Selections from the Writings of Kierkegaard
comical that Cockatoo, who doesn't love Marian at all, should be on
such intimate terms with her. But suppose, now, that Cockatoo does
love Marian. Would that be comical still? To me it would; and the
comical would seem to me to lie in love's having become capable of
being expressed in such fashion. Whether now this has been the custom
since the beginning of the world makes no difference whatsoever, for the
comical has the prescriptive right from all eternity to be present in
contradictions--and here is a contradiction. There is really
nothing comical in the antics of a manikin since we see some one pulling
the strings. But to be a manikin at the beck of something inexplicable
is indeed comical, for the contradiction lies in our not seeing any
sensible reason why one should have to twitch now this leg and now
that. Hence, if I cannot explain what I am doing, I do not care to do
it; and if I cannot understand the power into whose sphere I am
venturing, I do not care to surrender myself to that power. And if love
is so mysterious a law which binds together the extremest contradictions,
then who will guarantee that I might not, one day, become altogether
confused? Still, that does not concern me so much.
Again, I have heard that some lovers consider the behavior of other
lovers ridiculous. I cannot conceive how this ridicule is justified,
for if this law of love be a natural law, then all lovers are subject
to it; but if it be the law of their own choice, then those laughing
lovers ought to be able to explain all about love; which, however, they
are unable to do. But in this respect I understand this matter better as
it seems a convention for one lover to laugh at the other because
he always finds the other lover ridiculous, but not himself. If it
be ridiculous to kiss an ugly girl, it is also ridiculous to kiss
a pretty one; and the notion that doing this in some particular way
should entitle one to cast ridicule on another who does it differently,
is but presumptuousness and a conspiracy which does not, for all that,
exempt such a snob from laying himself open to the ridicule which
invariably results from the fact that no one is able to explain what
this act of kissing signifies, whereas it is to signify all--to
signify, indeed, that the lovers desire to belong to each other
in all eternity; aye, what is still more amusing, to render them
certain that they will. Now, if a man should suddenly lay his head on
one side, or shake it, or kick out with his leg and, upon my asking
him why he did this, should answer "To be sure I don't know, myself,
I just happened to do so, next time I may do something different, for I
did it unconsciously"--ah, then I would understand him quite
well. But if he said, as the lovers say about their antics, that all
bliss lay therein, how could I help finding it ridiculous--just
as I thought that other man's motions ridiculous, to be sure in a
different sense, until he restrained my laughter by declaring that
they did not signify anything. For by doing so he removed the
contradiction which is the basic cause of the comical. It is not at all
comical that the insignificant is declared to signify nothing, but it
is very much so if it be asserted to signify all.
As regards involuntary actions, the contradiction arises at the very
outset because involuntary actions are not looked for in a free rational
being. Thus if one supposed that the Pope had a coughing spell the
very moment he was to place the crown on Napoleon's head; or that
bride and groom in the most solemn moment of the wedding ceremony
should fall to sneezing--these would be examples of the comical.
That is, the more a given action accentuates the free rational being,
the more comical are involuntary actions. This holds true also in
respect of the erotic gesticulations, where the comical element appears
a second time, owing to the circumstance that the lovers attempt to
explain away the contradiction by attributing to their gesticulations an
absolute value. As is well known, children have a keen sense
of the ridiculous--witness children's testimony which can always
be relied on in this regard. Now as a rule children will laugh at
lovers, and if one makes them tell what they have seen, surely no one
can help laughing. This is, perhaps, due to the fact that children omit
the point. Very strange! When the Jew omitted the point no one cared to
laugh. Here, on the contrary, every one laughs because the point is
omitted; since, however, no one can explain what the point is--why,
then there is no point at all.
So the lovers explain nothing; and those who praise love explain
nothing but are merely intent on--as one is bidden in the Royal
Laws of Denmark--on saying anent it all which may be pleasant
and of good report. But a man who thinks, desires to have his logical
categories in good order; and he who thinks about love wishes to be
sure about his categories also in this matter. The fact is, though, that
people do not think about love, and a "pastoral science" is still
lacking; for even if a poet in a pastoral poem makes an attempt to
show how love is born, everything is smuggled in again by help of
another person who teaches the lovers how to love!
As we saw, the comical element in love arose from the face-about
whereby the highest quality of one sphere does not find expression in
that sphere but in the exactly opposite quality of another sphere. It is
comical that the soaring flight of love--the desire to belong to
each other for all time--lands ever, like Saft,[19] in the pantry;
but still more comical is it that this conclusion is said to
constitute love's highest expression.
Wherever there is a contradiction, there the comical element is
present also. I am ever following that track. If it be disconcerting to
you, dear fellow banqueters, to follow me in what I shall have to say
now, then follow me with averted countenances. I myself am speaking
as if with veiled eyes; for as I see only the mystery in these matters,
why, I cannot see, or I see nothing.
What is a consequence? If it cannot, in some way or other, be brought
under the same head as its antecedent--why, then it would be ridiculous
if it posed as a consequence. To illustrate: if a man who wanted to
take a bath jumped into the tank and, coming to the surface again
somewhat confused, groped for the rope to hold on to, but caught the
douche-line by mistake, and a shower now descended on him with
sufficient motivation and for excellent good reason--why, then the
consequence would be entirely in order. The ridiculous here consisted
in his seizing the wrong rope; but there is nothing ridiculous in
the shower descending when one pulls the proper rope. Rather, it would
be ridiculous if it did not come; as for example, just to show the
correctness of my contention about contradictions, if a man nerved
himself with bold resolution in order to withstand the shock and, in
the enthusiasm of his decision, with a stout heart pulled the
line--and the shower did not come.
Let us see now how it is with regard to love. The lovers wish to
belong to each other for all time, and this they express, curiously, by
embracing each other with all the intensity of the moment; and all the
bliss of love is said to reside therein. But all desire is egotistic.
Now, to be sure, the lover's desire is not egotistic in respect of
the one he loves, but the desire of both in conjunction is absolutely
egotistic in so far as they in their union and love represent a new ego.
And yet they are deceived; for in the same moment the race triumphs
over the individual, the race is victorious, and the individuals are
debased to do its bidding.
Now this I find more ridiculous than what Aristophanes thought so
ridiculous. The ridiculous aspect of his theory of bi-section lies in
the inherent contradiction (which the ancient author does not
sufficiently emphasize, however). In considering a person one naturally
supposes him to be an entity, and so one does believe till it becomes
apparent that, under the obsession of love, he is but a half which runs
about looking for its complement. There is nothing ridiculous in half
an apple. The comical would appear if a whole apple turned out to be
only half an apple. In the first case there exists no contradiction,
but certainly in the latter. If one actually based one's reasoning
on the figure of speech that woman is but half a person she would
not be ridiculous at all in her love. Man, however, who has been
enjoying civic rights as a whole person, will certainly appear
ridiculous when he takes to running about (and looking for his
other half);[20] for he betrays thereby that he is but half a
person. In fact, the more one thinks about the matter the more
ridiculous it seems; because if man really be a whole, why, then
he will not become a whole in love, but he and woman would make
up one and a half. No wonder, then, that the gods laugh, and
particularly at man.
But let me return to my consequence. When the lovers have found each
other, one should certainly believe that they formed a whole, and in
this should lie the proof of their assertion that they wished to live
for each other for all time. But lo! instead of living for each other
they begin to live for the race, and this they do not even suspect.
What is a consequence? If, as I observed, one cannot detect in it
the cause out of which it proceeded, the consequence is merely
ridiculous, and he becomes a laughing stock to whom this happens.
Now, the fact that the separated halves have found each other ought
to be a complete satisfaction and rest for them; and yet the consequence
is a new existence. That having found each other should mean a new
existence for the lovers, is comprehensible enough; but not, that a new
existence for a third being should take its inception from this fact.
And yet the resulting consequence is greater than that of which it is
the consequence, whereas such an end as the lovers' finding each other
ought to be infallible evidence of no other, subsequent, consequence
being thinkable.
Does the satisfaction of any other desire show an analogy to this
consequence? Quite on the contrary, the satisfaction of desire is in
every other case evinced by a period of rest; and even if a
_tristitia_[21] does supervene--indicating, by the way, that every
satisfaction of an appetite is comical--this _tristitia_ is a
straightforward consequence, though no _tristitia_ so eloquently
attests a preceding comical element as does that following love.
It is quite another matter with an enormous consequence such as
we are dealing with, a consequence of which no one knows whence
it comes, nor whether it will come; whereas, if it does come, it
comes as a consequence.
Who is able to grasp this? And yet that which for the initiates of
love constitutes the greatest pleasure is also the most important thing
for them--so important that they even adopt new names, derived
from the consequence thereof which thus, curiously enough, assumes
retroactive force. The lover is now called father, his sweetheart,
mother; and these names seem to them the most beautiful. And yet there
is a being to whom these names are even more beautiful; for what is as
beautiful as filial piety? To me it seems the most beautiful of all
sentiments; and fortunately I can appreciate the thought underlying it.
We are taught that it is seeming in a son to love his father. This I
comprehend, I cannot even suspect that there is any contradiction
possible here, and I acknowledge infinite satisfaction in being held
by the loving bonds of filial piety. I believe it is the greatest debt
of all to owe another being one's life. I believe that this debt cannot
ever be wiped out, or even fathomed by any calculation, and for this