Politics: A Treatise on Government
him who governs them, and that the one party should not have it in their
power to injure the other; but that the tyrant should attach to himself
that party which is the most powerful; which, if he does, he will have
no occasion either to make his slaves free, or to deprive citizens of
their arms; for the strength of either of the parties added to his
own forces will render him superior to any conspiracy. It would be
superfluous to go through all particulars; for the rule of conduct which
the tyrant ought to pursue is evident enough, and that is, to affect to
appear not the tyrant, but the king; the guardian of those he governs,
not their plunderer, [1315b] but their protector, and to affect
the middle rank in life, not one superior to all others: he should,
therefore, associate his nobles with him and soothe his people; for his
government will not only be necessarily more honourable and worthy of
imitation, as it will be over men of worth, and not abject wretches who
perpetually both hate and fear him; but it will be also more durable.
Let him also frame his life so that his manners may be consentaneous
to virtue, or at least let half of them be so, that he may not be
altogether wicked, but only so in part.
CHAPTER XII
Indeed an oligarchy and a tyranny are of all governments of the shortest
duration. The tyranny of Orthagoras and his family at Sicyon, it is
true, continued longer than any other: the reason for which was, that
they used their power with moderation, and were in many particulars
obedient to the laws; and, as Clisthenes was an able general, he never
fell into contempt, and by the care he took that in many particulars his
government should be popular. He is reported also to have presented a
person with a crown who adjudged the victory to another; and some say
that it is the statue of that judge which is placed in the forum.
They say also, that Pisistratus submitted to be summoned into the court
of the Areopagites. The second that we shall mention is the tyranny of
the Cypselidse, at Corinth, which continued seventy-seven years and
six months; for Cypselus was tyrant there thirty years, Periander
forty-four, and Psammetichus, the son of Georgias, three years; the
reason for which was, that Cypselus was a popular man, and governed
without guards. Periander indeed ruled like a tyrant, but then he was an
able general. The third was that of the Pisistradidae at Athens; but it
was not continual: for Pisistratus himself was twice expelled; so that
out of thirty-three years he was only fifteen in power, and his son
eighteen; so that the whole time was thirty-three years. Of the rest
we shall mention that of Hiero, and Gelo at Syracuse; and this did not
continue long, for both their reigns were only eighteen years; for
Gelo died in the eighth year of his tyranny, and Hiero in his tenth.
Thrasybulus fell in his eleventh month, and many other tyrannies have
continued a very short time. We have now gone through the general cases
of corruption and [1316a] means of preservation both in free states and
monarchies. In Plato's Republic, Socrates is introduced treating upon
the changes which different governments are liable to: but his discourse
is faulty; for he does not particularly mention what changes the best
and first governments are liable to; for he only assigns the general
cause, of nothing being immutable, but that in time everything will
alter [***tr.: text is unintelligible here***] he conceives that nature
will then produce bad men, who will not submit to education, and in
this, probably, he is not wrong; for it is certain that there are some
persons whom it is impossible by any education to make good men; but
why should this change be more peculiar to what he calls the best-formed
government, than to all other forms, and indeed to all other things
that exist? and in respect to his assigned time, as the cause of the
alteration of all things, we find that those which did not begin
to exist at the same time cease to be at the same time; so that, if
anything came into beginning the day before the solstice, it must alter
at the same time. Besides, why should such a form of government be
changed into the Lacedaemonian? for, in general, when governments alter,
they alter into the contrary species to what they before were, and
not into one like their former. And this reasoning holds true of other
changes; for he says, that from the Lacedaemonian form it changes into
an oligarchy, and from thence into a democracy, and from a democracy
into a tyranny: and sometimes a contrary change takes place, as from a
democracy into an oligarchy, rather than into a monarchy. With respect
to a tyranny he neither says whether there will be any change in it; or
if not, to what cause it will be owing; or if there is, into what other
state it will alter: but the reason of this is, that a tyranny is an
indeterminate government; and, according to him, every state ought to
alter into the first, and most perfect, thus the continuity and circle
would be preserved. But one tyranny often changed into another; as
at Syria, from Myron's to Clisthenes'; or into an oligarchy, as was
Antileo's at Chalcas; or into a democracy, as was Gelo's at Syracuse; or
into an aristocracy, as was Charilaus's at Lacedaemon, and at Carthage.
An oligarchy is also changed into a tyranny; such was the rise of most
of the ancient tyrannies in Sicily; at Leontini, into the tyranny of
Panaetius; at Gela, into that of Cleander; at Rhegium into that of
Anaxilaus; and the like in many other cities. It is absurd also to
suppose, that a state is changed into an oligarchy because those who are
in power are avaricious and greedy of money, and not because those who
are by far richer than their fellow citizens think it unfair that those
who have nothing should have an equal share in the rule of the state
with themselves, who possess so much-for in many oligarchies it is not
allowable to be employed in money-getting, and there are many laws to
prevent it. But in Carthage, which is a democracy, money-getting is
creditable, and yet their form of government remains unaltered. It is
also absurd to say, that in an oligarchy there are two cities, one of
the poor and another of the rich; for why should this happen to them
more than to the Lacedaemonians, or any other state where all possess
not equal property, or where all are not equally good? for though no
one member of the community should be poorer than he was before, yet
a democracy might nevertheless change into an oligarchy; if the rich
should be more powerful than the poor, and the one too negligent, and
the other attentive: and though these changes are owing to many causes,
yet he mentions but one only, that the citizens become poor by luxury,
and paying interest-money; as if at first they were all rich, or the
greater part of them: but this is not so, but when some of those who
have the principal management of public affairs lose their fortunes,
they will endeavour to bring about a revolution; but when others do,
nothing of consequence will follow, nor when such states do alter is
there any more reason for their altering into a democracy than any
other. Besides, though some of the members of the community may not have
spent their fortunes, yet if they share not in the honours of the state,
or if they are ill-used and insulted, they will endeavour to raise
seditions, and bring about a revolution, that they may be allowed to do
as they like; which, Plato says, arises from too much liberty. Although
there are many oligarchies and democracies, yet Socrates, when he is
treating of the changes they may undergo, speaks of them as if there was
but one of each sort.
BOOK VI
CHAPTER I
We have already shown what is the nature of the supreme council in the
state, and wherein one may differ from another, and how the different
magistrates should be regulated; and also the judicial department, and
what is best suited to what state; and also to what causes both the
destruction and preservation of governments are owing.
As there are very many species of democracies, as well as of other
states, it will not be amiss to consider at the same time anything which
we may have omitted to mention concerning either of them, and to allot
to each that mode of conduct which is peculiar to and advantageous for
them; and also to inquire into the combinations of all these different
modes of government which we [1317a] have mentioned; for as these are
blended together the government is altered, as from an aristocracy to
be an oligarchy, and from a free state to be a democracy. Now, I mean
by those combinations of government (which I ought to examine into, but
have not yet done), namely, whether the deliberative department and the
election of magistrates is regulated in a manner correspondent to an
oligarchy, or the judicial to an aristocracy, or the deliberative part
only to an oligarchy, and the election of magistrates to an aristocracy,
or whether, in any other manner, everything is not regulated according
to the nature of the government. But we will first consider what
particular sort of democracy is fitted to a particular city, and also
what particular oligarchy to a particular people; and of other states,
what is advantageous to what. It is also necessary to show clearly, not
only which of these governments is best for a state, but also how
it ought to be established there, and other things we will treat of
briefly.
And first, we will speak of a democracy; and this will at the same
time show clearly the nature of its opposite which some persons call
an oligarchy; and in doing this we must examine into all the parts of
a democracy, and everything that is connected therewith; for from the
manner in which these are compounded together different species of
democracies arise: and hence it is that they are more than one, and of
various natures. Now, there are two causes which occasion there being so
many democracies; one of which is that which we have already mentioned;
namely, there being different sorts of people; for in one country the
majority are husbandmen, in another mechanics, and hired servants; if
the first of these is added to the second, and the third to both of
them, the democracy will not only differ in the particular of better or
worse, but in this, that it will be no longer the same government; the
other is that which we will now speak of. The different things which are
connected with democracies and seem to make part of these states, do,
from their being joined to them, render them different from others: this
attending a few, that more, and another all. It is necessary that he who
would found any state which he may happen to approve of, or correct one,
should be acquainted with all these particulars. All founders of states
endeavour to comprehend within their own plan everything of nearly the
same kind with it; but in doing this they err, in the manner I have
already described in treating of the preservation and destruction of
governments. I will now speak of these first principles and manners, and
whatever else a democratical state requires.
CHAPTER II
Now the foundation of a democratical state is liberty, and people have
been accustomed to say this as if here only liberty was to be found; for
they affirm that this is the end proposed by every democracy. But one
part of liberty is to govern and be governed alternately; for, according
to democratical justice, equality is measured by numbers, and not by
worth: and this being just, it is necessary that the supreme power
should be vested in the people at large; and that what the majority
determine should be final: so that in a democracy the poor ought to have
more power than the rich, as being the greater number; for this is one