Politics: A Treatise on Government
and with respect to us, it must be admitted of course that the best
accidents of each must follow the same analogy. Besides, it is for the
sake of the soul that these things are desirable; and it is on this
account that wise men should desire them, not the soul for them. Let us
therefore be well assured, that every one enjoys as much happiness as he
possesses virtue and wisdom, and acts according to their dictates; since
for this we have the example of GOD Himself, _who is completely happy,
not from any external good, but in Himself, and because such is His
nature_. For good fortune is something different from happiness, as every
good which depends not on the mind is owing to chance or fortune; but
it is not from fortune that any one is wise and just: hence it follows,
that that city is happiest which is the best and acts best: for no one
can do well who acts not well; nor can the deeds either of man or city
be praiseworthy without virtue and wisdom; for whatsoever is just, or
wise, or prudent in a man, the same things are just, wise, and prudent
in a city.
Thus much by way of introduction; for I could not but just touch upon
this subject, though I could not go through a complete investigation
of it, as it properly belongs to another question: let us at present
suppose so much, that a man's happiest life, both as an individual and
as a citizen, is a life of virtue, accompanied with those enjoyments
which virtue usually procures. If [1324a] there are any who are not
convinced by what I have said, their doubts shall be answered hereafter,
at present we shall proceed according to our intended method.
CHAPTER II
It now remains for us to say whether the happiness of any individual
man and the city is the same or different: but this also is evident; for
whosoever supposes that riches will make a person happy, must place the
happiness of the city in riches if it possesses them; those who prefer a
life which enjoys a tyrannic power over others will also think, that the
city which has many others under its command is most happy: thus also
if any one approves a man for his virtue, he will think the most worthy
city the happiest: but here there are two particulars which require
consideration, one of which is, whether it is the most eligible life
to be a member of the community and enjoy the rights of a citizen, or
whether to live as a stranger, without interfering in public affairs;
and also what form of government is to be preferred, and what
disposition of the state is best; whether the whole community should be
eligible to a share in the administration, or only the greater part, and
some only: as this, therefore, is a subject of political examination
and speculation, and not what concerns the individual, and the first of
these is what we are at present engaged in, the one of these I am not
obliged to speak to, the other is the proper business of my present
design. It is evident that government must be the best which is so
established, that every one therein may have it in his power to act
virtuously and live happily: but some, who admit that a life of virtue
is most eligible, still doubt which is preferable a public life of
active virtue, or one entirely disengaged from what is without and
spent in contemplation; which some say is the only one worthy of a
philosopher; and one of these two different modes of life both now
and formerly seem to have been chosen by all those who were the most
virtuous men; I mean the public or philosophic. And yet it is of no
little consequence on which side the truth lies; for a man of sense
must naturally incline to the better choice; both as an individual and a
citizen. Some think that a tyrannic government over those near us is
the greatest injustice; but that a political one is not unjust: but that
still is a restraint on the pleasures and tranquillity of life. Others
hold the quite contrary opinion, and think that a public and active life
is the only life for man: for that private persons have no opportunity
of practising any one virtue, more than they have who are engaged
in public life the management of the [1324b] state. These are their
sentiments; others say, that a tyrannical and despotical mode of
government is the only happy one; for even amongst some free states the
object of their laws seems to be to tyrannise over their neighbours: so
that the generality of political institutions, wheresoever dispersed,
if they have any one common object in view, have all of them this,
to conquer and govern. It is evident, both from the laws of the
Lacedaemonians and Cretans, as well as by the manner in which they
educated their children, that all which they had in view was to make
them soldiers: besides, among all nations, those who have power enough
and reduce others to servitude are honoured on that account; as were the
Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Gauls: with some there are laws to
heighten the virtue of courage; thus they tell us that at Carthage they
allowed every person to wear as many rings for distinction as he had
served campaigns. There was also a law in Macedonia, that a man who had
not himself killed an enemy should be obliged to wear a halter; among
the Scythians, at a festival, none were permitted to drink out of
the cup was carried about who had not done the same thing. Among the
Iberians, a warlike nation, they fixed as many columns upon a man's tomb
as he had slain enemies: and among different nations different things
of this sort prevail, some of them established by law, others by custom.
Probably it may seem too absurd to those who are willing to take this
subject into their consideration to inquire whether it is the business
of a legislator to be able to point out by what means a state may govern
and tyrannise over its neighbours, whether they will, or will not: for
how can that belong either to the politician or legislator which is
unlawful? for that cannot be lawful which is done not only justly, but
unjustly also: for a conquest may be unjustly made. But we see nothing
of this in the arts: for it is the business neither of the physician nor
the pilot to use either persuasion or force, the one to his patients,
the other to his passengers: and yet many seem to think a despotic
government is a political one, and what they would not allow to be just
or proper, if exercised over themselves, they will not blush to exercise
over others; for they endeavour to be wisely governed themselves, but
think it of no consequence whether others are so or not: but a despotic
power is absurd, except only where nature has framed the one party for
dominion, the other for subordination; and therefore no one ought to
assume it over all in general, but those only which are the proper
objects thereof: thus no one should hunt men either for food or
sacrifice, but what is fit for those purposes, and these are wild
animals which are eatable.
Now a city which is well governed might be very [1325a] happy in itself
while it enjoyed a good system of laws, although it should happen to be
so situated as to have no connection with any other state, though its
constitution should not be framed for war or conquest; for it would then
have no occasion for these. It is evident therefore that the business of
war is to be considered as commendable, not as a final end, but as the
means of procuring it. It is the duty of a good legislator to examine
carefully into his state; and the nature of the people, and how they may
partake of every intercourse, of a good life, and of the happiness which
results from it: and in this respect some laws and customs differ from
others. It is also the duty of a legislator, if he has any neighbouring
states to consider in what manner he shall oppose each of them, or what
good offices he shall show them. But what should be the final end of the
best governments will be considered hereafter.
CHAPTER III
We will now speak to those who, while they agree that a life of virtue
is most eligible, yet differ in the use of it addressing ourselves to
both these parties; for there are some who disapprove of all political
governments, and think that the life of one who is really free is
different from the life of a citizen, and of all others most eligible:
others again think that the citizen is the best; and that it is
impossible for him who does nothing to be well employed; but that
virtuous activity and happiness are the same thing. Now both parties in
some particulars say what is right, in others what is wrong, thus, that
the life of a freeman is better than the life of a slave is true, for
a slave, as a slave, is employed in nothing honourable; for the common
servile employments which he is commanded to perform have nothing
virtuous in them; but, on the other hand, it is not true that a
submission to all sorts of governments is slavery; for the government of
freemen differs not more from the government of slaves than slavery and
freedom differ from each other in their nature; and how they do has been
already mentioned. To prefer doing of nothing to virtuous activity is
also wrong, for happiness consists in action, and many noble ends are
produced by the actions of the just and wise. From what we have already
determined on this subject, some one probably may think, that supreme
power is of all things best, as that will enable a man to command very
many useful services from others; so that he who can obtain this ought
not to give it up to another, but rather to seize it: and, for this
purpose, the father should have no attention or regard for the son, or
the son for the father, or friend for friend; for what is best is most
eligible: but to be a member of the community and be in felicity is
best. What these persons advance might probably be true, if the supreme
good was certainly theirs who plunder and use violence to others: but
it is [1325b] most unlikely that it should be so; for it is a mere
supposition: for it does not follow that their actions are honourable
who thus assume the supreme power over others, without they were by
nature as superior to them as a man to a woman, a father to a child, a
master to a slave: so that he who so far forsakes the paths of virtue
can never return back from whence he departed from them: for amongst
equals whatever is fair and just ought to be reciprocal; for this is
equal and right; but that equals should not partake of what is equal, or
like to like, is contrary to nature: but whatever is contrary to nature
is not right; therefore, if there is any one superior to the rest of the
community in virtue and abilities for active life, him it is proper to
follow, him it is right to obey, but the one alone will not do, but must
be joined to the other also: and, if we are right in what we have now
said, it follows that happiness consists in virtuous activity, and that
both with respect to the community as well as the individual an active
life is the happiest: not that an active life must necessarily refer to
other persons, as some think, or that those studies alone are practical
which are pursued to teach others what to do; for those are much more
so whose final object is in themselves, and to improve the judgment and
understanding of the man; for virtuous activity has an end, therefore
is something practical; nay, those who contrive the plan which others
follow are more particularly said to act, and are superior to the
workmen who execute their designs. But it is not necessary that states
which choose to have no intercourse with others should remain inactive;
for the several members thereof may have mutual intercourse with each
other; for there are many opportunities for this among the different
citizens; the same thing is true of every individual: for, was it