Politics: A Treatise on Government
one, and see that these are not contrary to the genius of the state
in which he lives, whether it may be an oligarchy, a democracy, or any
other form of government; and, for the same reason, those should be
guarded against who are most prosperous in the city: the means of doing
which is by appointing those who are otherwise to the business and the
offices of the state. I mean, to oppose men of account to the common
people, the poor to the rich, and to blend both these into one body, and
to increase the numbers of those who are in the middle rank; and
this will prevent those seditions which arise from an inequality of
condition. But above all, in every state it is necessary, both by the
laws and every other method possible, to prevent those who are employed
by the public from being venal, and this particularly in an oligarchy;
for then the people will not be so much displeased from seeing
themselves excluded from a share in the government (nay, they will
rather be glad to have leisure to attend their private affairs) as at
suspecting that the officers of the state steal the public money, then
indeed they are afflicted with double concern, both because they are
deprived of the honours of the state, and pillaged by those who enjoy
them. There is one method of blending together a democracy and an
aristocracy, [1309a] if office brought no profit; by which means both
the rich and the poor will enjoy what they desire; for to admit all to
a share in the government is democratical; that the rich should be
in office is aristocratical. This must be done by letting no public
employment whatsoever be attended with any emolument; for the poor will
not desire to be in office when they can get nothing by it, but had
rather attend to their own affairs: but the rich will choose it, as
they want nothing of the community. Thus the poor will increase their
fortunes by being wholly employed in their own concerns; and the
principal part of the people will not be governed by the lower sort.
To prevent the exchequer from being defrauded, let all public money be
delivered out openly in the face of the whole city, and let copies of
the accounts be deposited in the different wards tribes, and divisions.
But, as the magistrates are to execute their offices without any
advantages, the law ought to provide proper honours for those who
execute them well. In democracies also it is necessary that the rich
should be protected, by not permitting their lands to be divided, nor
even the produce of them, which in some states is done unperceivably. It
would be also better if the people would prevent them when they offer to
exhibit a number of unnecessary and yet expensive public entertainments
of plays, music, processions, and the like. In an oligarchy it is
necessary to take great care of the poor, and allot them public
employments which are gainful; and, if any of the rich insult them, to
let their punishment be severer than if they insulted one of their own
rank; and to let estates pass by affinity, and not gift: nor to permit
any person to have more than one; for by this means property will be
more equally divided, and the greater part of the poor get into better
circumstances. It is also serviceable in a democracy and an oligarchy
to allot those who take no part in public affairs an equality or a
preference in other things; the rich in a democracy, to the poor in an
oligarchy: but still all the principal offices in the state to be filled
only by those who are best qualified to discharge them.
CHAPTER IX
There are three qualifications necessary for those who fill the
first departments in government; first of all, an affection for the
established constitution; second place, abilities every way completely
equal to the business of their office; in the third, virtue and justice
correspondent to the nature of that particular state they are placed in;
for if justice is not the same in all states, it is evident that there
must be different species thereof. There may be some doubt, when all
these qualifications do not in the same persons, in what manner the
choice shall be made; as for instance, suppose that one person is
an accomplished general, but a bad man and no friend to the [1309b]
constitution; another is just and a friend to it, which shall one
prefer? we should then consider of two qualities, which of them the
generality possess in a greater degree, which in a less; for which
reason in the choice of a general we should regard his courage more than
his virtue as the more uncommon quality; as there are fewer capable of
conducting an army than there are good men: but, to protect the state
or manage the finances, the contrary rule should be followed; for these
require greater virtue than the generality are possessed of, but only
that knowledge which is common to all. It may be asked, if a man has
abilities equal to his appointment in the state, and is affectionate to
the constitution, what occasion is there for being virtuous, since
these two things alone are sufficient to enable him to be useful to
the public? it is, because those who possess those qualities are often
deficient in prudence; for, as they often neglect their own affairs,
though they know them and love themselves, so nothing will prevent their
serving the public in the same manner. In short, whatsoever the laws
contain which we allow to be useful to the state contributes to its
preservation: but its first and principal support is (as has been often
insisted upon) to have the number of those who desire to preserve it
greater than those who wish to destroy it. Above all things that ought
not to be forgotten which many governments now corrupted neglect;
namely, to preserve a mean. For many things seemingly favourable to a
democracy destroy a democracy, and many things seemingly favourable to
an oligarchy destroy an oligarchy. Those who think this the only virtue
extend it to excess, not considering that as a nose which varies a
little from perfect straightness, either towards a hook nose or a
flat one, may yet be beautiful and agreeable to look at; but if this
particularity is extended beyond measure, first of all the properties of
the part is lost, but at last it can hardly be admitted to be a nose at
all, on account of the excess of the rise or sinking: thus it is with
other parts of the human body; so also the same thing is true with
respect to states; for both an oligarchy and a democracy may something
vary from their most perfect form and yet be well constituted; but if
any one endeavours to extend either of them too far, at first he will
make the government the worse for it, but at last there will be no
government at all remaining. The lawgiver and the politician therefore
should know well what preserves and what destroys a democracy or an
oligarchy, for neither the one nor the other can possibly continue
without rich and poor: but that whenever an entire equality of
circumstances [1310a] prevails, the state must necessarily become of
another form; so that those who destroy these laws, which authorise an
inequality in property, destroy the government. It is also an error in
democracies for the demagogues to endeavour to make the common people
superior to the laws; and thus by setting them at variance with the
rich, dividing one city into two; whereas they ought rather to speak
in favour of the rich. In oligarchies, on the contrary, it is wrong to
support those who are in administration against the people. The oaths
also which they take in an oligarchy ought to be contrary to what they
now are; for, at present, in some places they swear, "I will be adverse
to the common people, and contrive all I can against them;" whereas they
ought rather to suppose and pretend the contrary; expressing in their
oaths, that they will not injure the people. But of all things which I
have mentioned, that which contributes most to preserve the state is,
what is now most despised, to educate your children for the state; for
the most useful laws, and most approved by every statesman, will be of
no service if the citizens are not accustomed to and brought up in
the principles of the constitution; of a democracy, if that is by law
established; of an oligarchy, if that is; for if there are bad morals
in one man, there are in the city. But to educate a child fit for the
state, it must not be done in the manner which would please either those
who have the power in an oligarchy or those who desire a democracy, but
so as they may be able to conduct either of these forms of governments.
But now the children of the magistrates in an oligarchy are brought up
too delicately, and the children of the poor hardy with exercise
and labour; so that they are both desirous of and able to promote
innovations. In democracies of the purest form they pursue a method
which is contrary to their welfare; the reason of which is, that they
define liberty wrong: now, there are two things which seem to be the
objects of a democracy, that the people in general should possess the
supreme power, and all enjoy freedom; for that which is just seems to
be equal, and what the people think equal, that is a law: now, their
freedom and equality consists in every one's doing what they please:
that is in such a democracy every one may live as he likes; "as his
inclination guides," in the words of Euripides: but this is wrong, for
no one ought to think it slavery to live in subjection to government,
but protection. Thus I have mentioned the causes of corruption in
different states, and the means of their preservation.
CHAPTER X
It now remains that we speak of monarchies, their causes of corruption,
and means of preservation; and indeed almost the same things which have
been said of other governments happen to kingdoms and tyrannies; for a
kingdom partakes of an aristocracy, a tyranny of the worst species of an
oligarchy and democracy; for which reason it is the worst that man
can submit to, as being composed of two, both of which are bad, and
collectively retains all the corruptions and all the defects of both
these states. These two species of monarchies arise from principles
contrary to each other: a kingdom is formed to protect the better sort
of people against the multitude, and kings are appointed out of those,
who are chosen either for their superior virtue and actions flowing from
virtuous principles, or else from their noble descent; but a tyrant is
chosen out of the meanest populace; an enemy to the better sort, that
the common people may not be oppressed by them. That this is true
experience convinces us; for the generality of tyrants were indeed mere
demagogues, who gained credit with the people by oppressing the nobles.
Some tyrannies were established in this manner after the cities were
considerably enlarged--others before that time, by kings who exceeded
the power which their country allowed them, from a desire of governing
despotically: others were founded by those who were elected to the
superior offices in the state; for formerly the people appointed
officers for life, who came to be at the head of civil and religious
affairs, and these chose one out of their body in whom the supreme power
over all the magistrates was placed. By all these means it was easy
to establish a tyranny, if they chose it; for their power was ready at
hand, either by their being kings, or else by enjoying the honours of
the state; thus Phidon at Argos and other tyrants enjoyed originally the
kingly power; Phalaris and others in Ionia, the honours of the state.
Pansetius at Leontium, Cypselus at Corinth, Pisistratus at Athens,
Dionysius at Syracuse, and others, acquired theirs by having been
demagogues. A kingdom, as we have said, partakes much of the nature of