The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
four): and the Just likewise implies four terms at the least, and the
ratio between the two pair of terms is the same, because the persons
and the things are divided similarly. It will stand then thus,
A:B::C:D, and then permutando A:C::B:D, and then (supposing C and D to
represent the things) A+C:B+D::A:B. The distribution in fact consisting
in putting together these terms thus: and if they are put together so
as to preserve this same ratio, the distribution puts them together
justly.[11] So then the joining together of the first and third and
second and fourth proportionals is the Just in the distribution, and
this Just is the mean relatively to that which violates the
proportionate, for the proportionate is a mean and the Just is
proportionate. Now mathematicians call this kind of proportion
geometrical: for in geometrical proportion the whole is to the whole as
each part to each part. Furthermore this proportion is not continual,
because the person and thing do not make up one term.
The Just then is this proportionate, and the Unjust that which violates
the proportionate; and so there comes to be the greater and the less:
which in fact is the case in actual transactions, because he who acts
unjustly has the greater share and he who is treated unjustly has the
less of what is good: but in the case of what is bad this is reversed:
for the less evil compared with the greater comes to be reckoned for
good, because the less evil is more choice-worthy than the greater, and
what is choice-worthy is good, and the more so the greater good.
This then is the one species of the Just.
Chapter VII.
And the remaining one is the Corrective, which arises in voluntary as
well as involuntary transactions. Now this just has a different form
from the aforementioned; for that which is concerned in distribution of
common property is always according to the aforementioned proportion: I
mean that, if the division is made out of common property, the shares
will bear the same proportion to one another as the original
contributions did: and the Unjust which is opposite to this Just is
that which violates the proportionate.
But the Just which arises in transactions between men is an equal in a
certain sense, and the Unjust an unequal, only not in the way of that
proportion but of arithmetical.[12] Because it makes no difference
whether a robbery, for instance, is committed by a good man on a bad or
by a bad man on a good, nor whether a good or a bad man has committed
adultery: the law looks only to the difference created by the injury
and treats the men as previously equal, where the one does and the
other suffers injury, or the one has done and the other suffered harm.
And so this Unjust, being unequal, the judge endeavours to reduce to
equality again, because really when the one party has been wounded and
the other has struck him, or the one kills and the other dies, the
suffering and the doing are divided into unequal shares; well, the
judge tries to restore equality by penalty, thereby taking from the
gain.
For these terms gain and loss are applied to these cases, though
perhaps the term in some particular instance may not be strictly
proper, as gain, for instance, to the man who has given a blow, and
loss to him who has received it: still, when the suffering has been
estimated, the one is called loss and the other gain.
And so the equal is a mean between the more and the less, which
represent gain and loss in contrary ways (I mean, that the more of good
and the less of evil is gain, the less of good and the more of evil is
loss): between which the equal was stated to be a mean, which equal we
say is Just: and so the Corrective Just must be the mean between loss
and gain. And this is the reason why, upon a dispute arising, men have
recourse to the judge: going to the judge is in fact going to the Just,
for the judge is meant to be the personification of the Just.[13] And
men seek a judge as one in the mean, which is expressed in a name given
by some to judges (μεσίδιοι, or middle-men) under the notion that if
they can hit on the mean they shall hit on the Just. The Just is then
surely a mean since the judge is also.
So it is the office of a judge to make things equal, and the line, as
it were, having been unequally divided, he takes from the greater part
that by which it exceeds the half, and adds this on to the less. And
when the whole is divided into two exactly equal portions then men say
they have their own, when they have gotten the equal; and the equal is
a mean between the greater and the less according to arithmetical
equality.
This, by the way, accounts for the etymology of the term by which we in
Greek express the ideas of Just and Judge; (δίκαιον quasi δίχαιον, that
is in two parts, and δικάστης quasi διχάστης, he who divides into two
parts). For when from one of two equal magnitudes somewhat has been
taken and added to the other, this latter exceeds the former by twice
that portion: if it had been merely taken from the former and not added
to the latter, then the latter would have exceeded the former only by
that one portion; but in the other case, the greater exceeds the mean
by one, and the mean exceeds also by one that magnitude from which the
portion was taken. By this illustration, then, we obtain a rule to
determine what one ought to take from him who has the greater, and what
to add to him who has the less. The excess of the mean over the less
must be added to the less, and the excess of the greater over the mean
be taken from the greater.
Thus let there be three straight lines equal to one another. From one
of them cut off a portion, and add as much to another of them. The
whole line thus made will exceed the remainder of the first-named line,
by twice the portion added, and will exceed the untouched line by that
portion.[14] And these terms loss and gain are derived from voluntary
exchange: that is to say, the having more than what was one’s own is
called gaining, and the having less than one’s original stock is called
losing; for instance, in buying or selling, or any other transactions
which are guaranteed by law: but when the result is neither more nor
less, but exactly the same as there was originally,[15] people say they
have their own, and neither lose nor gain.
So then the Just we have been speaking of is a mean between loss and
gain arising in involuntary transactions; that is, it is the having the
same after the transaction as one had before it took place.
Chapter VIII.
There are people who have a notion that Reciprocation is simply just,
as the Pythagoreans said: for they defined the Just simply and without
qualification as “That which reciprocates with another.” But this
simple Reciprocation will not fit on either to the Distributive Just,
or the Corrective (and yet this is the interpretation they put on the
Rhadamanthian rule of Just,
If a man should suffer what he hath done, then there would be
straightforward justice;”)
for in many cases differences arise: as, for instance, suppose one in
authority has struck a man, he is not to be struck in turn; or if a man
has struck one in authority, he must not only be struck but punished
also.[16] And again, the voluntariness or involuntariness of actions
makes a great difference.
But in dealings of exchange such a principle of Justice as this
Reciprocation forms the bond of union, but then it must be
Reciprocation according to proportion and not exact equality, because
by proportionate reciprocity of action the social community is held
together, For either Reciprocation of evil is meant, and if this be not
allowed it is thought to be a servile condition of things: or else
Reciprocation of good, and if this be not effected then there is no
admission to participation which is the very bond of their union.
And this is the moral of placing the Temple of the Graces (χάριτες) in
the public streets; to impress the notion that there may be requital,
this being peculiar to χάρις[17] because a man ought to requite with a
good turn the man who has done him a favour and then to become himself
the originator of another χάρις, by doing him a favour.
Now the acts of mutual giving in due proportion may be represented by
the diameters of a parallelogram, at the four angles of which the
parties and their wares are so placed that the side connecting the
parties be opposite to that connecting the wares, and each party be
connected by one side with his own ware, as in the accompanying
diagram.
The builder is to receive from the shoemaker of his ware, and to give
him of his own: if then there be first proportionate equality, and
_then_ the Reciprocation takes place, there will be the just result
which we are speaking of: if not, there is not the equal, nor will the
connection stand: for there is no reason why the ware of the one may
not be better than that of the other, and therefore before the exchange
is made they must have been equalised. And this is so also in the other
arts: for they would have been destroyed entirely if there were not a
correspondence in point of quantity and quality between the producer
and the consumer. For, we must remember, no dealing arises between two
of the same kind, two physicians, for instance; but say between a
physician and agriculturist, or, to state it generally, between those
who are different and not equal, but these of course must have been
equalised before the exchange can take place.
It is therefore indispensable that all things which can be exchanged
should be capable of comparison, and for this purpose money has come
in, and comes to be a kind of medium, for it measures all things and so
likewise the excess and defect; for instance, how many shoes are equal
to a house or a given quantity of food. As then the builder to the
shoemaker, so many shoes must be to the house (or food, if instead of a
builder an agriculturist be the exchanging party); for unless there is
this proportion there cannot be exchange or dealing, and this
proportion cannot be unless the terms are in some way equal; hence the
need, as was stated above, of some one measure of all things. Now this
is really and truly the Demand for them, which is the common bond of
all such dealings. For if the parties were not in want at all or not
similarly of one another’s wares, there would either not be any
exchange, or at least not the same.
And money has come to be, by general agreement, a representative of
Demand: and the account of its Greek name νομισμα is this, that it is
what it is not naturally but by custom or law (νόμος), and it rests
with us to change its value, or make it wholly useless.
Very well then, there will be Reciprocation when the terms have been
equalised so as to stand in this proportion; Agriculturist : Shoemaker
: : wares of Shoemaker : wares of Agriculturist; but you must bring
them to this form of proportion when they exchange, otherwise the one
extreme will combine both exceedings of the mean:[18] but when they
have exactly their own then they are equal and have dealings, because
the same equality can come to be in their case. Let A represent an
agriculturist, C food, B a shoemaker, D his wares equalised with A’s.
Then the proportion will be correct, A:B::C:D; _now_ Reciprocation will
be practicable, if it were not, there would have been no dealing.
Now that what connects men in such transactions is Demand, as being
some one thing, is shown by the fact that, when either one does not
want the other or neither want one another, they do not exchange at
all: whereas they do[19] when one wants what the other man has, wine
for instance, giving in return corn for exportation.
And further, money is a kind of security to us in respect of exchange