Politics: A Treatise on Government
what principles a democracy and an oligarchy ought to be established.
CHAPTER VIII
After what has been said I proceed next to treat particularly of the
magistrates; of what nature they should be, how many, and for what
purpose, as I have already mentioned: for without necessary magistrates
no state can exist, nor without those which contribute to its dignity
and good order can exist happily: now it is necessary that in small
states the magistrates should be few; in a large one, many: also to
know well what offices may be joined together, and what ought to be
separated. The first thing necessary is to establish proper regulators
in the markets; for which purpose a certain magistrate should be
appointed to inspect their contracts and preserve good order; for of
necessity, in almost every city there must be both buyers and sellers to
supply each other's mutual wants: and this is what is most productive
of the comforts of life; for the sake of which men seem to have joined
together in one community. A second care, and nearly related to the
first, is to have an eye both to the public and private edifices in
the city, that they may be an ornament; and also to take care of all
buildings which are likely to fall: and to see that the highways are
kept in proper repair; and also that the landmarks between different
estates are preserved, that there may be no disputes on that account;
and all other business of the same nature. Now, this business may be
divided into several branches, over each of which in populous cities
they appoint a separate person; one to inspect the buildings, another
the fountains, another the harbours; and they are called the inspectors
of the city. A third, which is very like the last, and conversant nearly
about the same objects, only in the country, is to take care of what
is done out of the city. The officers who have this employment we call
inspectors of the lands, or inspectors of the woods; but the business
of all three of them is the same. There must also be other officers
appointed to receive the public revenue and to deliver it out to those
who are in the different departments of the state: these are called
receivers or quaestors. There must also be another, before whom all
private contracts and sentences of courts should be enrolled, as well
as proceedings and declarations. Sometimes this employment is divided
amongst many, but there is one supreme over the rest; these are called
proctors, notaries, and the like. Next to these is an officer whose
business is of all others the most necessary, and yet most difficult;
namely, to take care that sentence is executed upon those who are
condemned; and that every one pays the fines laid on him; and also to
have the charge of those who are in prison. [1322a] This office is very
disagreeable on account of the odium attending it, so that no one will
engage therein without it is made very profitable, or, if they do,
will they be willing to execute it according to law; but it is most
necessary, as it is of no service to pass judgment in any cause without
that judgment is carried into execution: for without this human society
could not subsist: for which reason it is best that this office should
not be executed by one person, but by some of the magistrates of the
other courts. In like manner, the taking care that those fines which
are ordered by the judges are levied should be divided amongst different
persons. And as different magistrates judge different causes, let the
causes of the young be heard by the young: and as to those which are
already brought to a hearing, let one person pass sentence, and another
see it executed: as, for instance, let the magistrates who have the care
of the public buildings execute the sentence which the inspectors of
the markets have passed, and the like in other cases: for by so much the
less odium attends those who carry the laws into execution, by so much
the easier will they be properly put in force: therefore for the same
persons to pass the sentence and to execute it will subject them to
general hatred; and if they pass it upon all, they will be considered
as the enemies of all. Thus one person has often the custody of the
prisoner's body, while another sees the sentence against him executed,
as the eleven did at Athens: for which reason it is prudent to separate
these offices, and to give great attention thereunto as equally
necessary with anything we have already mentioned; for it will certainly
happen that men of character will decline accepting this office, and
worthless persons cannot properly be entrusted with it, as having
themselves rather an occasion for a guard than being qualified to guard
others. This, therefore, ought by no means to be a separate office from
others; nor should it be continually allotted to any individuals, but
the young men; where there is a city-guard, the youths ought in turns
to take these offices upon them. These, then, as the most necessary
magistrates, ought to be first mentioned: next to these are others no
less necessary, but of much higher rank, for they ought to be men of
great skill and fidelity. These are they who have the guard of the city,
and provide everything that is necessary for war; whose business it is,
both in war and peace, to defend the walls and the gates, and to take
care to muster and marshal the citizens. Over all these there are
sometimes more officers, sometimes fewer: thus in little cities there is
only one whom they call either general or polemarch; but where there are
horse and light-armed troops, and bowmen, and sailors, they sometimes
put distinct commanders over each of these; who again have others under
them, according to their different divisions; all of which join together
to make one military body: and thus much for this department. Since some
of the magistrates, if not all, have business with the public money,
it is necessary that there should be other officers, whose employment
should be nothing else than to take an account of what they have, and
correct any mismanagement therein. But besides all these magistrates
there is one who is supreme over them all, who very often has in his own
power the disposal of the public revenue and taxes; who presides over
the people when the supreme power is in them; for there must be some
magistrate who has a power to summon them together, and to preside as
head of the state. These are sometimes called preadvisers; but where
there are many, more properly a council. These are nearly the civil
magistrates which are requisite to a government: but there are other
persons whose business is confined to religion; as the priests, and
those who are to take care of the temples, that they are kept in proper
repair, or, if they fall down, that they may be rebuilt; and whatever
else belongs to public worship. This charge is sometimes entrusted to
one person, as in very small cities: in others it is delegated to many,
and these distinct from the priesthood, as the builders or keepers of
holy places, and officers of the sacred revenue. Next to these are
those who are appointed to have the general care of all those public
sacrifices to the tutelar god of the state, which the laws do not
entrust to the priests: and these in different states have different
appellations. To enumerate in few words the different departments of
all those magistrates who are necessary: these are either religion,
war, taxes, expenditures, markets, public buildings, harbours, highways.
Belonging to the courts of justice there are scribes to enroll private
contracts; and there must also be guards set over the prisoners, others
to see the law is executed, council on either side, and also others to
watch over the conduct of those who are to decide the causes. Amongst
the magistrates also may finally be reckoned those who are to give their
advice in public affairs. But separate states, who are peculiarly happy
and have leisure to attend to more minute particulars, and are very
attentive to good order, require particular magistrates for themselves;
such as those who have the government of the women; who are to see the
laws are executed; who take care of the boys and preside over their
education. To these may be added those who have the care of their
gymnastic exercises, [1323a] their theatres, and every other public
spectacle which there may happen to be. Some of these, however, are not
of general use; as the governors of the women: for the poor are obliged
to employ their wives and children in servile offices for want of
slaves. As there are three magistrates to whom some states entrust the
supreme power; namely, guardians of the laws, preadvisers, and senators;
guardians of the laws suit best to an aristocracy, preadvisers to an
oligarchy, and a senate to a democracy. And thus much briefly concerning
all magistrates.
BOOK VII
CHAPTER I
He who proposes to make that inquiry which is necessary concerning what
government is best, ought first to determine what manner of living is
most eligible; for while this remains uncertain it will also be equally
uncertain what government is best: for, provided no unexpected accidents
interfere, it is highly probable, that those who enjoy the best
government will live the most happily according to their circumstances;
he ought, therefore, first to know what manner of life is most desirable
for all; and afterwards whether this life is the same to the man and
the citizen, or different. As I imagine that I have already sufficiently
shown what sort of life is best in my popular discourses on that
subject, I think I may very properly repeat the same here; as most
certainly no one ever called in question the propriety of one of the
divisions; namely, that as what is good, relative to man, may be divided
into three sorts, what is external, what appertains to the body, and
what to the soul, it is evident that all these must conspire to make
a man happy: for no one would say that a man was happy who had no
fortitude, no temperance, no justice, no prudence; but was afraid of the
flies that flew round him: nor would abstain from the meanest theft if
he was either hungry or dry, or would murder his dearest friend for
a farthing; and also was in every particular as wanting in his
understanding as an infant or an idiot. These truths are so evident that
all must agree to them; though some may dispute about the quantity and
the degree: for they may think, that a very little virtue is sufficient
for happiness; but for riches, property, power, honour, and all such
things, they endeavour to increase them without bounds: but to such we
reply, that it is easy to prove from what experience teaches us in these
cases, that these external goods produce not virtue, but virtue them.
As to a happy life, whether it is to be found in pleasure or virtue or
both, certain it is, that those whose morals are most pure, and whose
understandings are best cultivated, will enjoy more of it, although
their fortune is but moderate than those do who own an exuberance of
wealth, are deficient in those; and this utility any one who reflects
may easily convince himself of; for whatsoever is external has its
boundary, as a machine, and whatsoever is useful in its excess is either
necessarily hurtful, or at best useless to the possessor; but every good
quality of the soul the higher it is in degree, so much the more useful
it is, if it is permitted on this subject to use the word useful as well
as noble. It is also very evident, that the accidents of each subject
take place of each other, as the subjects themselves, of which we allow
they are accidents, differ from each other in value; so that if the soul
is more noble than any outward possession, as the body, both in itself