The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
things are hurtful; others to whom they are useful to a certain degree:
for this reason then the province of Justice is among _Men_.
Chapter XV.
We have next to speak of Equity and the Equitable, that is to say, of
the relations of Equity to Justice and the Equitable to the Just; for
when we look into the matter the two do not appear identical nor yet
different in kind; and we sometimes commend the Equitable and the man
who embodies it in his actions, so that by way of praise we commonly
transfer the term also to other acts instead of the term good, thus
showing that the more Equitable a thing is the better it is: at other
times following a certain train of reasoning we arrive at a difficulty,
in that the Equitable though distinct from the Just is yet
praiseworthy; it seems to follow either that the Just is not good or
the Equitable not Just, since they are by hypothesis different; or if
both are good then they are identical.
This is a tolerably fair statement of the difficulty which on these
grounds arises in respect of the Equitable; but, in fact, all these may
be reconciled and really involve no contradiction: for the Equitable is
Just, being also better than one form of Just, but is not better than
the Just as though it were different from it in kind: Just and
Equitable then are identical, and, both being good, the Equitable is
the better of the two.
What causes the difficulty is this; the Equitable is Just, but not the
Just which is in accordance with written law, being in fact a
correction of that kind of Just. And the account of this is, that every
law is necessarily universal while there are some things which it is
not possible to speak of rightly in any universal or general statement.
Where then there is a necessity for general statement, while a general
statement cannot apply rightly to all cases, the law takes the
generality of cases, being fully aware of the error thus involved; and
rightly too notwithstanding, because the fault is not in the law, or in
the framer of the law, but is inherent in the nature of the thing,
because the matter of all action is necessarily such.
When then the law has spoken in general terms, and there arises a case
of exception to the general rule, it is proper, in so far as the
lawgiver omits the case and by reason of his universality of statement
is wrong, to set right the omission by ruling it as the lawgiver
himself would rule were he there present, and would have provided by
law had he foreseen the case would arise. And so the Equitable is Just
but better than one form of Just; I do not mean the abstract Just but
the error which arises out of the universality of statement: and this
is the nature of the Equitable, “a correction of Law, where Law is
defective by reason of its universality.”
This is the reason why not all things are according to law, because
there are things about which it is simply impossible to lay down a law,
and so we want special enactments for particular cases. For to speak
generally, the rule of the undefined must be itself undefined also,
just as the rule to measure Lesbian building is made of lead: for this
rule shifts according to the form of each stone and the special
enactment according to the facts of the case in question.
It is clear then what the Equitable is; namely that it is Just but
better than one form of Just: and hence it appears too who the
Equitable man is: he is one who has a tendency to choose and carry out
these principles, and who is not apt to press the letter of the law on
the worse side but content to waive his strict claims though backed by
the law: and this moral state is Equity, being a species of Justice,
not a different moral state from Justice.
Chapter XVI.
The answer to the second of the two questions indicated above, “whether
it is possible for a man to deal unjustly by himself,” is obvious from
what has been already stated.
In the first place, one class of Justs is those which are enforced by
law in accordance with Virtue in the most extensive sense of the term:
for instance, the law does not bid a man kill himself; and whatever it
does not bid it forbids: well, whenever a man does hurt contrary to the
law (unless by way of requital of hurt), voluntarily, i.e. knowing to
whom he does it and wherewith, he acts Unjustly. Now he that from rage
kills himself, voluntarily, does this in contravention of Right Reason,
which the law does not permit. He therefore acts Unjustly: but towards
whom? towards the Community, not towards himself (because he suffers
with his own consent, and no man can be Unjustly dealt with with his
own consent), and on this principle the Community punishes him; that is
a certain infamy is attached to the suicide as to one who acts Unjustly
towards the Community.
Next, a man cannot deal Unjustly by himself in the sense in which a man
is Unjust who only does Unjust acts without being entirely bad (for the
two things are different, because the Unjust man is in a way bad, as
the coward is, not as though he were chargeable with badness in the
full extent of the term, and so he does not act Unjustly in this
sense), because if it were so then it would be possible for the same
thing to have been taken away from and added to the same person:[29]
but this is really not possible, the Just and the Unjust always
implying a plurality of persons.
Again, an Unjust action must be voluntary, done of deliberate purpose,
and aggressive (for the man who hurts because he has first suffered and
is merely requiting the same is not thought to act Unjustly), but here
the man does to himself and suffers the same things at the same time.
Again, it would imply the possibility of being Unjustly dealt with with
one’s own consent.
And, besides all this, a man cannot act Unjustly without his act
falling under some particular crime; now a man cannot seduce his own
wife, commit a burglary on his own premises, or steal his own property.
After all, the general answer to the question is to allege what was
settled respecting being Unjustly dealt with with one’s own consent.
Chapter XVII.
It is obvious, moreover, that being Unjustly dealt by and dealing
Unjustly by others are both wrong; because the one is having less, the
other having more, than the mean, and the case is parallel to that of
the healthy in the healing art, and that of good condition in the art
of training: but still the dealing Unjustly by others is the worst of
the two, because this involves wickedness and is blameworthy;
wickedness, I mean, either wholly, or nearly so (for not all voluntary
wrong implies injustice), but the being Unjustly dealt by does not
involve wickedness or injustice.
In itself then, the being Unjustly dealt by is the least bad, but
accidentally it may be the greater evil of the two. However, scientific
statement cannot take in such considerations; a pleurisy, for instance,
is called a greater physical evil than a bruise: and yet this last may
be the greater accidentally; it may chance that a bruise received in a
fall may cause one to be captured by the enemy and slain.
Further: Just, in the way of metaphor and similitude, there may be I do
not say between a man and himself exactly but between certain parts of
his nature; but not Just of every kind, only such as belongs to the
relation of master and slave, or to that of the head of a family. For
all through this treatise the rational part of the Soul has been viewed
as distinct from the irrational.
Now, taking these into consideration, there is thought to be a
possibility of injustice towards one’s self, because herein it is
possible for men to suffer somewhat in contradiction of impulses really
their own; and so it is thought that there is Just of a certain kind
between these parts mutually, as between ruler and ruled.
Let this then be accepted as an account of the distinctions which we
recognise respecting Justice and the rest of the moral virtues.[30]
BOOK VI
Chapter I.
Having stated in a former part of this treatise that men should choose
the mean instead of either the excess or defect, and that the mean is
according to the dictates of Right Reason; we will now proceed to
explain this term.
For in all the habits which we have expressly mentioned, as likewise in
all the others, there is, so to speak, a mark with his eye fixed on
which the man who has Reason tightens or slacks his rope;[1] and there
is a certain limit of those mean states which we say are in accordance
with Right Reason, and lie between excess on the one hand and defect on
the other.
Now to speak thus is true enough but conveys no very definite meaning:
as, in fact, in all other pursuits requiring attention and diligence on
which skill and science are brought to bear; it is quite true of course
to say that men are neither to labour nor relax too much or too little,
but in moderation, and as Right Reason directs; yet if this were all a
man had he would not be greatly the wiser; as, for instance, if in
answer to the question, what are proper applications to the body, he
were to be told, “Oh! of course, whatever the science of medicine, and
in such manner as the physician, directs.”
And so in respect of the mental states it is requisite not merely that
this should be true which has been already stated, but further that it
should be expressly laid down what Right Reason is, and what is the
definition of it.
Chapter II.
Now in our division of the Excellences of the Soul, we said there were
two classes, the Moral and the Intellectual: the former we have already
gone through; and we will now proceed to speak of the others, premising
a few words respecting the Soul itself. It was stated before, you will
remember, that the Soul consists of two parts, the Rational, and
Irrational: we must now make a similar division of the Rational.
Let it be understood then that there are two parts of the Soul
possessed of Reason; one whereby we realise those existences whose
causes cannot be otherwise than they are, and one whereby we realise
those which can be otherwise than they are,[2] (for there must be,
answering to things generically different, generically different parts
of the soul naturally adapted to each, since these parts of the soul
possess their knowledge in virtue of a certain resemblance and
appropriateness in themselves to the objects of which they are
percipients);[3] and let us name the former, “that which is apt to
know,” the latter, “that which is apt to calculate” (because
deliberating and calculating are the same, and no one ever deliberates
about things which cannot be otherwise than they are: and so the
Calculative will be one part of the Rational faculty of the soul).
We must discover, then, which is the best state of each of these,
because that will be the Excellence of each; and this again is relative
to the work each has to do.[4]
There are in the Soul three functions on which depend moral action and
truth; Sense, Intellect, Appetition, whether vague Desire or definite
Will. Now of these Sense is the originating cause of no moral action,
as is seen from the fact that brutes have Sense but are in no way
partakers of moral action.[5]
[Intellect and Will are thus connected,] what in the Intellectual
operation is Affirmation and Negation that in the Will is Pursuit and
Avoidance, And so, since Moral Virtue is a State apt to exercise Moral
Choice and Moral Choice is Will consequent on deliberation, the Reason
must be true and the Will right, to constitute good Moral Choice, and
what the Reason affirms the Will must pursue.[6]
Now this Intellectual operation and this Truth is what bears upon Moral
Action; of course truth and falsehood must be the good and the bad of