The Advancement of Learning
manner was, did conclude every particular with this clause, “And in this
fortune had no part.” And it came so to pass, that he never prospered in
anything he took in hand afterwards. For this is too high and too
arrogant, savouring of that which Ezekiel saith of Pharaoh, _Dicis_,
_Fluvius est neus et ego feci memet ipsum_; or of that which another
prophet speaketh, that men offer sacrifices to their nets and snares; and
that which the poet expresseth,
“Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile libro,
Nunc adsint!”
For these confidences were ever unhallowed, and unblessed; and,
therefore, those that were great politiques indeed ever ascribed their
successes to their felicity and not to their skill or virtue. For so
Sylla surnamed himself Felix, not Magnus. So Cæsar said to the master of
the ship, _Cæsarem portas et fortunam ejus_.
(12) But yet, nevertheless, these positions, _Faber quisque fortunæ suæ_:
_Sapiens dominabitur astris_: _Invia virtuti null est via_, and the like,
being taken and used as spurs to industry, and not as stirrups to
insolency, rather for resolution than for the presumption or outward
declaration, have been ever thought sound and good; and are no question
imprinted in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of this opinion as
they can scarce contain it within. As we see in Augustus Cæsar (who was
rather diverse from his uncle than inferior in virtue), how when he died
he desired his friends about him to give him a _plaudite_, as if he were
conscious to himself that he had played his part well upon the stage.
This part of knowledge we do report also as deficient; not but that it is
practised too much, but it hath not been reduced to writing. And,
therefore, lest it should seem to any that it is not comprehensible by
axiom, it is requisite, as we did in the former, that we set down some
heads or passages of it.
(13) Wherein it may appear at the first a new and unwonted argument to
teach men how to raise and make their fortune; a doctrine wherein every
man perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple, till he see the
difficulty: for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as virtue; and it is
as hard and severe a thing to be a true politique, as to be truly moral.
But the handling hereof concerneth learning greatly, both in honour and
in substance. In honour, because pragmatical men may not go away with an
opinion that learning is like a lark, that can mount and sing, and please
herself, and nothing else; but may know that she holdeth as well of the
hawk, that can soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the prey.
In substance, because it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth, that
nothing be in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise in the
globe of crystal or form; that is, that there be not anything in being
and action which should not be drawn and collected into contemplation and
doctrine. Neither doth learning admire or esteem of this architecture of
fortune otherwise than as of an inferior work, for no man’s fortune can
be an end worthy of his being, and many times the worthiest men do
abandon their fortune willingly for better respects: but nevertheless
fortune as an organ of virtue and merit deserveth the consideration.
(14) First, therefore, the precept which I conceive to be most summary
towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain that window which Momus
did require; who seeing in the frame of man’s heart such angles and
recesses, found fault there was not a window to look into them; that is,
to procure good informations of particulars touching persons, their
natures, their desires and ends, their customs and fashions, their helps
and advantages, and whereby they chiefly stand, so again their weaknesses
and disadvantages, and where they lie most open and obnoxious, their
friends, factions, dependences; and again their opposites, enviers,
competitors, their moods and times, _Sola viri molles aditus et tempora
noras_; their principles, rules, and observations, and the like: and this
not only of persons but of actions; what are on foot from time to time,
and how they are conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they import, and
the like. For the knowledge of present actions is not only material in
itself, but without it also the knowledge of persons is very erroneous:
for men change with the actions; and whilst they are in pursuit they are
one, and when they return to their nature they are another. These
informations of particulars, touching persons and actions, are as the
minor propositions in every active syllogism; for no excellency of
observations (which are as the major propositions) can suffice to ground
a conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the minors.
(15) That this knowledge is possible, Solomon is our surety, who saith,
_Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda_; _sed vir prudens
exhauriet illud_. And although the knowledge itself falleth not under
precept because it is of individuals, yet the instructions for the
obtaining of it may.
(16) We will begin, therefore, with this precept, according to the
ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief and
distrust; that more trust be given to countenances and deeds than to
words; and in words rather to sudden passages and surprised words than to
set and purposed words. Neither let that be feared which is said,
_Fronti nulla fides_, which is meant of a general outward behaviour, and
not of the private and subtle motions and labours of the countenance and
gesture; which, as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is _Animi janua_, “the gate
of the mind.” None more close than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of
Gallus, _Etenim vultu offensionem conjectaverat_. So again, noting the
differing character and manner of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in
the Senate, he saith, touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech
of Germanicus, thus: _Magis in speciem adornatis verbis_, _quam ut
penitus sentire crederetur_; but of Drusus thus: _Paucioribus sed
intentior_, _et fida oratione_; and in another place, speaking of his
character of speech when he did anything that was gracious and popular,
he saith, “That in other things he was _velut eluctantium verborum_;” but
then again, _solutius loquebatur quando subveniret_. So that there is no
such artificer of dissimulation, nor no such commanded countenance
(_vultus jussus_), that can sever from a feigned tale some of these
fashions, either a more slight and careless fashion, or more set and
formal, or more tedious and wandering, or coming from a man more drily
and hardly.
(17) Neither are deeds such assured pledges as that they may be trusted
without a judicious consideration of their magnitude and nature: _Fraus
sibi in parvis fidem præstruit ut majore emolumento fallat_; and the
Italian thinketh himself upon the point to be bought and sold, when he is
better used than he was wont to be without manifest cause. For small
favours, they do but lull men to sleep, both as to caution and as to
industry; and are, as Demosthenes calleth them, _Alimenta socordiæ_. So
again we see how false the nature of some deeds are, in that particular
which Mutianus practised upon Antonius Primus, upon that hollow and
unfaithful reconcilement which was made between them; whereupon Mutianus
advanced many of the friends of Antonius, _Simul amicis ejus præfecturas
et tribunatus largitur_: wherein, under pretence to strengthen him, he
did desolate him, and won from him his dependents.
(18) As for words, though they be like waters to physicians, full of
flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised specially with
the advantage of passion and affection. For so we see Tiberius, upon a
stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, came a step forth of his
dissimulation when he said, “You are hurt because you do not reign;” of
which Tacitus saith, _Audita hæc raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuere_:
_correptamque Græco versu admonuit_, _ideo lædi quia non regnaret_. And,
therefore, the poet doth elegantly call passions tortures that urge men
to confess their secrets:—
“Vino torus et ira.”
And experience showeth there are few men so true to themselves and so
settled but that, sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bravery, sometimes
upon kindness, sometimes upon trouble of mind and weakness, they open
themselves; specially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation,
according to the proverb of Spain, _Di mentira_, _y sacar as verdad_:
“Tell a lie and find a truth.”
(19) As for the knowing of men which is at second hand from reports:
men’s weaknesses and faults are best known from their enemies, their
virtues and abilities from their friends, their customs and times from
their servants, their conceits and opinions from their familiar friends,
with whom they discourse most. General fame is light, and the opinions
conceived by superiors or equals are deceitful; for to such men are more
masked: _Verior fama e domesticis emanat_.
(20) But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is by their
natures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men are best interpreted by
their natures, and the wisest by their ends. For it was both pleasantly
and wisely said (though I think very untruly) by a nuncio of the Pope,
returning from a certain nation where he served as lidger; whose opinion
being asked touching the appointment of one to go in his place, he wished
that in any case they did not send one that was too wise; because no very
wise man would ever imagine what they in that country were like to do.
And certainly it is an error frequent for men to shoot over, and to
suppose deeper ends and more compass reaches than are: the Italian
proverb being elegant, and for the most part true:—
“Di danari, di senno, e di fede,
C’è ne manco che non credi.”
“There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less good faith than men
do account upon.”
(21) But princes, upon a far other reason, are best interpreted by their
natures, and private persons by their ends. For princes being at the top
of human desires, they have for the most part no particular ends whereto
they aspire, by distance from which a man might take measure and scale of
the rest of their actions and desires; which is one of the causes that
maketh their hearts more inscrutable. Neither is it sufficient to inform
ourselves in men’s ends and natures of the variety of them only, but also
of the predominancy, what humour reigneth most, and what end is
principally sought. For so we see, when Tigellinus saw himself
outstripped by Petronius Turpilianus in Nero’s humours of pleasures,
_metus ejus rimatur_, he wrought upon Nero’s fears, whereby he broke the
other’s neck.
(22) But to all this part of inquiry the most compendious way resteth in
three things; the first, to have general acquaintance and inwardness with
those which have general acquaintance and look most into the world; and
specially according to the diversity of business, and the diversity of
persons, to have privacy and conversation with some one friend at least
which is perfect and well-intelligenced in every several kind. The
second is to keep a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and secrecy; in
most things liberty; secrecy where it importeth; for liberty of speech
inviteth and provoketh liberty to be used again, and so bringeth much to
a man’s knowledge; and secrecy on the other side induceth trust and
inwardness. The last is the reducing of a man’s self to this watchful
and serene habit, as to make account and purpose, in every conference and
action, as well to observe as to act. For as Epictetus would have a
philosopher in every particular action to say to himself, _Et hoc volo_,
_et etiam institutum servare_; so a politic man in everything should say