The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
old regal constitutions which Homer drew from, in which the Kings would
announce to the commonalty what they had determined before.
Now since that which is the object of Moral Choice is something in our
own power, which is the object of deliberation and the grasping of the
Will, Moral Choice must be “a grasping after something in our own power
consequent upon Deliberation:” because after having deliberated we
decide, and then grasp by our Will in accordance with the result of our
deliberation.[12]
Let this be accepted as a sketch of the nature and object of Moral
Choice, that object being “Means to Ends.”
Chapter VI.
That Wish has for its object-matter the End, has been already stated;
but there are two opinions respecting it; some thinking that its object
is real good, others whatever impresses the mind with a notion of good.
Now those who maintain that the object of Wish is real good are beset
by this difficulty, that what is wished for by him who chooses wrongly
is not really an object of Wish (because, on their theory, if it is an
object of wish, it must be good, but it is, in the case supposed,
evil). Those who maintain, on the contrary, that that which impresses
the mind with a notion of good is properly the object of Wish, have to
meet this difficulty, that there is nothing naturally an object of Wish
but to each individual whatever seems good to him; now different people
have different notions, and it may chance contrary ones.
But, if these opinions do not satisfy us, may we not say that,
abstractedly and as a matter of objective truth, the really good is the
object of Wish, but to each individual whatever impresses his mind with
the notion of good.[13] And so to the good man that is an object of
Wish which is really and truly so, but to the bad man anything may be;
just as physically those things are wholesome to the healthy which are
really so, but other things to the sick. And so too of bitter and
sweet, and hot and heavy, and so on. For the good man judges in every
instance correctly, and in every instance the notion conveyed to his
mind is the true one.
For there are fair and pleasant things peculiar to, and so varying
with, each state; and perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of
the good man is his seeing the truth in every instance, he being, in
fact, the rule and measure of these matters.
The multitude of men seem to be deceived by reason of pleasure, because
though it is not really a good it impresses their minds with the notion
of goodness, so they choose what is pleasant as good and avoid pain as
an evil.
Chapter VII.
Now since the End is the object of Wish, and the means to the End of
Deliberation and Moral Choice, the actions regarding these matters must
be in the way of Moral Choice, _i.e._ voluntary: but the acts of
working out the virtues are such actions, and therefore Virtue is in
our power.
And so too is Vice: because wherever it is in our power to do it is
also in our power to forbear doing, and _vice versâ_: therefore if the
doing (being in a given case creditable) is in our power, so too is the
forbearing (which is in the same case discreditable), and _vice versâ_.
But if it is in our power to do and to forbear doing what is creditable
or the contrary, and these respectively constitute the being good or
bad, then the being good or vicious characters is in our power.
As for the well-known saying, “No man voluntarily is wicked or
involuntarily happy,” it is partly true, partly false; for no man is
happy against his will, of course, but wickedness is voluntary. Or must
we dispute the statements lately made, and not say that Man is the
originator or generator of his actions as much as of his children?
But if this is matter of plain manifest fact, and we cannot refer our
actions to any other originations beside those in our own power, those
things must be in our own power, and so voluntary, the originations of
which are in ourselves.
Moreover, testimony seems to be borne to these positions both privately
by individuals, and by law-givers too, in that they chastise and punish
those who do wrong (unless they do so on compulsion, or by reason of
ignorance which is not self-caused), while they honour those who act
rightly, under the notion of being likely to encourage the latter and
restrain the former. But such things as are not in our own power,
_i.e._ not voluntary, no one thinks of encouraging us to do, knowing it
to be of no avail for one to have been persuaded not to be hot (for
instance), or feel pain, or be hungry, and so forth, because we shall
have those sensations all the same.
And what makes the case stronger is this: that they chastise for the
very fact of ignorance, when it is thought to be self-caused; to the
drunken, for instance, penalties are double, because the origination in
such case lies in a man’s own self: for he might have helped getting
drunk, and this is the cause of his ignorance.
Again, those also who are ignorant of legal regulations which they are
bound to know, and which are not hard to know, they chastise; and
similarly in all other cases where neglect is thought to be the cause
of the ignorance, under the notion that it was in their power to
prevent their ignorance, because they might have paid attention.
But perhaps a man is of such a character that he cannot attend to such
things: still men are themselves the causes of having become such
characters by living carelessly, and also of being unjust or destitute
of self-control, the former by doing evil actions, the latter by
spending their time in drinking and such-like; because the particular
acts of working form corresponding characters, as is shown by those who
are practising for any contest or particular course of action, for such
men persevere in the acts of working.
As for the plea, that a man did not know that habits are produced from
separate acts of working, we reply, such ignorance is a mark of
excessive stupidity.
Furthermore, it is wholly irrelevant to say that the man who acts
unjustly or dissolutely does not _wish_ to attain the habits of these
vices: for if a man wittingly does those things whereby he must become
unjust he is to all intents and purposes unjust voluntarily; but he
cannot with a wish cease to be unjust and become just. For, to take the
analogous case, the sick man cannot with a wish be well again, yet in a
supposable case he is voluntarily ill because he has produced his
sickness by living intemperately and disregarding his physicians. There
was a time then when he might have helped being ill, but now he has let
himself go he cannot any longer; just as he who has let a stone out of
his hand cannot recall it,[14] and yet it rested with him to aim and
throw it, because the origination was in his power. Just so the unjust
man, and he who has lost all self-control, might originally have helped
being what they are, and so they are voluntarily what they are; but now
that they are become so they no longer have the power of being
otherwise.
And not only are mental diseases voluntary, but the bodily are so in
some men, whom we accordingly blame: for such as are naturally deformed
no one blames, only such as are so by reason of want of exercise, and
neglect: and so too of weakness and maiming: no one would think of
upbraiding, but would rather compassionate, a man who is blind by
nature, or from disease, or from an accident; but every one would blame
him who was so from excess of wine, or any other kind of intemperance.
It seems, then, that in respect of bodily diseases, those which depend
on ourselves are censured, those which do not are not censured; and if
so, then in the case of the mental disorders, those which are censured
must depend upon ourselves.
But suppose a man to say, “that (by our own admission) all men aim at
that which conveys to their minds an impression of good, and that men
have no control over this impression, but that the End impresses each
with a notion correspondent to his own individual character; that to be
sure if each man is in a way the cause of his own moral state, so he
will be also of the kind of impression he receives: whereas, if this is
not so, no one is the cause to himself of doing evil actions, but he
does them by reason of ignorance of the true End, supposing that
through their means he will secure the chief good. Further, that this
aiming at the End is no matter of one’s own choice, but one must be
born with a power of mental vision, so to speak, whereby to judge
fairly and choose that which is really good; and he is blessed by
nature who has this naturally well: because it is the most important
thing and the fairest, and what a man cannot get or learn from another
but will have such as nature has given it; and for this to be so given
well and fairly would be excellence of nature in the highest and truest
sense.”
If all this be true, how will Virtue be a whit more voluntary than
Vice? Alike to the good man and the bad, the End gives its impression
and is fixed by nature or howsoever you like to say, and they act so
and so, referring everything else to this End.
Whether then we suppose that the End impresses each man’s mind with
certain notions not merely by nature, but that there is somewhat also
dependent on himself; or that the End is given by nature, and yet
Virtue is voluntary because the good man does all the rest voluntarily,
Vice must be equally so; because his own agency equally attaches to the
bad man in the actions, even if not in the selection of the End.
If then, as is commonly said, the Virtues are voluntary (because we at
least cooperate[15] in producing our moral states, and we assume the
End to be of a certain kind according as we are ourselves of certain
characters), the Vices must be voluntary also, because the cases are
exactly similar.
Chapter VIII.
Well now, we have stated generally respecting the Moral Virtues, the
genus (in outline), that they are mean states, and that they are
habits, and how they are formed, and that they are of themselves
calculated to act upon the circumstances out of which they were formed,
and that they are in our own power and voluntary, and are to be done so
as right Reason may direct.
But the particular actions and the habits are not voluntary in the same
sense; for of the actions we are masters from beginning to end
(supposing of course a knowledge of the particular details), but only
of the origination of the habits, the addition by small particular
accessions not being cognisiable (as is the case with sicknesses):
still they are voluntary because it rested with us to use our
circumstances this way or that.
Chapter IX.
Here we will resume the particular discussion of the Moral Virtues, and
say what they are, what is their object-matter, and how they stand
respectively related to it: of course their number will be thereby
shown.
First, then, of Courage. Now that it is a mean state, in respect of
fear and boldness, has been already said: further, the objects of our
fears are obviously things fearful or, in a general way of statement,
evils; which accounts for the common definition of fear, viz.
“expectation of evil.”
Of course we fear evils of all kinds: disgrace, for instance, poverty,
disease, desolateness, death; but not all these seem to be the
object-matter of the Brave man, because there are things which to fear
is right and noble, and not to fear is base; disgrace, for example,
since he who fears this is a good man and has a sense of honour, and he
who does not fear it is shameless (though there are those who call him
Brave by analogy, because he somewhat resembles the Brave man who
agrees with him in being free from fear); but poverty, perhaps, or