The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
It is moral excellence, _i.e._ Virtue, of course which I mean, because
this it is which is concerned with feelings and actions, and in these
there can be excess and defect and the mean: it is possible, for
instance, to feel the emotions of fear, confidence, lust, anger,
compassion, and pleasure and pain generally, too much or too little,
and in either case wrongly; but to feel them when we ought, on what
occasions, towards whom, why, and as, we should do, is the mean, or in
other words the best state, and this is the property of Virtue.
In like manner too with respect to the actions, there may be excess and
defect and the mean. Now Virtue is concerned with feelings and actions,
in which the excess is wrong and the defect is blamed but the mean is
praised and goes right; and both these circumstances belong to Virtue.
Virtue then is in a sense a mean state, since it certainly has an
aptitude for aiming at the mean.
Again, one may go wrong in many different ways (because, as the
Pythagoreans expressed it, evil is of the class of the infinite, good
of the finite), but right only in one; and so the former is easy, the
latter difficult; easy to miss the mark, but hard to hit it: and for
these reasons, therefore, both the excess and defect belong to Vice,
and the mean state to Virtue; for, as the poet has it,
“Men may be bad in many ways,
But good in one alone.”
Chapter VI.
Virtue then is “a state apt to exercise deliberate choice, being in the
relative mean, determined by reason, and[14] as the man of practical
wisdom would determine.”
It is a middle state between too faulty ones, in the way of excess on
one side and of defect on the other: and it is so moreover, because the
faulty states on one side fall short of, and those on the other exceed,
what is right, both in the case of the feelings and the actions; but
Virtue finds, and when found adopts, the mean.
And so, viewing it in respect of its essence and definition, Virtue is
a mean state; but in reference to the chief good and to excellence it
is the highest state possible.
But it must not be supposed that every action or every feeling is
capable of subsisting in this mean state, because some there are which
are so named as immediately to convey the notion of badness, as
malevolence, shamelessness, envy; or, to instance in actions, adultery,
theft, homicide; for all these and suchlike are blamed because they are
in themselves bad, not the having too much or too little of them.
In these then you never can go right, but must always be wrong: nor in
such does the right or wrong depend on the selection of a proper
person, time, or manner (take adultery for instance), but simply doing
any one soever of those things is being wrong.
You might as well require that there should be determined a mean state,
an excess and a defect in respect of acting unjustly, being cowardly,
or giving up all control of the passions: for at this rate there will
be of excess and defect a mean state; of excess, excess; and of defect,
defect.
But just as of perfected self-mastery and courage there is no excess
and defect, because the mean is in one point of view the highest
possible state, so neither of those faulty states can you have a mean
state, excess, or defect, but howsoever done they are wrong: you
cannot, in short, have of excess and defect a mean state, nor of a mean
state excess and defect.
Chapter VII.
It is not enough, however, to state this in general terms, we must also
apply it to particular instances, because in treatises on moral conduct
general statements have an air of vagueness, but those which go into
detail one of greater reality: for the actions after all must be in
detail, and the general statements, to be worth anything, must hold
good here.
We must take these details then from the well-known scheme.[15]
I. In respect of fears and confidence or boldness:
The Mean state is Courage: men may exceed, of course, either in absence
of fear or in positive confidence: the former has no name (which is a
common case), the latter is called rash: again, the man who has too
much fear and too little confidence is called a coward.
II. In respect of pleasures and pains (but not all, and perhaps fewer
pains than pleasures):
The Mean state here is perfected Self-Mastery, the defect total absence
of Self-control. As for defect in respect of pleasure, there are really
no people who are chargeable with it, so, of course, there is really no
name for such characters, but, as they are conceivable, we will give
them one and call them insensible.
III. In respect of giving and taking wealth[16] (_a_):
The mean state is Liberality, the excess Prodigality, the defect
Stinginess: here each of the extremes involves really an excess and
defect contrary to each other: I mean, the prodigal gives out too much
and takes in too little, while the stingy man takes in too much and
gives out too little. (It must be understood that we are now giving
merely an outline and summary, intentionally: and we will, in a later
part of the treatise, draw out the distinctions with greater
exactness.)
IV. In respect of wealth (b):
There are other dispositions besides these just mentioned; a mean state
called Munificence (for the munificent man differs from the liberal,
the former having necessarily to do with great wealth, the latter with
but small); the excess called by the names either of Want of taste or
Vulgar Profusion, and the defect Paltriness (these also differ from the
extremes connected with liberality, and the manner of their difference
shall also be spoken of later).
V. In respect of honour and dishonour (a):
The mean state Greatness of Soul, the excess which may be called
χαυνότης,[17] and the defect Littleness of Soul.
VI. In respect of honour and dishonour (b):
Now there is a state bearing the same relation to Greatness of Soul as
we said just now Liberality does to Munificence, with the difference
that is of being about a small amount of the same thing: this state
having reference to small honour, as Greatness of Soul to great honour;
a man may, of course, grasp at honour either more than he should or
less; now he that exceeds in his grasping at it is called ambitious, he
that falls short unambitious, he that is just as he should be has no
proper name: nor in fact have the states, except that the disposition
of the ambitious man is called ambition. For this reason those who are
in either extreme lay claim to the mean as a debateable land, and we
call the virtuous character sometimes by the name ambitious,[18]
sometimes by that of unambitious, and we commend sometimes the one and
sometimes the other. Why we do it shall be said in the subsequent part
of the treatise; but now we will go on with the rest of the virtues
after the plan we have laid down.
VII. In respect of anger:
Here too there is excess, defect, and a mean state; but since they may
be said to have really no proper names, as we call the virtuous
character Meek, we will call the mean state Meekness, and of the
extremes, let the man who is excessive be denominated Passionate, and
the faulty state Passionateness, and him who is deficient Angerless,
and the defect Angerlessness.
There are also three other mean states, having some mutual resemblance,
but still with differences; they are alike in that they all have for
their object-matter intercourse of words and deeds, and they differ in
that one has respect to truth herein, the other two to what is
pleasant; and this in two ways, the one in relaxation and amusement,
the other in all things which occur in daily life. We must say a word
or two about these also, that we may the better see that in all matters
the mean is praiseworthy, while the extremes are neither right nor
worthy of praise but of blame.
Now of these, it is true, the majority have really no proper names, but
still we must try, as in the other cases, to coin some for them for the
sake of clearness and intelligibleness.
I. In respect of truth:
The man who is in the mean state we will call Truthful, and his state
Truthfulness, and as to the disguise of truth, if it be on the side of
exaggeration, Braggadocia, and him that has it a Braggadocio; if on
that of diminution, Reserve and Reserved shall be the terms.
II. In respect of what is pleasant in the way of relaxation or
amusement.
The mean state shall be called Easy-pleasantry, and the character
accordingly a man of Easy-pleasantry; the excess Buffoonery, and the
man a Buffoon; the man deficient herein a Clown, and his state
Clownishness.
III. In respect of what is pleasant in daily life.
He that is as he should be may be called Friendly, and his mean state
Friendliness: he that exceeds, if it be without any interested motive,
somewhat too Complaisant, if with such motive, a Flatterer: he that is
deficient and in all instances unpleasant, Quarrelsome and Cross.
There are mean states likewise in feelings and matters concerning them.
Shamefacedness, for instance, is no virtue, still a man is praised for
being shamefaced: for in these too the one is denominated the man in
the mean state, the other in the excess; the Dumbfoundered, for
instance, who is overwhelmed with shame on all and any occasions: the
man who is in the defect, _i.e._ who has no shame at all in his
composition, is called Shameless: but the right character Shamefaced.
Indignation against successful vice,[19] again, is a state in the mean
between Envy and Malevolence: they all three have respect to pleasure
and pain produced by what happens to one’s neighbour: for the man who
has this right feeling is annoyed at undeserved success of others,
while the envious man goes beyond him and is annoyed at all success of
others, and the malevolent falls so far short of feeling annoyance that
he even rejoices [at misfortune of others].
But for the discussion of these also there will be another opportunity,
as of Justice too, because the term is used in more senses than one. So
after this we will go accurately into each and say how they are mean
states: and in like manner also with respect to the Intellectual
Excellences.
Chapter VIII.
Now as there are three states in each case, two faulty either in the
way of excess or defect, and one right, which is the mean state, of
course all are in a way opposed to one another; the extremes, for
instance, not only to the mean but also to one another, and the mean to
the extremes: for just as the half is greater if compared with the less
portion, and less if compared with the greater, so the mean states,
compared with the defects, exceed, whether in feelings or actions, and
_vice versa_. The brave man, for instance, shows as rash when compared
with the coward, and cowardly when compared with the rash; similarly
too the man of perfected self-mastery, viewed in comparison with the
man destitute of all perception, shows like a man of no self-control,
but in comparison with the man who really has no self-control, he looks
like one destitute of all perception: and the liberal man compared with
the stingy seems prodigal, and by the side of the prodigal, stingy.
And so the extreme characters push away, so to speak, towards each
other the man in the mean state; the brave man is called a rash man by
the coward, and a coward by the rash man, and in the other cases
accordingly. And there being this mutual opposition, the contrariety
between the extremes is greater than between either and the mean,
because they are further from one another than from the mean, just as
the greater or less portion differ more from each other than either
from the exact half.
Again, in some cases an extreme will bear a resemblance to the mean;
rashness, for instance, to courage, and prodigality to liberality; but