The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
Practically Wise varies: for whatever provides all things well for
itself, to this they would apply the term Practically Wise, and commit
these matters to it; which is the reason, by the way, that they call
some brutes Practically Wise, such that is as plainly have a faculty of
forethought respecting their own subsistence.
And it is quite plain that Science and πολιτικὴ cannot be identical:
because if men give the name of Science to that faculty which is
employed upon what is expedient for themselves, there will be many
instead of one, because there is not one and the same faculty employed
on the good of all animals collectively, unless in the same sense as
you may say there is one art of healing with respect to all living
beings.
If it is urged that man is superior to all other animals, that makes no
difference: for there are many other things more Godlike in their
nature than Man, as, most obviously, the elements of which the Universe
is composed.[25]
It is plain then that Science is the union of Knowledge and Intuition,
and has for its objects those things which are most precious in their
nature. Accordingly, Anexagoras, Thales, and men of that stamp, people
call Scientific, but not Practically Wise because they see them
ignorant of what concerns themselves; and they say that what they know
is quite out of the common run certainly, and wonderful, and hard, and
very fine no doubt, but still useless because they do not seek after
what is good for them as men.
Chapter VIII.
But Practical Wisdom is employed upon human matters, and such as are
objects of deliberation (for we say, that to deliberate well is most
peculiarly the work of the man who possesses this Wisdom), and no man
deliberates about things which cannot be otherwise than they are, nor
about any save those that have some definite End and this End good
resulting from Moral Action; and the man to whom we should give the
name of Good in Counsel, simply and without modification, is he who in
the way of calculation has a capacity for attaining that of practical
goods which is the best for Man.
Nor again does Practical Wisdom consist in a knowledge of general
principles only, but it is necessary that one should know also the
particular details, because it is apt to act, and action is concerned
with details: for which reason sometimes men who have not much
knowledge are more practical than others who have; among others, they
who derive all they know from actual experience: suppose a man to know,
for instance, that light meats are easy of digestion and wholesome, but
not what kinds of meat are light, he will not produce a healthy state;
that man will have a much better chance of doing so, who knows that the
flesh of birds is light and wholesome. Since then Practical Wisdom is
apt to act, one ought to have both kinds of knowledge, or, if only one,
the knowledge of details rather than of Principles. So there will be in
respect of Practical Wisdom the distinction of supreme and
subordinate.[26]
Further: πολιτικὴ and Practical Wisdom are the same mental state, but
the point of view is not the same.
Of Practical Wisdom exerted upon a community that which I would call
the Supreme is the faculty of Legislation; the subordinate, which is
concerned with the details, generally has the common name πολιτικὴ, and
its functions are Action and Deliberation (for the particular enactment
is a matter of action, being the ultimate issue of this branch of
Practical Wisdom, and therefore people commonly say, that these men
alone are really engaged in government, because they alone act, filling
the same place relatively to legislators, that workmen do to a
master).[27]
Again, that is thought to be Practical Wisdom in the most proper sense
which has for its object the interest of the Individual: and this
usually appropriates the common name: the others are called
respectively Domestic Management, Legislation, Executive Government
divided into two branches, Deliberative and Judicial.[28] Now of
course, knowledge for one’s self is one kind of knowledge, but it
admits of many shades of difference: and it is a common notion that the
man who knows and busies himself about his own concerns merely is the
man of Practical Wisdom, while they who extend their solicitude to
society at large are considered meddlesome.
Euripides has thus embodied this sentiment; “How,” says one of his
Characters, “How foolish am I, who whereas I might have shared equally,
idly numbered among the multitude of the army *** for them that are
busy and meddlesome [Jove hates],” because the generality of mankind
seek their own good and hold that this is their proper business. It is
then from this opinion that the notion has arisen that such men are the
Practically-Wise. And yet it is just possible that the good of the
individual cannot be secured independently of connection with a family
or a community. And again, how a man should manage his own affairs is
sometimes not quite plain, and must be made a matter of enquiry.[29]
A corroboration of what I have said is[30] the fact, that the young
come to be geometricians, and mathematicians, and Scientific in such
matters, but it is not thought that a young man can come to be
possessed of Practical Wisdom: now the reason is, that this Wisdom has
for its object particular facts, which come to be known from
experience, which a young man has not because it is produced only by
length of time.
By the way, a person might also enquire,[31] why a boy may be made a
mathematician but not Scientific or a natural philosopher. Is not this
the reason? that mathematics are taken in by the process of
abstraction, but the principles of Science[32] and natural philosophy
must be gained by experiment; and the latter young men talk of but do
not realise, while the nature of the former is plain and clear.
Again, in matter of practice, error attaches either to the general
rule, in the process of deliberation, or to the particular fact: for
instance, this would be a general rule, “All water of a certain gravity
is bad;” the particular fact, “this water is of that gravity.”
And that Practical Wisdom is not Knowledge is plain, for it has to do
with the ultimate issue,[33] as has been said, because every object of
action is of this nature.
To Intuition it is opposed, for this takes in those principles which
cannot be proved by reasoning, while Practical Wisdom is concerned with
the ultimate particular fact which cannot be realised by Knowledge but
by Sense; I do not mean one of the five senses, but the same by which
we take in the mathematical fact, that no rectilineal figure can be
contained by less than three lines, i.e. that a triangle is the
ultimate figure, because here also is a stopping point.
This however is Sense rather than Practical Wisdom, which is of another
kind.[34]
Chapter IX.
Now the acts of enquiring and deliberating differ, though deliberating
is a kind of enquiring. We ought to ascertain about Good Counsel
likewise what it is, whether a kind of Knowledge, or Opinion, or Happy
Conjecture, or some other kind of faculty. Knowledge it obviously is
not, because men do not enquire about what they know, and Good Counsel
is a kind of deliberation, and the man who is deliberating is enquiring
and calculating.
Neither is it Happy Conjecture; because this is independent of
reasoning, and a rapid operation; but men deliberate a long time, and
it is a common saying that one should execute speedily what has been
resolved upon in deliberation, but deliberate slowly.
Quick perception of causes[35] again is a different faculty from good
counsel, for it is a species of Happy Conjecture. Nor is Good Counsel
Opinion of any kind.
Well then, since he who deliberates ill goes wrong, and he who
deliberates well does so rightly, it is clear that Good Counsel is
rightness of some kind, but not of Knowledge nor of Opinion: for
Knowledge cannot be called right because it cannot be wrong, and
Rightness of Opinion is Truth: and again, all which is the object of
opinion is definitely marked out.[36]
Still, however, Good Counsel is not independent of Reason, Does it
remain then that it is a rightness of Intellectual Operation simply,
because this does not amount to an assertion; and the objection to
Opinion was that it is not a process of enquiry but already a definite
assertion; whereas whosoever deliberates, whether well or ill, is
engaged in enquiry and calculation.
Well, Good Counsel is a Rightness of deliberation, and so the first
question must regard the nature and objects of deliberation. Now
remember Rightness is an equivocal term; we plainly do not mean
Rightness of any kind whatever; the ἀκρατὴς, for instance, or the bad
man, will obtain by his calculation what he sets before him as an
object, and so he may be said to have deliberated _rightly_ in one
sense, but will have attained a great evil. Whereas to have deliberated
well is thought to be a good, because Good Counsel is Rightness of
deliberation of such a nature as is apt to attain good.
But even this again you may get by false reasoning, and hit upon the
right effect though not through right means,[37] your middle term being
fallacious: and so neither will this be yet Good Counsel in consequence
of which you get what you ought but not through proper means.
Again, one man may hit on a thing after long deliberation, another
quickly. And so that before described will not be yet Good Counsel, but
the Rightness must be with reference to what is expedient; and you must
have a proper end in view, pursue it in a right manner and right time.
Once more. One may deliberate well either generally or towards some
particular End.[38] Good counsel in the general then is that which goes
right towards that which is the End in a general way of consideration;
in particular, that which does so towards some particular End.
Since then deliberating well is a quality of men possessed of Practical
Wisdom, Good Counsel must be “Rightness in respect of what conduces to
a given End, of which[39] Practical Wisdom is the true conception.”
Chapter X.
There is too the faculty of Judiciousness, and also its absence, in
virtue of which we call men Judicious or the contrary.
Now Judiciousness is neither entirely identical with Knowledge or
Opinion (for then all would have been Judicious), nor is it any one
specific science, as medical science whose object matter is things
wholesome; or geometry whose object matter is magnitude: for it has not
for its object things which always exist and are immutable, nor of
those things which come into being just any which may chance; but those
in respect of which a man might doubt and deliberate.
And so it has the same object matter as Practical Wisdom; yet the two
faculties are not identical, because Practical Wisdom has the capacity
for commanding and taking the initiative, for its End is “what one
should do or not do:” but Judiciousness is only apt to decide upon
suggestions (though we do in Greek put “well” on to the faculty and its
concrete noun, these really mean exactly the same as the plain words),
and Judiciousness is neither the having Practical Wisdom, nor attaining
it: but just as learning is termed συνιέναι when a man uses his
knowledge, so judiciousness consists in employing the Opinionative
faculty in judging concerning those things which come within the
province of Practical Wisdom, when another enunciates them; and not
judging merely, but judging well (for εὐ and καλῶς mean exactly the
same thing). And the Greek name of this faculty is derived from the use
of the term συνιέναι in learning: μανθάνειν and συνιέναι being often
used as synonymous.
The faculty called γνώμη,[40] in right of which we call men εὐγνώμονες,