Politics: A Treatise on Government
citizens can bear, nor is it easy to preserve for any long time, unless
well supported by laws and manners. We have already noticed almost every
cause that can destroy either this or any other state. Those who have
taken the lead in such a democracy have endeavoured to support it, and
make the people powerful by collecting together as many persons as they
could and giving them their freedom, not only legitimately but naturally
born, and also if either of their parents were citizens, that is to say,
if either their father or mother; and this method is better suited to
this state than any other: and thus the demagogues have usually managed.
They ought, however, to take care, and do this no longer than the common
people are superior to the nobles and those of the middle rank, and
then stop; for, if they proceed still further, they will make the
state disorderly, and the nobles will ill brook the power of the common
people, and be full of resentment against it; which was the cause of
an insurrection at Cyrene: for a little evil is overlooked, but when it
becomes a great one it strikes the eye. It is, moreover, very-useful in
such a state to do as Clisthenes did at Athens, when he was desirous of
increasing the power of the people, and as those did who established the
democracy in Cyrene; that is, to institute many tribes and fraternities,
and to make the religious rites of private persons few, and those
common; and every means is to be contrived to associate and blend the
people together as much as possible; and that all former customs be
broken through. Moreover, whatsoever is practised in a tyranny
seems adapted to a democracy of this species; as, for instance, the
licentiousness of the slaves, the women, and the children; for this to
a certain degree is useful in such a state; and also to overlook every
one's living as they choose; for many will support such a government:
for it is more agreeable to many to live without any control than as
prudence would direct.
CHAPTER V
It is also the business of the legislator and all those who would
support a government of this sort not to make it too great a work, or
too perfect; but to aim only to render it stable: for, let a state be
constituted ever so badly, there is no difficulty in its continuing a
few days: they should therefore endeavour to procure its safety by
all those ways which we have described in assigning the causes of the
preservation and destruction of governments; avoiding what is hurtful,
and by framing such laws, written and unwritten, as contain those things
which chiefly tend to the preservation of the state; nor to suppose that
that is useful either for a democratic or [1320a] an oligarchic form of
government which contributes to make them more purely so, but what will
contribute to their duration: but our demagogues at present, to flatter
the people, occasion frequent confiscations in the courts; for which
reason those who have the welfare of the state really at heart should
act directly opposite to what they do, and enact a law to prevent
forfeitures from being divided amongst the people or paid into the
treasury, but to have them set apart for sacred uses: for those who
are of a bad disposition would not then be the less cautious, as their
punishment would be the same; and the community would not be so ready to
condemn those whom they sat in judgment on when they were to get nothing
by it: they should also take care that the causes which are brought
before the public should be as few as possible, and punish with the
utmost severity those who rashly brought an action against any one; for
it is not the commons but the nobles who are generally prosecuted: for
in all things the citizens of the same state ought to be affectionate to
each other, at least not to treat those who have the chief power in
it as their enemies. Now, as the democracies which have been lately
established are very numerous, and it is difficult to get the common
people to attend the public assemblies without they are paid for it,
this, when there is not a sufficient public revenue, is fatal to the
nobles; for the deficiencies therein must be necessarily made up by
taxes, confiscations, and fines imposed by corrupt courts of justice:
which things have already destroyed many democracies. Whenever, then,
the revenues of the state are small, there should be but few public
assemblies and but few courts of justice: these, however, should have
very extensive jurisdictions, but should continue sitting a few days
only, for by this means the rich would not fear the expense, although
they should receive nothing for their attendance, though the poor did;
and judgment also would be given much better; for the rich will not
choose to be long absent from their own affairs, but will willingly
be so for a short time: and, when there are sufficient revenues, a
different conduct ought to be pursued from what the demagogues at
present follow; for now they divide the surplus of the public money
amongst the poor; these receive it and again want the same supply, while
the giving it is like pouring water into a sieve: but the true patriot
in a democracy ought to take care that the majority of the community are
not too poor, for this is the cause of rapacity in that government; he
therefore should endeavour that they may enjoy perpetual plenty; and
as this also is advantageous to the rich, what can be saved out of the
public money should be put by, and then divided at once amongst the
poor, if possible, in such a quantity as may enable every one of them to
purchase a little field, and, if that cannot be done, at least to give
each of them enough to procure the implements [1320b] of trade and
husbandry; and if there is not enough for all to receive so much at
once, then to divide it according to tribes or any other allotment. In
the meantime let the rich pay them for necessary services, but not be
obliged to find them in useless amusements. And something like this
was the manner in which they managed at Carthage, and preserved the
affections of the people; for by continually sending some of their
community into colonies they procured plenty. It is also worthy of a
sensible and generous nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and
supplying them with what is necessary, induce them to work; or to
imitate the conduct of the people at Tarentum: for they, permitting the
poor to partake in common of everything which is needful for them, gain
the affections of the commonalty. They have also two different ways of
electing their magistrates; for some are chosen by vote, others by
lot; by the last, that the people at large may have some share in the
administration; by the former, that the state may be well governed: the
same may be accomplished if of the same magistrates you choose some by
vote, others by lot. And thus much for the manner in which democracies
ought to be established.
CHAPTER VI
What has been already said will almost of itself sufficiently show how
an oligarchy ought to be founded; for he who would frame such a state
should have in his view a democracy to oppose it; for every species of
oligarchy should be founded on principles diametrically opposite to some
species of democracy.
The first and best-framed oligarchy is that which approaches near to
what we call a free state; in which there ought to be two different
census, the one high, the other low: from those who are within the
latter the ordinary officers of the state ought to be chosen; from the
former the supreme magistrates: nor should any one be excluded from a
part of the administration who was within the census; which should be
so regulated that the commonalty who are included in it should by means
thereof be superior to those who have no share in the government; for
those who are to have the management of public affairs ought always to
be chosen out of the better sort of the people. Much in the same manner
ought that oligarchy to be established which is next in order: but as to
that which is most opposite to a pure democracy, and approaches nearest
to a dynasty and a tyranny, as it is of all others the worst, so it
requires the greatest care and caution to preserve it: for as bodies of
sound and healthy constitutions and ships which are well manned and
well found for sailing can bear many injuries without perishing, while
a diseased body or a leaky ship with an indifferent crew cannot support
the [1321a] least shock; so the worst-established governments want most
looking after. A number of citizens is the preservation of a democracy;
for these are opposed to those rights which are founded in rank: on
the contrary, the preservation of an oligarchy depends upon the due
regulation of the different orders in the society.
CHAPTER VII
As the greater part of the community are divided into four sorts of
people; husbandmen, mechanics, traders, and hired servants; and as those
who are employed in war may likewise be divided into four; the horsemen,
the heavy-armed soldier, the light-armed, and the sailor, where the
nature of the country can admit a great number of horse; there a
powerful oligarchy may be easily established: for the safety of the
inhabitants depends upon a force of that sort; but those who can support
the expense of horsemen must be persons of some considerable fortune.
Where the troops are chiefly heavy-armed, there an oligarchy, inferior
in power to the other, may be established; for the heavy-armed are
rather made up of men of substance than the poor: but the light-armed
and the sailors always contribute to support a democracy: but where the
number of these is very great and a sedition arises, the other parts of
the community fight at a disadvantage; but a remedy for this evil is
to be learned from skilful generals, who always mix a proper number of
light-armed soldiers with their horse and heavy-armed: for it is with
those that the populace get the better of the men of fortune in an
insurrection; for these being lighter are easily a match for the horse
and the heavy-armed: so that for an oligarchy to form a body of troops
from these is to form it against itself: but as a city is composed of
persons of different ages, some young and some old, the fathers should
teach their sons, while they were very young, a light and easy exercise;
but, when they are grown up, they should be perfect in every warlike
exercise. Now, the admission of the people to any share in the
government should either be (as I said before) regulated by a census, or
else, as at Thebes, allowed to those who for a certain time have ceased
from any mechanic employment, or as at Massalia, where they are chosen
according to their worth, whether citizens or foreigners. With respect
to the magistrates of the highest rank which it may be necessary to
have in a state, the services they are bound to do the public should be
expressly laid down, to prevent the common people from being desirous
of accepting their employments, and also to induce them to regard their
magistrates with favour when they know what a price they pay for their
honours. It is also necessary that the magistrates, upon entering into
their offices, should make magnificent sacrifices and erect some public
structure, that the people partaking of the entertainment, and seeing
the city ornamented with votive gifts in their temples and public
structures, may see with pleasure the stability of the government: add
to this also, that the nobles will have their generosity recorded: but
now this is not the conduct which those who are at present at the head
of an oligarchy pursue, but the contrary; for they are not more desirous
of honour than of gain; for which reason such oligarchies may more
properly be called little democracies. Thus [1321b] we have explained on