The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
do much the same, for they become hopeful when in that state); but when
the event disappoints their expectations they run away: now it was said
to be the character of a Brave man to withstand things which are
fearful to man or produce that impression, because it is honourable so
to do and the contrary is dishonourable.
For this reason it is thought to be a greater proof of Courage to be
fearless and undisturbed under the pressure of sudden fear than under
that which may be anticipated, because Courage then comes rather from a
fixed habit, or less from preparation: since as to foreseen dangers a
man might take his line even from calculation and reasoning, but in
those which are sudden he will do so according to his fixed habit of
mind.
Fifthly and lastly, those who are acting under Ignorance have a show of
Courage and are not very far from the Hopeful; but still they are
inferior inasmuch as they have no opinion of themselves; which the
others have, and therefore stay and contest a field for some little
time; but they who have been deceived fly the moment they know things
to be otherwise than they supposed, which the Argives experienced when
they fell on the Lacedæmonians, taking them for the men of Sicyon.
Chapter XII.
We have described then what kind of men the Brave are, and what they
who are thought to be, but are not really, Brave.
It must be remarked, however, that though Courage has for its
object-matter boldness and fear it has not both equally so, but objects
of fear much more than the former; for he that under pressure of these
is undisturbed and stands related to them as he ought is better
entitled to the name of Brave than he who is properly affected towards
objects of confidence. So then men are termed Brave for withstanding
painful things.
It follows that Courage involves pain and is justly praised, since it
is a harder matter to withstand things that are painful than to abstain
from such as are pleasant.
It must not be thought but that the End and object of Courage is
pleasant, but it is obscured by the surrounding circumstances: which
happens also in the gymnastic games; to the boxers the End is pleasant
with a view to which they act, I mean the crown and the honours; but
the receiving the blows they do is painful and annoying to flesh and
blood, and so is all the labour they have to undergo; and, as these
drawbacks are many, the object in view being small appears to have no
pleasantness in it.
If then we may say the same of Courage, of course death and wounds must
be painful to the Brave man and against his will: still he endures
these because it is honourable so to do or because it is dishonourable
not to do so. And the more complete his virtue and his happiness so
much the more will he be pained at the notion of death: since to such a
man as he is it is best worth while to live, and he with full
consciousness is deprived of the greatest goods by death, and this is a
painful idea. But he is not the less Brave for feeling it to be so, nay
rather it may be he is shown to be more so because he chooses the
honour that may be reaped in war in preference to retaining safe
possession of these other goods. The fact is that to act with pleasure
does not belong to all the virtues, except so far as a man realises the
End of his actions.
But there is perhaps no reason why not such men should make the best
soldiers, but those who are less truly Brave but have no other good to
care for: these being ready to meet danger and bartering their lives
against small gain.
Let thus much be accepted as sufficient on the subject of Courage; the
true nature of which it is not difficult to gather, in outline at
least, from what has been said.
Chapter XIII.
Next let us speak of Perfected Self-Mastery, which seems to claim the
next place to Courage, since these two are the Excellences of the
Irrational part of the Soul.
That it is a mean state, having for its object-matter Pleasures, we
have already said (Pains being in fact its object-matter in a less
degree and dissimilar manner), the state of utter absence of
self-control has plainly the same object-matter; the next thing then is
to determine what kind of Pleasures.
Let Pleasures then be understood to be divided into mental and bodily:
instances of the former being love of honour or of learning: it being
plain that each man takes pleasure in that of these two objects which
he has a tendency to like, his body being no way affected but rather
his intellect. Now men are not called perfectly self-mastering or
wholly destitute of self-control in respect of pleasures of this class:
nor in fact in respect of any which are not bodily; those for example
who love to tell long stories, and are prosy, and spend their days
about mere chance matters, we call gossips but not wholly destitute of
self-control, nor again those who are pained at the loss of money or
friends.
It is bodily Pleasures then which are the object-matter of Perfected
Self-Mastery, but not even all these indifferently: I mean, that they
who take pleasure in objects perceived by the Sight, as colours, and
forms, and painting, are not denominated men of Perfected Self-Mastery,
or wholly destitute of self-control; and yet it would seem that one may
take pleasure even in such objects, as one ought to do, or excessively,
or too little.
So too of objects perceived by the sense of Hearing; no one applies the
terms before quoted respectively to those who are excessively pleased
with musical tunes or acting, or to those who take such pleasure as
they ought.
Nor again to those persons whose pleasure arises from the sense of
Smell, except incidentally:[24] I mean, we do not say men have no
self-control because they take pleasure in the scent of fruit, or
flowers, or incense, but rather when they do so in the smells of
unguents and sauces: since men destitute of self-control take pleasure
herein, because hereby the objects of their lusts are recalled to their
imagination (you may also see other men take pleasure in the smell of
food when they are hungry): but to take pleasure in such is a mark of
the character before named since these are objects of desire to him.
Now not even brutes receive pleasure in right of these senses, except
incidentally. I mean, it is not the scent of hares’ flesh but the
eating it which dogs take pleasure in, perception of which pleasure is
caused by the sense of Smell. Or again, it is not the lowing of the ox
but eating him which the lion likes; but of the fact of his nearness
the lion is made sensible by the lowing, and so he appears to take
pleasure in this. In like manner, he has no pleasure in merely seeing
or finding a stag or wild goat, but in the prospect of a meal.
The habits of Perfect Self-Mastery and entire absence of self-control
have then for their object-matter such pleasures as brutes also share
in, for which reason they are plainly servile and brutish: they are
Touch and Taste.
But even Taste men seem to make little or no use of; for to the sense
of Taste belongs the distinguishing of flavours; what men do, in fact,
who are testing the quality of wines or seasoning “made dishes.”
But men scarcely take pleasure at all in these things, at least those
whom we call destitute of self-control do not, but only in the actual
enjoyment which arises entirely from the sense of Touch, whether in
eating or in drinking, or in grosser lusts. This accounts for the wish
said to have been expressed once by a great glutton, “that his throat
had been formed longer than a crane’s neck,” implying that his pleasure
was derived from the Touch.
The sense then with which is connected the habit of absence of
self-control is the most common of all the senses, and this habit would
seem to be justly a matter of reproach, since it attaches to us not in
so far as we are men but in so far as we are animals. Indeed it is
brutish to take pleasure in such things and to like them best of all;
for the most respectable of the pleasures arising from the touch have
been set aside; those, for instance, which occur in the course of
gymnastic training from the rubbing and the warm bath: because the
touch of the man destitute of self-control is not indifferently of
_any_ part of the body but only of particular parts.
Now of lusts or desires some are thought to be universal, others
peculiar and acquired; thus desire for food is natural since every one
who really needs desires also food, whether solid or liquid, or both
(and, as Homer says, the man in the prime of youth needs and desires
intercourse with the other sex); but when we come to this or that
particular kind, then neither is the desire universal nor in all men is
it directed to the same objects. And therefore the conceiving of such
desires plainly attaches to us as individuals. It must be admitted,
however, that there is something natural in it: because different
things are pleasant to different men and a preference of some
particular objects to chance ones is universal. Well then, in the case
of the desires which are strictly and properly natural few men go wrong
and all in one direction, that is, on the side of too much: I mean, to
eat and drink of such food as happens to be on the table till one is
overfilled is exceeding in quantity the natural limit, since the
natural desire is simply a supply of a real deficiency.
For this reason these men are called belly-mad, as filling it beyond
what they ought, and it is the slavish who become of this character.
But in respect of the peculiar pleasures many men go wrong and in many
different ways; for whereas the term “fond of so and so” implies either
taking pleasure in wrong objects, or taking pleasure excessively, or as
the mass of men do, or in a wrong way, they who are destitute of all
self-control exceed in all these ways; that is to say, they take
pleasure in some things in which they ought not to do so (because they
are properly objects of detestation), and in such as it is right to
take pleasure in they do so more than they ought and as the mass of men
do.
Well then, that excess with respect to pleasures is absence of
self-control, and blameworthy, is plain. But viewing these habits on
the side of pains, we find that a man is not said to have the virtue
for withstanding them (as in the case of Courage), nor the vice for not
withstanding them; but the man destitute of self-control is such,
because he is pained more than he ought to be at not obtaining things
which are pleasant (and thus his pleasure produces pain to him), and
the man of Perfected Self-Mastery is such in virtue of not being pained
by their absence, that is, by having to abstain from what is pleasant.
Now the man destitute of self-control desires either all pleasant
things indiscriminately or those which are specially pleasant, and he
is impelled by his desire to choose these things in preference to all
others; and this involves pain, not only when he misses the attainment
of his objects but, in the very desiring them, since all desire is
accompanied by pain. Surely it is a strange case this, being pained by
reason of pleasure.
As for men who are defective on the side of pleasure, who take less
pleasure in things than they ought, they are almost imaginary
characters, because such absence of sensual perception is not natural
to man: for even the other animals distinguish between different kinds
of food, and like some kinds and dislike others. In fact, could a man
be found who takes no pleasure in anything and to whom all things are
alike, he would be far from being human at all: there is no name for
such a character because it is simply imaginary.
But the man of Perfected Self-Mastery is in the mean with respect to