The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
at some future time (supposing that one wants nothing now that we shall
have it when we do): the theory of money being that whenever one brings
it one can receive commodities in exchange: of course this too is
liable to depreciation, for its purchasing power is not always the
same, but still it is of a more permanent nature than the commodities
it represents. And this is the reason why all things should have a
price set upon them, because thus there may be exchange at any time,
and if exchange then dealing. So money, like a measure, making all
things commensurable equalises them: for if there was not exchange
there would not have been dealing, nor exchange if there were not
equality, nor equality if there were not the capacity of being
commensurate: it is impossible that things so greatly different should
be really commensurate, but we can approximate sufficiently for all
practical purposes in reference to Demand. The common measure must be
some one thing, and also from agreement (for which reason it is called
νόμισμα), for this makes all things commensurable: in fact, all things
are measured by money. Let B represent ten minæ, A a house worth five
minæ, or in other words half B, C a bed worth 1/10th of B: it is clear
then how many beds are equal to one house, namely, five.
It is obvious also that exchange was thus conducted before the
existence of money: for it makes no difference whether you give for a
house five beds or the price of five beds.
Chapter IX.
We have now said then what the abstract Just and Unjust are, and these
having been defined it is plain that just acting is a mean between
acting unjustly and being acted unjustly towards: the former being
equivalent to having more, and the latter to having less.
But Justice, it must be observed, is a mean state not after the same
manner as the forementioned virtues, but because it aims at producing
the mean, while Injustice occupies _both_ the extremes.
And Justice is the moral state in virtue of which the just man is said
to have the aptitude for practising the Just in the way of moral
choice, and for making division between, himself and another, or
between two other men, not so as to give to himself the greater and to
his neighbour the less share of what is choice-worthy and contrariwise
of what is hurtful, but what is proportionably equal, and in like
manner when adjudging the rights of two other men.
Injustice is all this with respect to the Unjust: and since the Unjust
is excess or defect of what is good or hurtful respectively, in
violation of the proportionate, therefore Injustice is both excess and
defect because it aims at producing excess and defect; excess, that is,
in a man’s own case of what is simply advantageous, and defect of what
is hurtful: and in the case of other men in like manner generally
speaking, only that the proportionate is violated not always in one
direction as before but whichever way it happens in the given case. And
of the Unjust act the less is being acted unjustly towards, and the
greater the acting unjustly towards others.[20]
Let this way of describing the nature of Justice and Injustice, and
likewise the Just and the Unjust generally, be accepted as sufficient.
Chapter X.
[Again, since a man may do unjust acts and not yet have formed a
character of injustice, the question arises whether a man is unjust in
each particular form of injustice, say a thief, or adulterer, or
robber, by doing acts of a given character.
We may say, I think, that this will not of itself make any difference;
a man may, for instance, have had connection with another’s wife,
knowing well with whom he was sinning, but he may have done it not of
deliberate choice but from the impulse of passion: of course he acts
unjustly, but he has not necessarily formed an unjust character: that
is, he may have stolen yet not be a thief; or committed an act of
adultery but still not be an adulterer, and so on in other cases which
might be enumerated.][21]
Of the relation which Reciprocation bears to the Just we have already
spoken: and here it should be noticed that the Just which we are
investigating is both the Just in the abstract and also as exhibited in
Social Relations, which latter arises in the case of those who live in
communion with a view to independence and who are free and equal either
proportionately or numerically.[22]
It follows then that those who are not in this position have not among
themselves the Social Just, but still Just of some kind and resembling
that other. For Just implies mutually acknowledged law, and law the
possibility of injustice, for adjudication is the act of distinguishing
between the Just and the Unjust.
And among whomsoever there is the possibility of injustice among these
there is that of acting unjustly; but it does not hold conversely that
injustice attaches to all among whom there is the possibility of acting
unjustly, since by the former we mean giving one’s self the larger
share of what is abstractedly good and the less of what is abstractedly
evil.
This, by the way, is the reason why we do not allow a man to govern,
but Principle, because a man governs for himself and comes to be a
despot: but the office of a ruler is to be guardian of the Just and
therefore of the Equal. Well then, since he seems to have no peculiar
personal advantage, supposing him a Just man, for in this case he does
not allot to himself the larger share of what is abstractedly good
unless it falls to his share proportionately (for which reason he
really governs for others, and so Justice, men say, is a good not to
one’s self so much as to others, as was mentioned before), therefore
some compensation must be given him, as there actually is in the shape
of honour and privilege; and wherever these are not adequate there
rulers turn into despots.
But the Just which arises in the relations of Master and Father, is not
identical with, but similar to, these; because there is no possibility
of injustice towards those things which are absolutely one’s own; and a
slave or child (so long as this last is of a certain age and not
separated into an independent being), is, as it were, part of a man’s
self, and no man chooses to hurt himself, for which reason there cannot
be injustice towards one’s own self: therefore neither is there the
social Unjust or Just, which was stated to be in accordance with law
and to exist between those among whom law naturally exists, and these
were said to be they to whom belongs equality of ruling and being
ruled.
Hence also there is Just rather between a man and his wife than between
a man and his children or slaves; this is in fact the Just arising in
domestic relations: and this too is different from the Social Just.
Further, this last-mentioned Just is of two kinds, natural and
conventional; the former being that which has everywhere the same force
and does not depend upon being received or not; the latter being that
which originally may be this way or that indifferently but not after
enactment: for instance, the price of ransom being fixed at a mina, or
the sacrificing a goat instead of two sheep; and again, all cases of
special enactment, as the sacrificing to Brasidas as a hero; in short,
all matters of special decree.
But there are some men who think that all the Justs are of this latter
kind, and on this ground: whatever exists by nature, they say, is
unchangeable and has everywhere the same force; fire, for instance,
burns not here only but in Persia as well, but the Justs they see
changed in various places.
Now this is not really so, and yet it is in a way (though among the
gods perhaps by no means): still even amongst ourselves there is
somewhat existing by nature: allowing that everything is subject to
change, still there is that which does exist by nature, and that which
does not.[23]
Nay, we may go further, and say that it is practically plain what among
things which can be otherwise does exist by nature, and what does not
but is dependent upon enactment and conventional, even granting that
both are alike subject to be changed: and the same distinctive
illustration will apply to this and other cases; the right hand is
naturally the stronger, still some men may become equally strong in
both.
A parallel may be drawn between the Justs which depend upon convention
and expedience, and measures; for wine and corn measures are not equal
in all places, but where men buy they are large, and where these same
sell again they are smaller: well, in like manner the Justs which are
not natural, but of human invention, are not everywhere the same, for
not even the forms of government are, and yet there is one only which
by nature would be best in all places.
Chapter XI.
Now of Justs and Lawfuls each bears to the acts which embody and
exemplify it the relation of an universal to a particular; the acts
being many, but each of the principles only singular because each is an
universal. And so there is a difference between an unjust act and the
abstract Unjust, and the just act and the abstract Just: I mean, a
thing is unjust in itself, by nature or by ordinance; well, when this
has been embodied in act, there is an unjust act, but not till then,
only some unjust thing.[24] And similarly of a just act. (Perhaps
δικαιοπράγημα is more correctly the common or generic term for just
act, the word δικαίωμα, which I have here used, meaning generally and
properly the act corrective of the unjust act.) Now as to each of them,
what kinds there are, and how many, and what is their object-matter, we
must examine afterwards.
For the present we proceed to say that, the Justs and the Unjusts being
what have been mentioned, a man is said to act unjustly or justly when
he embodies these abstracts in voluntary actions, but when in
involuntary, then he neither acts unjustly or justly except
accidentally; I mean that the being just or unjust is really only
accidental to the agents in such cases.
So both unjust and just actions are limited by the being voluntary or
the contrary: for when an embodying of the Unjust is voluntary, then it
is blamed and is at the same time also an unjust action: but, if
voluntariness does not attach, there will be a thing which is in itself
unjust but not yet an unjust action.
By voluntary, I mean, as we stated before, whatsoever of things in his
own power a man does with knowledge, and the absence of ignorance as to
the person to whom, or the instrument with which, or the result with
which he does; as, for instance, whom he strikes, what he strikes him
with, and with what probable result; and each of these points again,
not accidentally nor by compulsion; as supposing another man were to
seize his hand and strike a third person with it, here, of course, the
owner of the hand acts not voluntarily, because it did not rest with
him to do or leave undone: or again, it is conceivable that the person
struck may be his father, and he may know that it is a man, or even one
of the present company, whom he is striking, but not know that it is
his father. And let these same distinctions be supposed to be carried
into the case of the result and in fact the whole of any given action.
In fine then, that is involuntary which is done through ignorance, or
which, not resulting from ignorance, is not in the agent’s control or
is done on compulsion.
I mention these cases, because there are many natural things which we
do and suffer knowingly but still no one of which is either voluntary
or involuntary, growing old, or dying, for instance.
Again, accidentality may attach to the unjust in like manner as to the
just acts. For instance, a man may have restored what was deposited
with him, but against his will and from fear of the consequences of a