Politics: A Treatise on Government
mark of liberty which all framers of a democracy lay down as a criterion
of that state; another is, to live as every one likes; for this, they
say, is a right which liberty gives, since he is a slave who must live
as he likes not. This, then, is another criterion of a democracy. Hence
arises the claim to be under no command whatsoever to any one, upon any
account, any otherwise than by rotation, and that just as far only as
that person is, in his turn, under his also. This also is conducive to
that equality which liberty demands. These things being premised, and
such being the government, it follows that such rules as the following
should be observed in it, that all the magistrates should be chosen out
of all the people, and all to command each, and each in his turn all:
that all the magistrates should be chosen by lot, except to those
offices only which required some particular knowledge and skill: that no
census, or a very small one, should be required to qualify a man for any
office: that none should be in the same employment twice, or very few,
and very seldom, except in the army: that all their appointments should
be limited to a very short time, or at least as many as possible:
that the whole community should be qualified to judge in all causes
whatsoever, let the object be ever so extensive, ever so interesting, or
of ever so high a nature; as at Athens, where the people at large judge
the magistrates when they come out of office, and decide concerning
public affairs as well as private contracts: that the supreme power
should be in the public assembly; and that no magistrate should be
allowed any discretionary power but in a few instances, and of no
consequence to public business. Of all magistrates a senate is best
suited to a democracy, where the whole community is not paid for giving
their attendance; for in that case it loses its power; for then the
people will bring all causes before them, by appeal, as we have
already mentioned in a former book. In the next place, there should, if
possible, be a fund to pay all the citizens--who have any share in the
management of public affairs, either as members of the assembly, judges,
and magistrates; but if this cannot be done, at least the magistrates,
the judges the senators, and members of the supreme assembly, and also
those officers who are obliged to eat at a common table ought to be
paid. Moreover, as an oligarchy is said to be a government of men of
family, fortune, and education; so, on the contrary, a democracy is a
government in the hands of men of no birth, indigent circumstances, and
mechanical employments. In this state also no office [1318a] should be
for life; and, if any such should remain after the government has been
long changed into a democracy, they should endeavour by degrees to
diminish the power; and also elect by lot instead of vote. These things,
then, appertain to all democracies; namely, to be established on that
principle of justice which is homogeneous to those governments; that is,
that all the members of the state, by number, should enjoy an equality,
which seems chiefly to constitute a democracy, or government of the
people: for it seems perfectly equal that the rich should have no more
share in the government than the poor, nor be alone in power; but that
all should be equal, according to number; for thus, they think, the
equality and liberty of the state best preserved.
CHAPTER III
In the next place we must inquire how this equality is to be procured.
Shall the qualifications be divided so that five hundred rich should be
equal to a thousand poor, or shall the thousand have equal power with
the five hundred? or shall we not establish our equality in this manner?
but divide indeed thus, and afterwards taking an equal number both out
of the five hundred and the thousand, invest them with the power of
creating the magistrates and judges. Is this state then established
according to perfect democratical justice, or rather that which is
guided by numbers only? For the defenders of a democracy say, that that
is just which the majority approve of: but the favourers of an oligarchy
say, that that is just which those who have most approve of; and that we
ought to be directed by the value of property. Both the propositions are
unjust; for if we agree with what the few propose we erect a tyranny:
for if it should happen that an individual should have more than the
rest who are rich, according to oligarchical justice, this man alone
has a right to the supreme power; but if superiority of numbers is to
prevail, injustice will then be done by confiscating the property of the
rich, who are few, as we have already said. What then that equality is,
which both parties will admit, must be collected from the definition
of right which is common to them both; for they both say that what the
majority of the state approves of ought to be established. Be it so; but
not entirely: but since a city happens to be made up of two different
ranks of people, the rich and the poor, let that be established which
is approved of by both these, or the greater part: but should there be
opposite sentiments, let that be established which shall be approved
of by the greater part: but let this be according to the census; for
instance, if there should be ten of the rich and twenty of the poor, and
six of the first and fifteen of the last should agree upon any measure,
and the remaining four of the rich should join with the remaining five
of the poor in opposing it, that party whose census when added together
should determine which opinion should be law, and should these happen
to be equal, it should be regarded as a case similar to an assembly or
court of justice dividing equally upon any question that comes before
them, who either determine it by lot or some such method. But although,
with [1318b] respect to what is equal and just, it may be very difficult
to establish the truth, yet it is much easier to do than to persuade
those who have it in their power to encroach upon others to be guided
thereby; for the weak always desire what is equal and just, but the
powerful pay no regard thereunto.
CHAPTER IV
There are four kinds of democracies. The best is that which is composed
of those first in order, as we have already said, and this also is the
most ancient of any. I call that the first which every one would place
so, was he to divide the people; for the best part of these are the
husbandmen. We see, then, that a democracy may be framed where the
majority live by tillage or pasturage; for, as their property is
but small, they will not be at leisure perpetually to hold public
assemblies, but will be continually employed in following their own
business, not having otherwise the means of living; nor will they be
desirous of what another enjoys, but will rather like to follow their
own business than meddle with state affairs and accept the offices of
government, which will be attended with no great profit; for the major
part of mankind are rather desirous of riches than honour (a proof of
this is, that they submitted to the tyrannies in ancient times, and do
now submit to the oligarchies, if no one hinders them in their usual
occupations, or deprives them of their property; for some of them soon
get rich, others are removed from poverty); besides, their having the
right of election and calling their magistrates to account for their
conduct when they come out of office, will satisfy their desire of
honours, if any of them entertain that passion: for in some states,
though the commonalty have not the right of electing the magistrates,
yet it is vested in part of that body chosen to represent them: and it
is sufficient for the people at large to possess the deliberative power:
and this ought to be considered as a species of democracy; such was that
formerly at Mantinsea: for which reason it is proper for the democracy
we have been now treating of to have a power (and it has been usual for
them to have it) of censuring their magistrates when out of office,
and sitting in judgment upon all causes: but that the chief magistrates
should be elected, and according to a certain census, which should vary
with the rank of their office, or else not by a census, but according
to their abilities for their respective appointments. A state thus
constituted must be well constituted; for the magistracies will be
always filled with the best men with the approbation of the people;
who will not envy their superiors: and these and the nobles should
be content with this part in the administration; for they will not be
governed by their inferiors. They will be also careful to use their
power with moderation, as there are others to whom full power is
delegated to censure their conduct; for it is very serviceable to the
state to have them dependent upon others, and not to be permitted to do
whatsoever they choose; for with such a liberty there would be no check
to that evil particle there is in every one: therefore it is [1319a]
necessary and most for the benefit of the state that the offices thereof
should be filled by the principal persons in it, whose characters are
unblemished, and that the people are not oppressed. It is now evident
that this is the best species of democracy, and on what account; because
the people are such and have such powers as they ought to have. To
establish a democracy of husbandmen some of those laws which were
observed in many ancient states are universally useful; as, for
instance, on no account to permit any one to possess more than a certain
quantity of land, or within a certain distance from the city. Formerly
also, in some states, no one was allowed to sell their original lot of
land. They also mention a law of one Oxylus, which forbade any one to
add to their patrimony by usury. We ought also to follow the law of
the Aphutaeans, as useful to direct us in this particular we are now
speaking of; for they having but very little ground, while they were
a numerous people, and at the same time were all husbandmen, did not
include all their lands within the census, but divided them in such a
manner that, according to the census, the poor had more power than
the rich. Next to the commonalty of husbandmen is one of shepherds and
herdsmen; for they have many things in common with them, and, by their
way of life, are excellently qualified to make good soldiers, stout in
body, and able to continue in the open air all night. The generality of
the people of whom other democracies are composed are much worse than
these; for their lives are wretched nor have they any business with
virtue in anything they do; these are your mechanics, your exchange-men,
and hired servants; as all these sorts of men frequent the exchange and
the citadel, they can readily attend the public assembly; whereas the
husbandmen, being more dispersed in the country, cannot so easily meet
together; nor are they equally desirous of doing it with these others!
When a country happens to be so situated that a great part of the land
lies at a distance from the city, there it is easy to establish a good
democracy or a free state for the people in general will be obliged to
live in the country; so that it will be necessary in such a democracy,
though there may be an exchange-mob at hand, never to allow a legal
assembly without the inhabitants of the country attend. We have shown in
what manner the first and best democracy ought to be established, and it
will be equally evident as to the rest, for from these we [1319b] should
proceed as a guide, and always separate the meanest of the people from
the rest. But the last and worst, which gives to every citizen without
distinction a share in every part of the administration, is what few