Politics: A Treatise on Government
of happiness in their own power, but do not rightly apply them. Since
we propose to inquire what government is best, namely, that by which
a state may be best administered, and that state is best administered
where the people are the happiest, it is evident that happiness is a
thing we should not be unacquainted with. Now, I have already said in
my treatise on Morals (if I may here make any use of what I have there
shown), that happiness consists in the energy and perfect practice of
virtue; and this not relatively, but simply; I mean by relatively, what
is necessary in some certain circumstances; by simply, what is good and
fair in itself: of the first sort are just punishments, and restraints
in a just cause; for they arise from virtue and are necessary, and on
that account are virtuous; though it is more desirable that neither any
state nor any individual should stand in need of them; but those actions
which are intended either to procure honour or wealth are simply good;
the others eligible only to remove an evil; these, on the contrary, are
the foundation and means of relative good. A worthy man indeed will bear
poverty, disease, and other unfortunate accidents with a noble mind;
but happiness consists in the contrary to these (now we have already
determined in our treatise on Morals, that he is a man of worth who
considers what is good because it is virtuous as what is simply good; it
is evident, therefore, that all the actions of such a one must be worthy
and simply good): this has led some persons to conclude, that the cause
of happiness was external goods; which would be as if any one should
suppose that the playing well upon the lyre was owing to the instrument,
and not to the art. It necessarily follows from what has been said,
that some things should be ready at hand and others procured by the
legislator; for which reason in founding a city we earnestly wish that
there may be plenty of those things which are supposed to be under the
dominion of fortune (for some things we admit her to be mistress over);
but for a state to be worthy and great is not only the work of fortune
but of knowledge and judgment also. But for a state to be worthy it is
necessary that those citizens which are in the administration should
be worthy also; but as in our city every citizen is to be so, we must
consider how this may be accomplished; for if this is what every one
could be, and not some individuals only, it would be more desirable; for
then it would follow, that what might be done by one might be done
by all. Men are worthy and good three ways; by nature, by custom, by
reason. In the first place, a man ought to be born a man, and not any
other animal; that is to say, he ought to have both a body and soul; but
it avails not to be only born [1332b] with some things, for custom
makes great alterations; for there are some things in nature capable of
alteration either way which are fixed by custom, either for the better
or the worse. Now, other animals live chiefly a life of nature; and in
very few things according to custom; but man lives according to reason
also, which he alone is endowed with; wherefore he ought to make all
these accord with each other; for if men followed reason, and were
persuaded that it was best to obey her, they would act in many respects
contrary to nature and custom. What men ought naturally to be, to make
good members of a community, I have already determined; the rest of
this discourse therefore shall be upon education; for some things are
acquired by habit, others by hearing them.
CHAPTER XIV
As every political community consists of those who govern and of those
who are governed, let us consider whether during the continuance of
their lives they ought to be the same persons or different; for it
is evident that the mode of education should be adapted to this
distinction. Now, if one man differed from another as much, as we
believe, the gods and heroes differ from men: in the first place, being
far their superiors in body; and, secondly, in the soul: so that the
superiority of the governors over the governed might be evident beyond
a doubt, it is certain that it would be better for the one always to
govern, the other always to be governed: but, as this is not easy to
obtain, and kings are not so superior to those they govern as Scylax
informs us they are in India, it is evident that for many reasons it is
necessary that all in their turns should both govern and be governed:
for it is just that those who are equal should have everything alike;
and it is difficult for a state to continue which is founded in
injustice; for all those in the country who are desirous of innovation
will apply themselves to those who are under the government of the rest,
and such will be their numbers in the state, that it will be impossible
for the magistrates to get the better of them. But that the governors
ought to excel the governed is beyond a doubt; the legislator therefore
ought to consider how this shall be, and how it may be contrived that
all shall have their equal share in the administration. Now, with
respect to this it will be first said, that nature herself has directed
us in our choice, laying down the selfsame thing when she has made some
young, others old: the first of whom it becomes to obey, the latter
to command; for no one when he is young is offended at his being under
government, or thinks himself too good for it; more especially when he
considers that he himself shall receive the same honours which he
pays when he shall arrive at a proper age. In some respects it must be
acknowledged that the governors and the governed are the same, in others
they are different; it is therefore necessary that their education
should be in [1333a] some respect the same, in others different: as they
say, that he will be a good governor who has first learnt to obey. Now
of governments, as we have already said, some are instituted for the
sake of him who commands; others for him who obeys: of the first sort is
that of the master over the servant; of the latter, that of freemen over
each other. Now some things which are commanded differ from others; not
in the business, but in the end proposed thereby: for which reason many
works, even of a servile nature, are not disgraceful for young freemen
to perform; for many things which are ordered to be done are not
honourable or dishonourable so much in their own nature as in the end
which is proposed, and the reason for which they are undertaken. Since
then we have determined, that the virtue of a good citizen and good
governor is the same as of a good man; and that every one before he
commands should have first obeyed, it is the business of the legislator
to consider how his citizens may be good men, what education is
necessary to that purpose, and what is the final object of a good life.
The soul of man may be divided into two parts; that which has reason in
itself, and that which hath not, but is capable of obeying its dictates:
and according to the virtues of these two parts a man is said to be
good: but of those virtues which are the ends, it will not be difficult
for those to determine who adopt the division I have already given; for
the inferior is always for the sake of the superior; and this is equally
evident both in the works of art as well as in those of nature; but that
is superior which has reason. Reason itself also is divided into
two parts, in the manner we usually divide it; the theoretic and the
practical; which division therefore seems necessary for this part also:
the same analogy holds good with respect to actions; of which those
which are of a superior nature ought always to be chosen by those who
have it in their power; for that is always most eligible to every one
which will procure the best ends. Now life is divided into labour and
rest, war and peace; and of what we do the objects are partly necessary
and useful, partly noble: and we should give the same preference to
these that we do to the different parts of the soul and its actions,
as war to procure peace; labour, rest; and the useful, the noble. The
politician, therefore, who composes a body of laws ought to extend his
views to everything; the different parts of the soul and their actions;
more particularly to those things which are of a superior nature and
ends; and, in the same manner, to the lives of men and their different
actions.
They ought to be fitted both for labour and war, but rather [1333b] for
rest and peace; and also to do what is necessary and useful, but rather
what is fair and noble. It is to those objects that the education of the
children ought to tend, and of all the youths who want instruction. All
the Grecian states which now seem best governed, and the legislators who
founded those states, appear not to have framed their polity with a view
to the best end, or to every virtue, in their laws and education; but
eagerly to have attended to what is useful and productive of gain: and
nearly of the same opinion with these are some persons who have written
lately, who, by praising the Lacedaemonian state, show they approve of
the intention of the legislator in making war and victory the end of
his government. But how contrary to reason this is, is easily proved by
argument, and has already been proved by facts (but as the generality of
men desire to have an extensive command, that they may have everything
desirable in the greater abundance; so Thibron and others who have
written on that state seem to approve of their legislator for having
procured them an extensive command by continually enuring them to
all sorts of dangers and hardships): for it is evident, since the
Lacedemonians have now no hope that the supreme power will be in their
own hand, that neither are they happy nor was their legislator wise.
This also is ridiculous, that while they preserved an obedience to their
laws, and no one opposed their being governed by them, they lost the
means of being honourable: but these people understand not rightly
what sort of government it is which ought to reflect honour on the
legislator; for a government of freemen is nobler than despotic power,
and more consonant to virtue. Moreover, neither should a city be thought
happy, nor should a legislator be commended, because he has so trained
the people as to conquer their neighbours; for in this there is a
great inconvenience: since it is evident that upon this principle every
citizen who can will endeavour to procure the supreme power in his own
city; which crime the Lacedaemonians accuse Pausanias of, though he
enjoyed such great honours.
Such reasoning and such laws are neither political, useful nor true: but
a legislator ought to instil those laws on the minds of men which are
most useful for them, both in their public and private capacities. The
rendering a people fit for war, that they may enslave their inferiors
ought not to be the care of the legislator; but that they may not
themselves be reduced to slavery by others. In [1334a] the next place,
he should take care that the object of his government is the safety
of those who are under it, and not a despotism over all: in the third
place, that those only are slaves who are fit to be only so. Reason
indeed concurs with experience in showing that all the attention which
the legislator pays to the business of war, and all other rules which
he lays down, should have for their object rest and peace; since most
of those states (which we usually see) are preserved by war; but, after
they have acquired a supreme power over those around them, are ruined;
for during peace, like a sword, they lose their brightness: the fault of
which lies in the legislator, who never taught them how to be at rest.
CHAPTER XV