The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
receiving (expenditure of course we class under giving). Well now,
Prodigality exceeds in giving and forbearing to receive and is
deficient in receiving, while Stinginess is deficient in giving and
exceeds in receiving, but it is in small things.
The two parts of Prodigality, to be sure, do not commonly go together;
it is not easy, I mean, to give to all if you receive from none,
because private individuals thus giving will soon find their means run
short, and such are in fact thought to be prodigal. He that should
combine both would seem to be no little superior to the Stingy man: for
he may be easily cured, both by advancing in years, and also by the
want of means, and he may come thus to the mean: he has, you see,
already the _facts_ of the Liberal man, he gives and forbears to
receive, only he does neither in right manner or well. So if he could
be wrought upon by habituation in this respect, or change in any other
way, he would be a real Liberal man, for he will give to those to whom
he should, and will forbear to receive whence he ought not. This is the
reason too why he is thought not to be low in moral character, because
to exceed in giving and in forbearing to receive is no sign of badness
or meanness, but only of folly.
Well then, he who is Prodigal in this fashion is thought far superior
to the Stingy man for the aforementioned reasons, and also because he
does good to many, but the Stingy man to no one, not even to himself.
But most Prodigals, as has been said, combine with their other faults
that of receiving from improper sources, and on this point are Stingy:
and they become grasping, because they wish to spend and cannot do this
easily, since their means soon run short and they are necessitated to
get from some other quarter; and then again, because they care not for
what is honourable, they receive recklessly, and from all sources
indifferently, because they desire to give but care not how or whence.
And for this reason their givings are not Liberal, inasmuch as they are
not honourable, nor purely disinterested, nor done in right fashion;
but they oftentimes make those rich who should be poor, and to those
who are quiet respectable kind of people they will give nothing, but to
flatterers, or those who subserve their pleasures in any way, they will
give much. And therefore most of them are utterly devoid of
self-restraint; for as they are open-handed they are liberal in
expenditure upon the unrestrained gratification of their passions, and
turn off to their pleasures because they do not live with reference to
what is honourable.
Thus then the Prodigal, if unguided, slides into these faults; but if
he could get care bestowed on him he might come to the mean and to what
is right.
Stinginess, on the contrary, is incurable: old age, for instance, and
incapacity of any kind, is thought to make people Stingy; and it is
more congenial to human nature than Prodigality, the mass of men being
fond of money rather than apt to give: moreover it extends far and has
many phases, the modes of stinginess being thought to be many. For as
it consists of two things, defect of giving and excess of receiving,
everybody does not have it entire, but it is sometimes divided, and one
class of persons exceed in receiving, the other are deficient in
giving. I mean those who are designated by such appellations as
sparing, close-fisted, niggards, are all deficient in giving; but other
men’s property they neither desire nor are willing to receive, in some
instances from a real moderation and shrinking from what is base.
There are some people whose motive, either supposed or alleged, for
keeping their property is this, that they may never be driven to do
anything dishonourable: to this class belongs the skinflint, and every
one of similar character, so named from the excess of not-giving.
Others again decline to receive their neighbour’s goods from a motive
of fear; their notion being that it is not easy to take other people’s
things yourself without their taking yours: so they are content neither
to receive nor give.
The other class again who are Stingy in respect of receiving exceed in
that they receive anything from any source; such as they who work at
illiberal employments, brothel keepers, and such-like, and usurers who
lend small sums at large interest: for all these receive from improper
sources, and improper amounts. Their common characteristic is
base-gaining, since they all submit to disgrace for the sake of gain
and that small; because those who receive great things neither whence
they ought, nor what they ought (as for instance despots who sack
cities and plunder temples), we denominate wicked, impious, and unjust,
but not Stingy.
Now the dicer and bath-plunderer and the robber belong to the class of
the Stingy, for they are given to base gain: both busy themselves and
submit to disgrace for the sake of gain, and the one class incur the
greatest dangers for the sake of their booty, while the others make
gain of their friends to whom they ought to be giving.
So both classes, as wishing to make gain from improper sources, are
given to base gain, and all such receivings are Stingy. And with good
reason is Stinginess called the contrary of Liberality: both because it
is a greater evil than Prodigality, and because men err rather in this
direction than in that of the Prodigality which we have spoken of as
properly and completely such.
Let this be considered as what we have to say respecting Liberality and
the contrary vices.
Chapter III.
Next in order would seem to come a dissertation on Magnificence, this
being thought to be, like liberality, a virtue having for its
object-matter Wealth; but it does not, like that, extend to all
transactions in respect of Wealth, but only applies to such as are
expensive, and in these circumstances it exceeds liberality in respect
of magnitude, because it is (what the very name in Greek hints at)
fitting expense on a large scale: this term is of course relative: I
mean, the expenditure of equipping and commanding a trireme is not the
same as that of giving a public spectacle: “fitting” of course also is
relative to the individual, and the matter wherein and upon which he
has to spend. And a man is not denominated Magnificent for spending as
he should do in small or ordinary things, as, for instance,
“Oft to the wandering beggar did I give,”
but for doing so in great matters: that is to say, the Magnificent man
is liberal, but the liberal is not thereby Magnificent. The falling
short of such a state is called Meanness, the exceeding it Vulgar
Profusion, Want of Taste, and so on; which are faulty, not because they
are on an excessive scale in respect of right objects but, because they
show off in improper objects, and in improper manner: of these we will
speak presently. The Magnificent man is like a man of skill, because he
can see what is fitting, and can spend largely in good taste; for, as
we said at the commencement, the confirmed habit is determined by the
separate acts of working, and by its object-matter.
Well, the expenses of the Magnificent man are great and fitting: such
also are his works (because this secures the expenditure being not
great merely, but befitting the work). So then the work is to be
proportionate to the expense, and this again to the work, or even above
it: and the Magnificent man will incur such expenses from the motive of
honour, this being common to all the virtues, and besides he will do it
with pleasure and lavishly; excessive accuracy in calculation being
Mean. He will consider also how a thing may be done most beautifully
and fittingly, rather, than for how much it may be done, and how at the
least expense.
So the Magnificent man must be also a liberal man, because the liberal
man will also spend what he ought, and in right manner: but it is the
Great, that is to say tke large scale, which is distinctive of the
Magnificent man, the object-matter of liberality being the same, and
without spending more money than another man he will make the work more
magnificent. I mean, the excellence of a possession and of a work is
not the same: as a piece of property that thing is most valuable which
is worth most, gold for instance; but as a work that which is great and
beautiful, because the contemplation of such an object is admirable,
and so is that which is Magnificent. So the excellence of a work is
Magnificence on a large scale. There are cases of expenditure which we
call honourable, such as are dedicatory offerings to the gods, and the
furnishing their temples, and sacrifices, and in like manner everything
that has reference to the Deity, and all such public matters as are
objects of honourable ambition, as when men think in any case that it
is their duty to furnish a chorus for the stage splendidly, or fit out
and maintain a trireme, or give a general public feast.
Now in all these, as has been already stated, respect is had also to
the rank and the means of the man who is doing them: because they
should be proportionate to these, and befit not the work only but also
the doer of the work. For this reason a poor man cannot be a
Magnificent man, since he has not means wherewith to spend largely and
yet becomingly; and if he attempts it he is a fool, inasmuch as it is
out of proportion and contrary to propriety, whereas to be in
accordance with virtue a thing must be done rightly.
Such expenditure is fitting moreover for those to whom such things
previously belong, either through themselves or through their ancestors
or people with whom they are connected, and to the high-born or people
of high repute, and so on: because all these things imply greatness and
reputation.
So then the Magnificent man is pretty much as I have described him, and
Magnificence consists in such expenditures: because they are the
greatest and most honourable: and of private ones such as come but once
for all, marriage to wit, and things of that kind; and any occasion
which engages the interest of the community in general, or of those who
are in power; and what concerns receiving and despatching strangers;
and gifts, and repaying gifts: because the Magnificent man is not apt
to spend upon himself but on the public good, and gifts are pretty much
in the same case as dedicatory offerings.
It is characteristic also of the Magnificent man to furnish his house
suitably to his wealth, for this also in a way reflects credit; and
again, to spend rather upon such works as are of long duration, these
being most honourable. And again, propriety in each case, because the
same things are not suitable to gods and men, nor in a temple and a
tomb. And again, in the case of expenditures, each must be great of its
kind, and great expense on a great object is most magnificent, that is
in any case what is great in these particular things.
There is a difference too between greatness of a work and greatness of
expenditure: for instance, a very beautiful ball or cup is magnificent
as a present to a child, while the price of it is small and almost
mean. Therefore it is characteristic of the Magnificent man to do
magnificently whatever he is about: for whatever is of this kind cannot
be easily surpassed, and bears a proper proportion to the expenditure.
Such then is the Magnificent man.
The man who is in the state of excess, called one of Vulgar Profusion,
is in excess because he spends improperly, as has been said. I mean in
cases requiring small expenditure he lavishes much and shows off out of
taste; giving his club a feast fit for a wedding-party, or if he has to
furnish a chorus for a comedy, giving the actors purple to wear in the
first scene, as did the Megarians. And all such things he will do, not