government shall also alter from
its ancient and approved democratic form into one entirely new, if
there is no census to regulate the election of magistrates; for, as the
election is with the people, the demagogues who are desirous of being in
office, to flatter them, will endeavour with all their power to make the
people superior even to the laws. To prevent this entirely, or at least
in a great measure, the magistrates should be elected by the tribes, and
not by the people at large. These are nearly the revolutions to which
democracies are liable, and also the causes from whence they arise.
CHAPTER VI
There are two things which of all others most evidently occasion a
revolution in an oligarchy; one is, when the people are ill used, for
then every individual is ripe for [1305b] sedition; more particularly if
one of the oligarchy should happen to be their leader; as Lygdamis, at
Naxus, who was afterwards tyrant of that island. Seditions also which
arise from different causes will differ from each other; for sometimes
a revolution is brought about by the rich who have no share in the
administration, which is in the hands of a very few indeed: and this
happened at Massilia, Ister, Heraclea, and other cities; for those who
had no share in the government ceased not to raise disputes till they
were admitted to it: first the elder brothers, and then the younger
also: for in some places the father and son are never in office at the
same time; in others the elder and younger brother: and where this is
observed the oligarchy partakes something of a free state. At Ister it
was changed into a democracy; in Heraclea, instead of being in the
hands of a few, it consisted of six hundred. At Cnidus the oligarchy
was destroyed by the nobles quarrelling with each other, because the
government was in the hands of so few: for there, as we have just
mentioned, if the father was in office, the son could not; or, if there
were many brothers, the eldest only; for the people, taking advantage of
their disputes, elected one of the nobles for their general, and got the
victory: for where there are seditions government is weak. And formerly
at Erithria, during the oligarchy of the Basilides, although the state
flourished greatly under their excellent management, yet because the
people were displeased that the power should be in the hands of so
few, they changed the government. Oligarchies also are subject to
revolutions, from those who are in office therein, from the quarrels of
the demagogues with each other. The demagogues are of two sorts; one
who flatter the few when they are in power: for even these have their
demagogues; such was Charicles at Athens, who had great influence over
the thirty; and, in the same manner, Phrynichus over the four hundred.
The others are those demagogues who have a share in the oligarchy,
and flatter the people: such were the state-guardians at Larissa, who
flattered the people because they were elected by them. And this will
always happen in every oligarchy where the magistrates do not elect
themselves, but are chosen out of men either of great fortune or certain
ranks, by the soldiers or by the people; as was the custom at Abydos.
And when the judicial department is not in the hands of the supreme
power, the demagogues, favouring the people in their causes, overturn
the government; which happened at Heraclea in Pontus: and also when
some desire to contract the power of the oligarchy into fewer hands; for
those who endeavour to support an equality are obliged to apply to the
people for assistance. An oligarchy is also subject to revolutions
when the nobility spend their fortunes by luxury; for such persons are
desirous of innovations, and either endeavour to be tyrants themselves
or to support others in being so, as [1306a] Hypparinus supported
Dionysius of Syracuse. And at Amphipolis one Cleotimus collected a
colony of Chalcidians, and when they came set them to quarrel with
the rich: and at AEgina a certain person who brought an action against
Chares attempted on that account to alter the government. Sometimes they
will try to raise commotions, sometimes they will rob the public, and
then quarrel with each other, or else fight with those who endeavour
to detect them; which was the case at Apollonia in Pontus. But if the
members of an oligarchy agree among themselves the state is not very
easily destroyed without some external force. Pharsalus is a proof of
this, where, though the place is small, yet the citizens have great
power, from the prudent use they make of it. An oligarchy also will be
destroyed when they create another oligarchy under it; that is, when the
management of public affairs is in the hands of a few, and not equally,
but when all of them do not partake of the supreme power, as happened
once at Elis, where the supreme power in general was in the hands of a
very few out of whom a senate was chosen, consisting but of ninety, who
held their places for life; and their mode of election was calculated to
preserve the power amongst each other's families, like the senators at
Lacedaemon. An oligarchy is liable to a revolution both in time of
war and peace; in war, because through a distrust in the citizens the
government is obliged to employ mercenary troops, and he to whom they
give the command of the army will very often assume the tyranny, as
Timophanes did at Corinth; and if they appoint more than one general,
they will very probably establish a dynasty: and sometimes, through fear
of this, they are forced to let the people in general have some share in
the government, because they are obliged to employ them. In peace,
from their want of confidence in each other, they will entrust the
guardianship of the state to mercenaries and their general, who will
be an arbiter between them, and sometimes become master of both, which
happened at Larissa, when Simos and the Aleuadae had the chief power.
The same thing happened at Abydos, during the time of the political
clubs, of which Iphiades' was one. Commotions also will happen in an
oligarchy from one party's overbearing and insulting another, or
from their quarrelling about their law-suits or marriages. How their
marriages, for instance, will have that effect has been already shown:
and in Eretria, Diagoras destroyed the oligarchy of the knights upon the
same account. A sedition also arose at Heraclea, from a certain person
being condemned by the court; and at Thebes, in consequence of a man's
being guilty of adultery; [1306b] the punishment indeed which Eurytion
suffered at Heraclea was just, yet it was illegally executed: as was
that at Thebes upon Archias; for their enemies endeavoured to have them
publicly bound in the pillory. Many revolutions also have been brought
about in oligarchies by those who could not brook the despotism which
those persons assumed who were in power, as at Cnidus and Chios. Changes
also may happen by accident in what we call a free state and in an
oligarchy; wheresoever the senators, judges, and magistrates are chosen
according to a certain census; for it often happens that the highest
census is fixed at first; so that a few only could have a share in
the government, in an oligarchy, or in a free state those of moderate
fortunes only; when the city grows rich, through peace or some other
happy cause, it becomes so little that every one's fortune is equal to
the census, so that the whole community may partake of all the honours
of government; and this change sometimes happens by little and little,
and insensible approaches, sometimes quicker. These are the revolutions
and seditions that arise in oligarchies, and the causes to which they
are owing: and indeed both democracies and oligarchies sometimes alter,
not into governments of a contrary form, but into those of the same
government; as, for instance, from having the supreme power in the law
to vest it in the ruling party, or the contrariwise.