The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
is under the neck of animals and the instrument with which people close
doors.
Let it be ascertained then in how many senses the term “Unjust man” is
used. Well, he who violates the law, and he who is a grasping man, and
the unequal man, are all thought to be Unjust and so manifestly the
Just man will be, the man who acts according to law, and the equal man
“The Just” then will be the lawful and the equal, and “the Unjust” the
unlawful and the unequal.
Well, since the Unjust man is also a grasping man, he will be so, of
course, with respect to good things, but not of every kind, only those
which are the subject-matter of good and bad fortune and which are in
themselves always good but not always to the individual.[4] Yet men
pray for and pursue these things: this they should not do but pray that
things which are in the abstract good may be so also to them, and
choose what is good for themselves.
But the Unjust man does not always choose actually the greater part,
but even sometimes the less; as in the case of things which are simply
evil: still, since the less evil is thought to be in a manner a good
and the grasping is after good, therefore even in this case he is
thought to be a grasping man, _i.e._ one who strives for more good than
fairly falls to his share: of course he is also an unequal man, this
being an inclusive and common term.
Chapter II.
We said that the violator of Law is Unjust, and the keeper of the Law
Just: further, it is plain that all Lawful things are in a manner Just,
because by Lawful we understand what have been defined by the
legislative power and each of these we say is Just. The Laws too give
directions on all points, aiming either at the common good of all, or
that of the best, or that of those in power (taking for the standard
real goodness or adopting some other estimate); in one way we mean by
Just, those things which are apt to produce and preserve happiness and
its ingredients for the social community.
Further, the Law commands the doing the deeds not only of the brave man
(as not leaving the ranks, nor flying, nor throwing away one’s arms),
but those also of the perfectly self-mastering man, as abstinence from
adultery and wantonness; and those of the meek man, as refraining from
striking others or using abusive language: and in like manner in
respect of the other virtues and vices commanding some things and
forbidding others, rightly if it is a good law, in a way somewhat
inferior if it is one extemporised.
Now this Justice is in fact perfect Virtue, yet not simply so but as
exercised towards one’s neighbour: and for this reason Justice is
thought oftentimes to be the best of the Virtues, and
“neither Hesper nor the Morning-star
So worthy of our admiration:”
and in a proverbial saying we express the same;
“All virtue is in Justice comprehended.”
And it is in a special sense perfect Virtue because it is the practice
of perfect Virtue. And perfect it is because he that has it is able to
practise his virtue towards his neighbour and not merely on himself; I
mean, there are many who can practise virtue in the regulation of their
own personal conduct who are wholly unable to do it in transactions
with their neighbour. And for this reason that saying of Bias is
thought to be a good one,
“Rule will show what a man is;”
for he who bears Rule is necessarily in contact with others, i.e. in a
community. And for this same reason Justice alone of all the Virtues is
thought to be a good to others, because it has immediate relation to
some other person, inasmuch as the Just man does what is advantageous
to another, either to his ruler or fellow-subject. Now he is the basest
of men who practises vice not only in his own person,[5] but towards
his friends also; but he the best who practises virtue not merely in
his own person but towards his neighbour, for this is a matter of some
difficulty.
However, Justice in this sense is not a part of Virtue but is
co-extensive with Virtue; nor is the Injustice which answers to it a
part of Vice but co-extensive with Vice. Now wherein Justice in this
sense differs from Virtue appears from what has been said: it is the
same really, but the point of view is not the same: in so far as it has
respect to one’s neighbour it is Justice, in so far as it is such and
such a moral state it is simply Virtue.
Chapter III.
But the object of our enquiry is Justice, in the sense in which it is a
part of Virtue (for there is such a thing, as we commonly say), and
likewise with respect to particular Injustice. And of the existence of
this last the following consideration is a proof: there are many vices
by practising which a man acts unjustly, of course, but does not grasp
at more than his share of good; if, for instance, by reason of
cowardice he throws away his shield, or by reason of ill-temper he uses
abusive language, or by reason of stinginess does not give a friend
pecuniary assistance; but whenever he does a grasping action, it is
often in the way of none of these vices, certainly not in all of them,
still in the way of some vice or other (for we blame him), and in the
way of Injustice. There is then some kind of Injustice distinct from
that co-extensive with Vice and related to it as a part to a whole, and
some “Unjust” related to that which is co-extensive with violation of
the law as a part to a whole.
Again, suppose one man seduces a man’s wife with a view to gain and
actually gets some advantage by it,[6] and another does the same from
impulse of lust, at an expense of money and damage; this latter will be
thought to be rather destitute of self-mastery than a grasping man, and
the former Unjust but not destitute of self-mastery: now why? plainly
because of his gaining.
Again, all other acts of Injustice we refer to some particular
depravity, as, if a man commits adultery, to abandonment to his
passions; if he deserts his comrade, to cowardice; if he strikes
another, to anger: but if he gains by the act to no other vice than to
Injustice.
Thus it is clear that there is a kind of Injustice different from and
besides that which includes all Vice, having the same name because the
definition is in the same genus; for both have their force in dealings
with others, but the one acts upon honour, or wealth, or safety, or by
whatever one name we can include all these things, and is actuated by
pleasure attendant on gain, while the other acts upon all things which
constitute the sphere of the good man’s action.
Chapter IV.
Now that there is more than one kind of Justice, and that there is one
which is distinct from and besides that which is co-extensive with,
Virtue, is plain: we must next ascertain what it is, and what are its
characteristics.
Well, the Unjust has been divided into the unlawful and the unequal,
and the Just accordingly into the lawful and the equal: the
aforementioned Injustice is in the way of the unlawful. And as the
unequal and the more[7] are not the same, but differing as part to
whole (because all more is unequal, but not all unequal more), so the
Unjust and the Injustice we are now in search of are not the same with,
but other than, those before mentioned, the one being the parts, the
other the wholes; for this particular Injustice is a part of the
Injustice co-extensive with Vice, and likewise this Justice of the
Justice co-extensive with Virtue. So that what we have now to speak of
is the particular Justice and Injustice, and likewise the particular
Just and Unjust.
Here then let us dismiss any further consideration of the Justice
ranking as co-extensive with Virtue (being the practice of Virtue in
all its bearings towards others), and of the co-relative Injustice
(being similarly the practice of Vice). It is clear too, that we must
separate off the Just and the Unjust involved in these: because one may
pretty well say that most lawful things are those which naturally
result in action from Virtue in its fullest sense, because the law
enjoins the living in accordance with each Virtue and forbids living in
accordance with each Vice. And the producing causes of Virtue in all
its bearings are those enactments which have been made respecting
education for society.
By the way, as to individual education, in respect of which a man is
simply good without reference to others, whether it is the province of
πολιτικὴ or some other science we must determine at a future time: for
it may be it is not the same thing to be a good man and a good citizen
in every case.[8]
Chapter V.
Now of the Particular Justice, and the Just involved in it, one species
is that which is concerned in the distributions of honour, or wealth,
or such other things as are to be shared among the members of the
social community (because in these one man as compared with another may
have either an equal or an unequal share), and the other is that which
is Corrective in the various transactions between man and man.
And of this latter there are two parts: because of transactions some
are voluntary and some involuntary; voluntary, such as follow; selling,
buying, use, bail, borrowing, deposit, hiring: and this class is called
voluntary because the origination of these transactions is voluntary.
The involuntary again are either such as effect secrecy; as theft,
adultery, poisoning, pimping, kidnapping of slaves, assassination,
false witness; or accompanied with open violence; as insult, bonds,
death, plundering, maiming, foul language, slanderous abuse.
Chapter VI.
Well, the unjust man we have said is unequal, and the abstract “Unjust”
unequal: further, it is plain that there is some mean of the unequal,
that is to say, the equal or exact half (because in whatever action
there is the greater and the less there is also the equal, i.e. the
exact half). If then the Unjust is unequal the Just is equal, which all
must allow without further proof: and as the equal is a mean the Just
must be also a mean. Now the equal implies two terms at least: it
follows then that the Just is both a mean and equal, and these to
certain persons; and, in so far as it is a mean, between certain things
(that is, the greater and the less), and, so far as it is equal,
between two, and in so far as it is just it is so to certain persons.
The Just then must imply four terms at least, for those[9] to which it
is just are two, and the terms representing the things are two.
And there will be the same equality between the terms representing the
persons, as between those representing the things: because as the
latter are to one another so are the former: for if the persons are not
equal they must not have equal shares; in fact this is the very source
of all the quarrelling and wrangling in the world, when either they who
are equal have and get awarded to them things not equal, or being not
equal those things which are equal. Again, the necessity of this
equality of ratios is shown by the common phrase “according to rate,”
for all agree that the Just in distributions ought to be according to
some rate: but what that rate is to be, all do not agree; the democrats
are for freedom, oligarchs for wealth, others for nobleness of birth,
and the aristocratic party for virtue.
The Just, then, is a certain proportionable thing. For proportion does
not apply merely to number in the abstract,[10] but to number
generally, since it is equality of ratios, and implies four terms at
least (that this is the case in what may be called discrete proportion
is plain and obvious, but it is true also in continual proportion, for
this uses the one term as two, and mentions it twice; thus A:B:C may be
expressed A:B::B:C. In the first, B is named twice; and so, if, as in
the second, B is actually written twice, the proportionals will be