The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
greater nor less than the truth.
It is possible of course to take any of these lines either with or
without some further view: but in general men speak, and act, and live,
each according to his particular character and disposition, unless
indeed a man is acting from any special motive.
Now since falsehood is in itself low and blameable, while truth is
noble and praiseworthy, it follows that the Truthful man (who is also
in the mean) is praiseworthy, and the two who depart from strict truth
are both blameable, but especially the Exaggerator.
We will now speak of each, and first of the Truthful man: I call him
Truthful, because we are not now meaning the man who is true in his
agreements nor in such matters as amount to justice or injustice (this
would come within the province of a different virtue), but, in such as
do not involve any such serious difference as this, the man we are
describing is true in life and word simply because he is in a certain
moral state.
And he that is such must be judged to be a good man: for he that has a
love for Truth as such, and is guided by it in matters indifferent,
will be so likewise even more in such as are not indifferent; for
surely he will have a dread of falsehood as base, since he shunned it
even in itself: and he that is of such a character is praiseworthy, yet
he leans rather to that which is below the truth, this having an
appearance of being in better taste because exaggerations are so
hateful.
As for the man who lays claim to things above what really belongs to
him _without_ any special motive, he is like a base man because he
would not otherwise have taken pleasure in falsehood, but he shows as a
fool rather than as a knave. But if a man does this _with_ a special
motive, suppose for honour or glory, as the Braggart does, then he is
not so very blameworthy, but if, directly or indirectly, for pecuniary
considerations, he is more unseemly.
Now the Braggart is such not by his power but by his purpose, that is
to say, in virtue of his moral state, and because he is a man of a
certain kind; just as there are liars who take pleasure in falsehood
for its own sake while others lie from a desire of glory or gain. They
who exaggerate with a view to glory pretend to such qualities as are
followed by praise or highest congratulation; they who do it with a
view to gain assume those which their neighbours can avail themselves
of, and the absence of which can be concealed, as a man’s being a
skilful soothsayer or physician; and accordingly most men pretend to
such things and exaggerate in this direction, because the faults I have
mentioned are in them.
The Reserved, who depreciate their own qualities, have the appearance
of being more refined in their characters, because they are not thought
to speak with a view to gain but to avoid grandeur: one very common
trait in such characters is their denying common current opinions, as
Socrates used to do. There are people who lay claim falsely to small
things and things the falsity of their pretensions to which is obvious;
these are called Factotums and are very despicable.
This very Reserve sometimes shows like Exaggeration; take, for
instance, the excessive plainness of dress affected by the
Lacedæmonians: in fact, both excess and the extreme of deficiency
partake of the nature of Exaggeration. But they who practise Reserve in
moderation, and in cases in which the truth is not very obvious and
plain, give an impression of refinement. Here it is the Exaggerator (as
being the worst character) who appears to be opposed to the Truthful
Man.
Chapter X.
Next, as life has its pauses and in them admits of pastime combined
with Jocularity, it is thought that in this respect also there is a
kind of fitting intercourse, and that rules may be prescribed as to the
kind of things one should say and the manner of saying them; and in
respect of hearing likewise (and there will be a difference between the
saying and hearing such and such things). It is plain that in regard to
these things also there will be an excess and defect and a mean.
Now they who exceed in the ridiculous are judged to be Buffoons and
Vulgar, catching at it in any and every way and at any cost, and aiming
rather at raising laughter than at saying what is seemly and at
avoiding to pain the object of their wit. They, on the other hand, who
would not for the world make a joke themselves and are displeased with
such as do are thought to be Clownish and Stern. But they who are
Jocular in good taste are denominated by a Greek term expressing
properly ease of movement, because such are thought to be, as one may
say, motions of the moral character; and as bodies are judged of by
their motions so too are moral characters.
Now as the ridiculous lies on the surface, and the majority of men take
more pleasure than they ought in Jocularity and Jesting, the Buffoons
too get this name of Easy Pleasantry, as if refined and gentlemanlike;
but that they differ from these, and considerably too, is plain from
what has been said.
One quality which belongs to the mean state is Tact: it is
characteristic of a man of Tact to say and listen to such things as are
fit for a good man and a gentleman to say and listen to: for there are
things which are becoming for such a one to say and listen to in the
way of Jocularity, and there is a difference between the Jocularity of
the Gentleman and that of the Vulgarian; and again, between that of the
educated and uneducated man. This you may see from a comparison of the
Old and New Comedy: in the former obscene talk made the fun; in the
latter it is rather innuendo: and this is no slight difference _as
regards decency_.
Well then, are we to characterise him who jests well by his saying what
is becoming a gentleman, or by his avoiding to pain the object of his
wit, or even by his giving him pleasure? or will not such a definition
be vague, since different things are hateful and pleasant to different
men?
Be this as it may, whatever he says such things will he also listen to,
since it is commonly held that a man will do what he will bear to hear:
this must, however, be limited; a man will not do quite all that he
will hear: because jesting is a species of scurrility and there are
some points of scurrility forbidden by law; it may be certain points of
jesting should have been also so forbidden. So then the refined and
gentlemanlike man will bear himself thus as being a law to himself.
Such is the mean character, whether denominated the man of Tact or of
Easy Pleasantry.
But the Buffoon cannot resist the ridiculous, sparing neither himself
nor any one else so that he can but raise his laugh, saying things of
such kind as no man of refinement would say and some which he would not
even tolerate if said by others in his hearing.
The Clownish man is for such intercourse wholly useless: inasmuch as
contributing nothing jocose of his own he is savage with all who do.
Yet some pause and amusement in life are generally judged to be
indispensable.
The three mean states which have been described do occur in life, and
the object-matter of all is interchange of words and deeds. They
differ, in that one of them is concerned with truth, and the other two
with the pleasurable: and of these two again, the one is conversant
with the jocosities of life, the other with all other points of social
intercourse.
Chapter XI.
To speak of Shame as a Virtue is incorrect, because it is much more
like a feeling than a moral state. It is defined, we know, to be “a
kind of fear of disgrace,” and its effects are similar to those of the
fear of danger, for they who feel Shame grow red and they who fear
death turn pale. So both are evidently in a way physical, which is
thought to be a mark of a feeling rather than a moral state.
Moreover, it is a feeling not suitable to every age, but only to youth:
we do think that the young should be Shamefaced, because since they
live at the beck and call of passion they do much that is wrong and
Shame acts on them as a check. In fact, we praise such young men as are
Shamefaced, but no one would ever praise an old man for being given to
it, inasmuch as we hold that he ought not to do things which cause
Shame; for Shame, since it arises at low bad actions, does not at all
belong to the good man, because such ought not to be done at all: nor
does it make any difference to allege that some things are disgraceful
really, others only because they are thought so; for neither should be
done, so that a man ought not to be in the position of feeling Shame.
In truth, to be such a man as to do anything disgraceful is the part of
a faulty character. And for a man to be such that he would feel Shame
if he should do anything disgraceful, and to think that this
constitutes him a good man, is absurd: because Shame is felt at
voluntary actions only, and a good man will never voluntarily do what
is base.
True it is, that Shame may be good on a certain supposition, as “if a
man should do such things, he would feel Shame:” but then the Virtues
are good in themselves, and not merely in supposed cases. And, granted
that impudence and the not being ashamed to do what is disgraceful is
base, it does not the more follow that it is good for a man to do such
things and feel Shame.
Nor is Self-Control properly a Virtue, but a kind of mixed state:
however, all about this shall be set forth in a future Book.
BOOK V
Chapter I.
Now the points for our enquiry in respect of Justice and Injustice are,
what kind of actions are their object-matter, and what kind of a mean
state Justice is, and between what points the abstract principle of it,
i.e. the Just, is a mean. And our enquiry shall be, if you please,
conducted in the same method as we have observed in the foregoing parts
of this Treatise.
We see then that all men mean by the term Justice a moral state such
that in consequence of it men have the capacity of doing what is just,
and actually do it, and wish it:[1] similarly also with respect to
Injustice, a moral state such that in consequence of it men do unjustly
and wish what is unjust: let us also be content then with these as a
ground-work sketched out.
I mention the two, because the same does not hold with regard to States
whether of mind or body as with regard to Sciences or Faculties: I mean
that whereas it is thought that the same Faculty or Science embraces
contraries, a State will not: from health, for instance, not the
contrary acts are done but the healthy ones only; we say a man walks
healthily when he walks as the healthy man would.
However, of the two contrary states the one may be frequently known
from the other, and oftentimes the states from their subject-matter: if
it be seen clearly what a good state of body is, then is it also seen
what a bad state is, and from the things which belong to a good state
of body the good state itself is seen, and _vice versâ_. If, for
instance, the good state is firmness of flesh it follows that the bad
state is flabbiness of flesh; and whatever causes firmness of flesh is
connected with the good state.
It follows moreover in general,[2] that if of two contrary terms the
one is used in many senses so also will the other be; as, for instance,
if “the Just,” then also “the Unjust.” Now Justice and Injustice do
seem to be used respectively in many senses, but, because the line of
demarcation between these is very fine and minute,[3] it commonly
escapes notice that they are thus used, and it is not plain and
manifest as where the various significations of terms are widely
different for in these last the visible difference is great, for
instance, the word κλεὶς is used equivocally to denote the bone which