Protagoras
Laconizing set in supposing that the Lacedaemonians are a great nation
because they bruise their ears; the far-fetched notion, which is 'really
too bad,' that Simonides uses the Lesbian (?) word, (Greek), because he
is addressing a Lesbian. The whole may also be considered as a satire on
those who spin pompous theories out of nothing. As in the arguments
of the Euthydemus and of the Cratylus, the veil of irony is
never withdrawn; and we are left in doubt at last how far in this
interpretation of Simonides Socrates is 'fooling,' how far he is in
earnest.
All the interests and contrasts of character in a great dramatic work
like the Protagoras are not easily exhausted. The impressiveness of
the scene should not be lost upon us, or the gradual substitution of
Socrates in the second part for Protagoras in the first. The characters
to whom we are introduced at the beginning of the Dialogue all play a
part more or less conspicuous towards the end. There is Alcibiades, who
is compelled by the necessity of his nature to be a partisan, lending
effectual aid to Socrates; there is Critias assuming the tone of
impartiality; Callias, here as always inclining to the Sophists, but
eager for any intellectual repast; Prodicus, who finds an opportunity
for displaying his distinctions of language, which are valueless and
pedantic, because they are not based on dialectic; Hippias, who has
previously exhibited his superficial knowledge of natural philosophy,
to which, as in both the Dialogues called by his name, he now adds the
profession of an interpreter of the Poets. The two latter personages
have been already damaged by the mock heroic description of them in
the introduction. It may be remarked that Protagoras is consistently
presented to us throughout as the teacher of moral and political virtue;
there is no allusion to the theories of sensation which are attributed
to him in the Theaetetus and elsewhere, or to his denial of the
existence of the gods in a well-known fragment ascribed to him; he is
the religious rather than the irreligious teacher in this Dialogue.
Also it may be observed that Socrates shows him as much respect as is
consistent with his own ironical character; he admits that the
dialectic which has overthrown Protagoras has carried himself round to
a conclusion opposed to his first thesis. The force of argument,
therefore, and not Socrates or Protagoras, has won the day.
But is Socrates serious in maintaining (1) that virtue cannot be taught;
(2) that the virtues are one; (3) that virtue is the knowledge of
pleasures and pains present and future? These propositions to us have an
appearance of paradox--they are really moments or aspects of the truth
by the help of which we pass from the old conventional morality to a
higher conception of virtue and knowledge. That virtue cannot be taught
is a paradox of the same sort as the profession of Socrates that he knew
nothing. Plato means to say that virtue is not brought to a man, but
must be drawn out of him; and cannot be taught by rhetorical discourses
or citations from the poets. The second question, whether the virtues
are one or many, though at first sight distinct, is really a part of
the same subject; for if the virtues are to be taught, they must be
reducible to a common principle; and this common principle is found to
be knowledge. Here, as Aristotle remarks, Socrates and Plato outstep the
truth--they make a part of virtue into the whole. Further, the nature
of this knowledge, which is assumed to be a knowledge of pleasures and
pains, appears to us too superficial and at variance with the spirit
of Plato himself. Yet, in this, Plato is only following the historical
Socrates as he is depicted to us in Xenophon's Memorabilia. Like
Socrates, he finds on the surface of human life one common bond by which
the virtues are united,--their tendency to produce happiness,--though
such a principle is afterwards repudiated by him.
It remains to be considered in what relation the Protagoras stands to
the other Dialogues of Plato. That it is one of the earlier or purely
Socratic works--perhaps the last, as it is certainly the greatest of
them--is indicated by the absence of any allusion to the doctrine of
reminiscence; and also by the different attitude assumed towards the
teaching and persons of the Sophists in some of the later Dialogues. The
Charmides, Laches, Lysis, all touch on the question of the relation of
knowledge to virtue, and may be regarded, if not as preliminary studies
or sketches of the more important work, at any rate as closely connected
with it. The Io and the lesser Hippias contain discussions of the Poets,
which offer a parallel to the ironical criticism of Simonides, and are
conceived in a similar spirit. The affinity of the Protagoras to
the Meno is more doubtful. For there, although the same question is
discussed, 'whether virtue can be taught,' and the relation of Meno to
the Sophists is much the same as that of Hippocrates, the answer to the
question is supplied out of the doctrine of ideas; the real Socrates is
already passing into the Platonic one. At a later stage of the Platonic
philosophy we shall find that both the paradox and the solution of it
appear to have been retracted. The Phaedo, the Gorgias, and the Philebus
offer further corrections of the teaching of the Protagoras; in all of
them the doctrine that virtue is pleasure, or that pleasure is the chief
or only good, is distinctly renounced.
Thus after many preparations and oppositions, both of the characters
of men and aspects of the truth, especially of the popular and
philosophical aspect; and after many interruptions and detentions by the
way, which, as Theodorus says in the Theaetetus, are quite as agreeable
as the argument, we arrive at the great Socratic thesis that virtue is
knowledge. This is an aspect of the truth which was lost almost as soon
as it was found; and yet has to be recovered by every one for himself
who would pass the limits of proverbial and popular philosophy. The
moral and intellectual are always dividing, yet they must be reunited,
and in the highest conception of them are inseparable. The thesis of
Socrates is not merely a hasty assumption, but may be also deemed an
anticipation of some 'metaphysic of the future,' in which the divided
elements of human nature are reconciled.
PROTAGORAS
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, who is the narrator of the Dialogue
to his Companion. Hippocrates, Alcibiades and Critias. Protagoras,
Hippias and Prodicus (Sophists). Callias, a wealthy Athenian.
SCENE: The House of Callias.
COMPANION: Where do you come from, Socrates? And yet I need hardly
ask the question, for I know that you have been in chase of the fair
Alcibiades. I saw him the day before yesterday; and he had got a beard
like a man,--and he is a man, as I may tell you in your ear. But I
thought that he was still very charming.
SOCRATES: What of his beard? Are you not of Homer's opinion, who says
'Youth is most charming when the beard first appears'?
And that is now the charm of Alcibiades.
COMPANION: Well, and how do matters proceed? Have you been visiting him,
and was he gracious to you?
SOCRATES: Yes, I thought that he was very gracious; and especially
to-day, for I have just come from him, and he has been helping me in an
argument. But shall I tell you a strange thing? I paid no attention to
him, and several times I quite forgot that he was present.
COMPANION: What is the meaning of this? Has anything happened between
you and him? For surely you cannot have discovered a fairer love than he
is; certainly not in this city of Athens.
SOCRATES: Yes, much fairer.
COMPANION: What do you mean--a citizen or a foreigner?
SOCRATES: A foreigner.
COMPANION: Of what country?
SOCRATES: Of Abdera.
COMPANION: And is this stranger really in your opinion a fairer love
than the son of Cleinias?
SOCRATES: And is not the wiser always the fairer, sweet friend?
COMPANION: But have you really met, Socrates, with some wise one?
SOCRATES: Say rather, with the wisest of all living men, if you are
willing to accord that title to Protagoras.
COMPANION: What! Is Protagoras in Athens?
SOCRATES: Yes; he has been here two days.
COMPANION: And do you just come from an interview with him?
SOCRATES: Yes; and I have heard and said many things.
COMPANION: Then, if you have no engagement, suppose that you sit down
and tell me what passed, and my attendant here shall give up his place
to you.
SOCRATES: To be sure; and I shall be grateful to you for listening.
COMPANION: Thank you, too, for telling us.
SOCRATES: That is thank you twice over. Listen then:--
Last night, or rather very early this morning, Hippocrates, the son of
Apollodorus and the brother of Phason, gave a tremendous thump with his
staff at my door; some one opened to him, and he came rushing in and
bawled out: Socrates, are you awake or asleep?
I knew his voice, and said: Hippocrates, is that you? and do you bring
any news?
Good news, he said; nothing but good.
Delightful, I said; but what is the news? and why have you come hither
at this unearthly hour?
He drew nearer to me and said: Protagoras is come.
Yes, I replied; he came two days ago: have you only just heard of his
arrival?
Yes, by the gods, he said; but not until yesterday evening.
At the same time he felt for the truckle-bed, and sat down at my feet,
and then he said: Yesterday quite late in the evening, on my return from
Oenoe whither I had gone in pursuit of my runaway slave Satyrus, as
I meant to have told you, if some other matter had not come in the
way;--on my return, when we had done supper and were about to retire to
rest, my brother said to me: Protagoras is come. I was going to you at
once, and then I thought that the night was far spent. But the moment
sleep left me after my fatigue, I got up and came hither direct.
I, who knew the very courageous madness of the man, said: What is the
matter? Has Protagoras robbed you of anything?
He replied, laughing: Yes, indeed he has, Socrates, of the wisdom which
he keeps from me.
But, surely, I said, if you give him money, and make friends with him,
he will make you as wise as he is himself.
Would to heaven, he replied, that this were the case! He might take all
that I have, and all that my friends have, if he pleased. But that is
why I have come to you now, in order that you may speak to him on my
behalf; for I am young, and also I have never seen nor heard him; (when
he visited Athens before I was but a child;) and all men praise him,
Socrates; he is reputed to be the most accomplished of speakers. There
is no reason why we should not go to him at once, and then we shall find
him at home. He lodges, as I hear, with Callias the son of Hipponicus:
let us start.
I replied: Not yet, my good friend; the hour is too early. But let us
rise and take a turn in the court and wait about there until day-break;
when the day breaks, then we will go. For Protagoras is generally at
home, and we shall be sure to find him; never fear.
Upon this we got up and walked about in the court, and I thought that
I would make trial of the strength of his resolution. So I examined him
and put questions to him. Tell me, Hippocrates, I said, as you are going
to Protagoras, and will be paying your money to him, what is he to whom
you are going? and what will he make of you? If, for example, you had
thought of going to Hippocrates of Cos, the Asclepiad, and were about to
give him your money, and some one had said to you: You are paying money
to your namesake Hippocrates, O Hippocrates; tell me, what is he that
you give him money? how would you have answered?
I should say, he replied, that I gave money to him as a physician.