The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
or say they have γνώμη, is “the right judgment of the equitable man.” A
proof of which is that we most commonly say that the equitable man has
a tendency to make allowance, and the making allowance in certain cases
is equitable. And συγγνώμη (the word denoting allowance) is right γνώμη
having a capacity of making equitable decisions, By “right” I mean that
of the Truthful man.
Chapter XI.
Now all these mental states[41] tend to the same object, as indeed
common language leads us to expect: I mean, we speak of γνώμη,
Judiciousness, Practical Wisdom, and Practical Intuition, attributing
the possession of γνώμη and Practical Intuition to the same Individuals
whom we denominate Practically-Wise and Judicious: because all these
faculties are employed upon the extremes,[42] i.e. on particular
details; and in right of his aptitude for deciding on the matters which
come within the province of the Practically-Wise, a man is Judicious
and possessed of good γνώμη; i.e. he is disposed to make allowance, for
considerations of equity are entertained by all good men alike in
transactions with their fellows.
And all matters of Moral Action belong to the class of particulars,
otherwise called extremes: for the man of Practical Wisdom must know
them, and Judiciousness and γνώμη are concerned with matters of Moral
Actions, which are extremes.
Intuition, moreover, takes in the extremes at both ends:[43] I mean,
the first and last terms must be taken in not by reasoning but by
Intuition [so that Intuition comes to be of two kinds], and that which
belongs to strict demonstrative reasonings takes in immutable, i.e.
Necessary, first terms; while that which is employed in practical
matters takes in the extreme, the Contingent, and the minor
Premiss:[44] for the minor Premisses are the source of the Final Cause,
Universals being made up out of Particulars.[45] To take in these, of
course, we must have Sense, i.e. in other words Practical Intuition.
And for this reason these are thought to be simply gifts of nature; and
whereas no man is thought to be Scientific by nature, men are thought
to have γνώμη, and Judiciousness, and Practical Intuition: a proof of
which is that we think these faculties are a consequence even of
particular ages, and this given age has Practical Intuition and γνώμη,
we say, as if under the notion that nature is the cause. And thus
Intuition is both the beginning and end, because the proofs are based
upon the one kind of extremes and concern the other.
And so[46] one should attend to the undemonstrable dicta and opinions
of the skilful, the old and the Practically-Wise, no less than to those
which are based on strict reasoning, because they see aright, having
gained their power of moral vision from experience.
Chapter XII.
Well, we have now stated the nature and objects of Practical Wisdom and
Science respectively, and that they belong each to a different part of
the Soul. But I can conceive a person questioning their utility.
“Science,” he would say, “concerns itself with none of the causes of
human happiness (for it has nothing to do with producing anything):
Practical Wisdom has this recommendation, I grant, but where is the
need of it, since its province is those things which are just and
honourable, and good for man, and these are the things which the good
man as such does; but we are not a bit the more apt to do them because
we know them, since the Moral Virtues are Habits; just as we are not
more apt to be healthy or in good condition from mere knowledge of what
relates to these (I mean,[47] of course, things so called not from
their producing health, etc., but from their evidencing it in a
particular subject), for we are not more apt to be healthy and in good
condition merely from knowing the art of medicine or training.
“If it be urged that _knowing what is_ good does not by itself make a
Practically-Wise man but _becoming_ good; still this Wisdom will be no
use either to those that are good, and so have it already, or to those
who have it not; because it will make no difference to them whether
they have it themselves or put themselves under the guidance of others
who have; and we might be contented to be in respect of this as in
respect of health: for though we wish to be healthy still we do not set
about learning the art of healing.
“Furthermore, it would seem to be strange that, though lower in the
scale than Science, it is to be its master; which it is, because
whatever produces results takes the rule and directs in each matter.”
This then is what we are to talk about, for these are the only points
now raised.
Now first we say that being respectively Excellences of different parts
of the Soul they must be choice-worthy, even on the supposition that
they neither of them produce results.
In the next place we say that they _do_ produce results; that Science
makes Happiness, not as the medical art but as healthiness makes
health:[48] because, being a part of Virtue in its most extensive
sense, it makes a man happy by being possessed and by working.
Next, Man’s work _as Man_ is accomplished by virtue of Practical Wisdom
and Moral Virtue, the latter giving the right aim and direction, the
former the right means to its attainment;[49] but of the fourth part of
the Soul, the mere nutritive principle, there is no such Excellence,
because nothing is in its power to do or leave undone.[50]
As to our not being more apt to do what is noble and just by reason of
possessing Practical Wisdom, we must begin a little higher up,[51]
taking this for our starting-point. As we say that men may do things in
themselves just and yet not be just men; for instance, when men do what
the laws require of them, either against their will, or by reason of
ignorance or something else, at all events not for the sake of the
things themselves; and yet they do what they ought and all that the
good man should do; so it seems that to be a good man one must do each
act in a particular frame of mind, I mean from Moral Choice and for the
sake of the things themselves which are done. Now it is Virtue which
makes the Moral Choice right, but whatever is naturally required to
carry out that Choice comes under the province not of Virtue but of a
different faculty. We must halt, as it were, awhile, and speak more
clearly on these points.
There is then a certain faculty, commonly named Cleverness, of such a
nature as to be able to do and attain whatever conduces to _any_ given
purpose: now if that purpose be a good one the faculty is praiseworthy;
if otherwise, it goes by a name which, denoting strictly the ability,
implies the willingness to do _anything_; we accordingly call the
Practically-Wise Clever, and also those who can and will do
anything.[52]
Now Practical Wisdom is not identical with Cleverness, nor is it
without this power of adapting means to ends: but this Eye of the Soul
(as we may call it) does not attain its proper state without goodness,
as we have said before and as is quite plain, because the syllogisms
into which Moral Action may be analysed have for their Major
Premiss,[53] “since —— is the End and the Chief Good”[54] (fill up the
blank with just anything you please, for we merely want to exhibit the
Form, so that anything will do), but _how_ this blank should be filled
is seen only by the good man: because Vice distorts the moral vision
and causes men to be deceived in respect of practical principles.[55]
It is clear, therefore, that a man cannot be a Practically-Wise,
without being a good, man.
We must enquire again also about Virtue: for it may be divided into
Natural Virtue and Matured, which two bear to each other a relation
similar to that which Practical Wisdom bears to Cleverness, one not of
identity but resemblance. I speak of Natural Virtue, because men hold
that each of the moral dispositions attach to us all somehow by nature:
we have dispositions[56] towards justice, self-mastery and courage, for
instance, immediately from our birth: but still we seek Goodness in its
highest sense as something distinct from these, and that these
dispositions should attach to us in a somewhat different fashion.[57]
Children and brutes have these natural states, but then they are
plainly hurtful unless combined with an intellectual element: at least
thus much is matter of actual experience and observation, that as a
strong body destitute of sight must, if set in motion, fall violently
because it has not sight, so it is also in the case we are considering:
but if it can get the intellectual element it then excels in acting.
Just so the Natural State of Virtue, being like this strong body, will
then be Virtue in the highest sense when it too is combined with the
intellectual element.
So that, as in the case of the Opinionative faculty, there are two
forms, Cleverness and Practical Wisdom; so also in the case of the
Moral there are two, Natural Virtue and Matured; and of these the
latter cannot be formed without Practical Wisdom.[58]
This leads some to say that all the Virtues are merely intellectual
Practical Wisdom, and Socrates was partly right in his enquiry and
partly wrong: wrong in that he thought all the Virtues were merely
intellectual Practical Wisdom, right in saying they were not
independent of that faculty.
A proof of which is that now all, in defining Virtue, add on the
“state” [mentioning also to what standard it has reference, namely
that] “which is accordant with Right Reason:” now “right” means in
accordance with Practical Wisdom. So then all seem to have an
instinctive notion that that state which is in accordance with
Practical Wisdom is Virtue; however, we must make a slight change in
their statement, because that state is Virtue, not merely which is in
accordance with but which implies the possession of Right Reason;
which, upon such matters, is Practical Wisdom. The difference between
us and Socrates is this: he thought the Virtues were reasoning
processes (_i.e._ that they were all instances of Knowledge in its
strict sense), but we say they imply the possession of Reason.
From what has been said then it is clear that one cannot be, strictly
speaking, good without Practical Wisdom nor Practically-Wise without
moral goodness.
And by the distinction between Natural and Matured Virtue one can meet
the reasoning by which it might be argued “that the Virtues are
separable because the same man is not by nature most inclined to all at
once so that he will have acquired this one before he has that other:”
we would reply that this is possible with respect to the Natural
Virtues but not with respect to those in right of which a man is
denominated simply good: because they will all belong to him together
with the one faculty of Practical Wisdom.
It is plain too that even had it not been apt to act we should have
needed it, because it is the Excellence of a part of the Soul; and that
the moral choice cannot be right independently of Practical Wisdom and
Moral Goodness; because this gives the right End, that causes the doing
these things which conduce to the End.
Then again, it is not Master of Science (i.e. of the superior part of
the Soul), just as neither is the healing art Master of health; for it
does not make use of it, but looks how it may come to be: so it
commands for the sake of it but does not command it.
The objection is, in fact, about as valid as if a man should say
πολιτικὴ governs the gods because it gives orders about all things in
the communty.
APPENDIX
On ἐπισπήμη, from I. Post. Analyt. chap. i. and ii.
(Such parts only are translated as throw light on the Ethics.)
All teaching, and all intellectual learning, proceeds on the basis of
previous knowledge, as will appear on an examination of all. The