Politics: A Treatise on Government
CHAPTER VII
Commotions also arise in aristocracies, from there being so few persons
in power (as we have already observed they do in oligarchies, for in
this particular an aristocracy is most near an oligarchy, for in both
these states the administration of public affairs is in the hands of
a few; not that this arises from the same cause in both, though herein
they chiefly seem alike): and these will necessarily be most likely to
happen when the generality of the people are high-spirited and think
themselves equal to each other in merit; such were those at Lacedasmon,
called the Partheniae (for these were, as well as others, descendants
of citizens), who being detected in a conspiracy against the state, were
sent to found Tarentum. They will happen also when some great men are
disgraced by those who have received higher honours than themselves, to
whom they are no ways inferior in abilities, as Lysander by the kings:
or when an ambitious man cannot get into power, as Cinadon, who, in the
reign of Agesilaus, was chief in a conspiracy against the Spartans:
and also when some are too poor and others too rich, which will most
frequently happen in time of war; as at Lacedaemon during the Messenian
war, which is proved by a poem of Tyrtaeus, [1307a] called "Eunomia;"
for some persons being reduced thereby, desired that the lands might
be divided: and also when some person of very high rank might still be
higher if he could rule alone, which seemed to be Pausanias's intention
at Lacedaemon, when he was their general in the Median war, and Anno's
at Carthage. But free states and aristocracies are mostly destroyed from
want of a fixed administration of public affairs; the cause of which
evil arises at first from want of a due mixture of the democratic and
the oligarchic parts in a free state; and in an aristocracy from the
same causes, and also from virtue not being properly joined to power;
but chiefly from the two first, I mean the undue mixture of the
democratic and oligarchic parts; for these two are what all free
states endeavour to blend together, and many of those which we call
aristocracies, in this particular these states differ from each other,
and on this account the one of them is less stable than the other, for
that state which inclines most to an oligarchy is called an aristocracy,
and that which inclines most to a democracy is called a free state; on
which account this latter is more secure than the former, for the wider
the foundation the securer the building, and it is ever best to live
where equality prevails. But the rich, if the community gives them rank,
very often endeavour to insult and tyrannise over others. On the whole,
whichever way a government inclines, in that it will settle, each party
supporting their own. Thus a free state will become a democracy; an
aristocracy an oligarchy; or the contrary, an aristocracy may change
into a democracy (for the poor, if they think themselves injured,
directly take part with the contrary side) and a free state into an
oligarchy. The only firm state is that where every one enjoys that
equality he has a right to and fully possesses what is his own. And what
I have been speaking of happened to the Thurians; for the magistrates
being elected according to a very high census, it was altered to a
lower, and they were subdivided into more courts, but in consequence of
the nobles possessing all the land, contrary to law; the state was too
much of an oligarchy, which gave them an opportunity of encroaching
greatly on the rest of the people; but these, after they had been well
inured to war, so far got the better of their guards as to expel every
one out of the country who possessed more than he ought. Moreover, as
all aristocracies are free oligarchies, the nobles therein endeavour to
have rather too much power, as at Lacedaemon, where property is now in
the hands of a few, and the nobles have too much liberty to do as they
please and make such alliances as they please. Thus the city of the
Locrians was ruined from an alliance with Dionysius; which state was
neither a democracy nor well-tempered aristocracy. But an aristocracy
chiefly approaches to a secret change by its being destroyed by degrees,
as we [1307b] have already said of all governments in general; and this
happens from the cause of the alteration being trifling; for whenever
anything which in the least regards the state is treated with contempt,
after that something else, and this of a little more consequence, will
be more easily altered, until the whole fabric of government is entirely
subverted, which happened in the government of Thurium; for the law
being that they should continue soldiers for five years, some young
men of a martial disposition, who were in great esteem amongst their
officers, despising those who had the management of public affairs,
and imagining they could easily accomplish their intention, first
endeavoured to abolish this law, with a view of having it lawful to
continue the same person perpetually in the military, perceiving that
the people would readily appoint them. Upon this, the magistrates who
are called counselors first joined together with an intention to oppose
it but were afterwards induced to agree to it, from a belief that if
that law was not repealed they would permit the management of all other
public affairs to remain in their hands; but afterwards, when they
endeavoured to restrain some fresh alterations that were making, they
found that they could do nothing, for the whole form of government was
altered into a dynasty of those who first introduced the innovations. In
short, all governments are liable to be destroyed either from within or
from without; from without when they have for their neighbour a state
whose policy is contrary to theirs, and indeed if it has great power the
same thing will happen if it is not their neighbour; of which both
the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians are a proof; for the one,
when conquerors everywhere destroyed the oligarchies; the other the
democracies. These are the chief causes of revolutions and dissensions
in governments.
CHAPTER VIII
We are now to consider upon what the preservation of governments in
general and of each state in particular depends; and, in the first
place, it is evident that if we are right in the causes we have assigned
for their destruction, we know also the means of their preservation; for
things contrary produce contraries: but destruction and preservation are
contrary to each other. In well-tempered governments it requires as much
care as anything whatsoever, that nothing be done contrary to law: and
this ought chiefly to be attended to in matters of small consequence;
for an illegality that approaches insensibly, approaches secretly, as in
a family small expenses continually repeated consume a man's income;
for the understanding is deceived thereby, as by this false argument; if
every part is little, then the whole is little: now, this in one sense
is true, in another is false, for the whole and all the parts together
are large, though made up of small parts. The first therefore of
anything is what the state ought to guard against. In the next place,
no credit ought to be given to those who endeavour to deceive the people
with false pretences; for they will be [1308a] confuted by facts. The
different ways in which they will attempt to do this have been already
mentioned. You may often perceive both aristocracies and oligarchies
continuing firm, not from the stability of their forms of government,
but from the wise conduct of the magistrates, both towards those who
have a part in the management of public affairs, and those also who
have not: towards those who have not, by never injuring them; and also
introducing those who are of most consequence amongst them into office;
nor disgracing those who are desirous of honour; or encroaching on the
property of individuals; towards those who have, by behaving to each
other upon an equality; for that equality which the favourers of a
democracy desire to have established in the state is not only just,
but convenient also, amongst those who are of the same rank: for which
reason, if the administration is in the hands of many, those rules which
are established in democracies will be very useful; as to let no one
continue in office longer than six months: that all those who are of
the same rank may have their turn; for between these there is a sort
of democracy: for which reason demagogues are most likely to arise up
amongst them, as we have already mentioned: besides, by this means both
aristocracies and democracies will be the less liable to be corrupted
into dynasties, because it will not be so easy for those who are
magistrates for a little to do as much mischief as they could in a
long time: for it is from hence that tyrannies arise in democracies
and oligarchies; for either those who are most powerful in each state
establish a tyranny, as the demagogues in the one, the dynasties in the
other, or the chief magistrates who have been long in power. Governments
are sometimes preserved not only by having the means of their corruption
at a great distance, but also by its being very near them; for those who
are alarmed at some impending evil keep a stricter hand over the state;
for which reason it is necessary for those who have the guardianship of
the constitution to be able to awaken the fears of the people, that they
may preserve it, and not like a night-guard to be remiss in protecting
the state, but to make the distant danger appear at hand. Great care
ought also to be used to endeavour to restrain the quarrels and disputes
of the nobles by laws, as well as to prevent those who are not already
engaged in them from taking a part therein; for to perceive an evil
at its very first approach is not the lot of every one, but of the
politician. To prevent any alteration taking place in an oligarchy or
free state on account of the census, if that happens to continue the
same while the quantity of money is increased, it will be useful to take
a general account of the whole amount of it in former times, to compare
it with the present, and to do this every year in those cities where the
census is yearly, [1308b] in larger communities once in three or five
years; and if the whole should be found much larger or much less than it
was at the time when the census was first established in the state,
let there be a law either to extend or contract it, doing both these
according to its increase or decrease; if it increases making the census
larger, if it decreases smaller: and if this latter is not done in
oligarchies and free states, you will have a dynasty arise in the one,
an oligarchy in the other: if the former is not, free states will
be changed into democracies, and oligarchies into free states or
democracies. It is a general maxim in democracies, oligarchies,
monarchies, and indeed in all governments, not to let any one acquire a
rank far superior to the rest of the community, but rather to endeavour
to confer moderate honours for a continuance than great ones for a short
time; for these latter spoil men, for it is not every one who can bear
prosperity: but if this rule is not observed, let not those honours
which were conferred all at once be all at once taken away, but rather
by degrees. But, above all things, let this regulation be made by the
law, that no one shall have too much power, either by means of his
fortune or friends; but if he has, for his excess therein, let it be
contrived that he shall quit the country. Now, as many persons promote
innovations, that they may enjoy their own particular manner of living,
there ought to be a particular officer to inspect the manners of every