The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
with a view to that which is really honourable, but to display his
wealth, and because he thinks he shall be admired for these things; and
he will spend little where he ought to spend much, and much where he
should spend little.
The Mean man will be deficient in every case, and even where he has
spent the most he will spoil the whole effect for want of some trifle;
he is procrastinating in all he does, and contrives how he may spend
the least, and does even that with lamentations about the expense, and
thinking that he does all things on a greater scale than he ought.
Of course, both these states are faulty, but they do not involve
disgrace because they are neither hurtful to others nor very unseemly.
Chapter IV.
The very name of Great-mindedness implies, that great things are its
object-matter; and we will first settle what kind of things. It makes
no difference, of course, whether we regard the moral state in the
abstract or as exemplified in an individual.
Well then, he is thought to be Great-minded who values himself highly
and at the same time justly, because he that does so without grounds is
foolish, and no virtuous character is foolish or senseless. Well, the
character I have described is Great-minded. The man who estimates
himself lowly, and at the same time justly, is modest; but not
Great-minded, since this latter quality implies greatness, just as
beauty implies a large bodily conformation while small people are neat
and well made but not beautiful.
Again, he who values himself highly without just grounds is a Vain man:
though the name must not be applied to every case of unduly high
self-estimation. He that values himself below his real worth is
Small-minded, and whether that worth is great, moderate, or small, his
own estimate falls below it. And he is the strongest case of this error
who is really a man of great worth, for what would he have done had his
worth been less?
The Great-minded man is then, as far as greatness is concerned, at the
summit, but in respect of propriety he is in the mean, because he
estimates himself at his real value (the other characters respectively
are in excess and defect). Since then he justly estimates himself at a
high, or rather at the highest possible rate, his character will have
respect specially to one thing: this term “rate” has reference of
course to external goods: and of these we should assume that to be the
greatest which we attribute to the gods, and which is the special
object of desire to those who are in power, and which is the prize
proposed to the most honourable actions: now honour answers to these
descriptions, being the greatest of external goods. So the Great-minded
man bears himself as he ought in respect of honour and dishonour. In
fact, without need of words, the Great-minded plainly have honour for
their object-matter: since honour is what the great consider themselves
specially worthy of, and according to a certain rate.
The Small-minded man is deficient, both as regards himself, and also as
regards the estimation of the Great-minded: while the Vain man is in
excess as regards himself, but does not get beyond the Great-minded
man. Now the Great-minded man, being by the hypothesis worthy of the
greatest things, must be of the highest excellence, since the better a
man is the more is he worth, and he who is best is worth the most: it
follows then, that to be truly Great-minded a man must be good, and
whatever is great in each virtue would seem to belong to the
Great-minded. It would no way correspond with the character of the
Great-minded to flee spreading his hands all abroad; nor to injure any
one; for with what object in view will he do what is base, in whose
eyes nothing is great? in short, if one were to go into particulars,
the Great-minded man would show quite ludicrously unless he were a good
man: he would not be in fact deserving of honour if he were a bad man,
honour being the prize of virtue and given to the good.
This virtue, then, of Great-mindedness seems to be a kind of ornament
of all the other virtues, in that it makes them better and cannot be
without them; and for this reason it is a hard matter to be really and
truly Great-minded; for it cannot be without thorough goodness and
nobleness of character.
Honour then and dishonour are specially the object-matter of the
Great-minded man: and at such as is great, and given by good men, he
will be pleased moderately as getting his own, or perhaps somewhat less
for no honour can be quite adequate to perfect virtue: but still he
will accept this because they have nothing higher to give him. But such
as is given by ordinary people and on trifling grounds he will entirely
despise, because these do not come up to his deserts: and dishonour
likewise, because in his case there cannot be just ground for it.
Now though, as I have said, honour is specially the object-matter of
the Great-minded man, I do not mean but that likewise in respect of
wealth and power, and good or bad fortune of every kind, he will bear
himself with moderation, fall out how they may, and neither in
prosperity will he be overjoyed nor in adversity will he be unduly
pained. For not even in respect of honour does he so bear himself; and
yet it is the greatest of all such objects, since it is the cause of
power and wealth being choice-worthy, for certainly they who have them
desire to receive honour through them. So to whom honour even is a
small thing to him will all other things also be so; and this is why
such men are thought to be supercilious.
It seems too that pieces of good fortune contribute to form this
character of Great-mindedness: I mean, the nobly born, or men of
influence, or the wealthy, are considered to be entitled to honour, for
they are in a position of eminence and whatever is eminent by good is
more entitled to honour: and this is why such circumstances dispose men
rather to Great-mindedness, because they receive honour at the hands of
some men.
Now really and truly the good man alone is entitled to honour; only if
a man unites in himself goodness with these external advantages he is
thought to be more entitled to honour: but they who have them without
also having virtue are not justified in their high estimate of
themselves, nor are they rightly denominated Great-minded; since
perfect virtue is one of the indispensable conditions to such &
character.
Further, such men become supercilious and insolent, it not being easy
to bear prosperity well without goodness; and not being able to bear
it, and possessed with an idea of their own superiority to others, they
despise them, and do just whatever their fancy prompts; for they mimic
the Great-minded man, though they are not like him, and they do this in
such points as they can, so without doing the actions which can only
flow from real goodness they despise others. Whereas the Great-minded
man despises on good grounds (for he forms his opinions truly), but the
mass of men do it at random.
Moreover, he is not a man to incur little risks, nor does he court
danger, because there are but few things he has a value for; but he
will incur great dangers, and when he does venture he is prodigal of
his life as knowing that there are terms on which it is not worth his
while to live. He is the sort of man to do kindnesses, but he is
ashamed to receive them; the former putting a man in the position of
superiority, the latter in that of inferiority; accordingly he will
greatly overpay any kindness done to him, because the original actor
will thus be laid under obligation and be in the position of the party
benefited. Such men seem likewise to remember those they have done
kindnesses to, but not those from whom they have received them: because
he who has received is inferior to him who has done the kindness and
our friend wishes to be superior; accordingly he is pleased to hear of
his own kind acts but not of those done to himself (and this is why, in
Homer, Thetis does not mention to Jupiter the kindnesses she had done
him, nor did the Lacedæmonians to the Athenians but only the benefits
they had received).
Further, it is characteristic of the Great-minded man to ask favours
not at all, or very reluctantly, but to do a service very readily; and
to bear himself loftily towards the great or fortunate, but towards
people of middle station affably; because to be above the former is
difficult and so a grand thing, but to be above the latter is easy; and
to be high and mighty towards the former is not ignoble, but to do it
towards those of humble station would be low and vulgar; it would be
like parading strength against the weak.
And again, not to put himself in the way of honour, nor to go where
others are the chief men; and to be remiss and dilatory, except in the
case of some great honour or work; and to be concerned in few things,
and those great and famous. It is a property of him also to be open,
both in his dislikes and his likings, because concealment is a
consequent of fear. Likewise to be careful for reality rather than
appearance, and talk and act openly (for his contempt for others makes
him a bold man, for which same reason he is apt to speak the truth,
except where the principle of reserve comes in), but to be reserved
towards the generality of men.
And to be unable to live with reference to any other but a friend;
because doing so is servile, as may be seen in that all flatterers are
low and men in low estate are flatterers. Neither is his admiration
easily excited, because nothing is great in his eyes; nor does he bear
malice, since remembering anything, and specially wrongs, is no part of
Great-mindedness, but rather overlooking them; nor does he talk of
other men; in fact, he will not speak either of himself or of any
other; he neither cares to be praised himself nor to have others
blamed; nor again does he praise freely, and for this reason he is not
apt to speak ill even of his enemies except to show contempt and
insolence.
And he is by no means apt to make laments about things which cannot be
helped, or requests about those which are trivial; because to be thus
disposed with respect to these things is consequent only upon real
anxiety about them. Again, he is the kind of man to acquire what is
beautiful and unproductive rather than what is productive and
profitable: this being rather the part of an independent man.
Also slow motion, deep-toned voice, and deliberate style of speech, are
thought to be characteristic of the Great-minded man: for he who is
earnest about few things is not likely to be in a hurry, nor he who
esteems nothing great to be very intent: and sharp tones and quickness
are the result of these.
Chapter V.
This then is my idea of the Great-minded man; and he who is in the
defect is a Small-minded man, he who is in the excess a Vain man.
However, as we observed in respect of the last character we discussed,
these extremes are not thought to be vicious exactly, but only
mistaken, for they do no harm.
The Small-minded man, for instance, being really worthy of good
deprives himself of his deserts, and seems to have somewhat faulty from
not having a sufficiently high estimate of his own desert, in fact from
self-ignorance: because, but for this, he would have grasped after what
he really is entitled to, and that is good. Still such characters are
not thought to be foolish, but rather laggards. But the having such an
opinion of themselves seems to have a deteriorating effect on the
character: because in all cases men’s aims are regulated by their
supposed desert, and thus these men, under a notion of their own want
of desert, stand aloof from honourable actions and courses, and
similarly from external goods.