The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
Mathematical Sciences, and every other system, draw their conclusions
in this method. So too of reasonings, whether by syllogism, or
induction: for both teach through what is previously known, the former
assuming the premisses as from wise men, the latter proving universals
from the evidentness of the particulars. In like manner too
rhetoricians persuade, either through examples (which amounts to
induction), or through enthymemes (which amounts to syllogism).
CHAP. II
Well, we suppose that we _know_ things (in the strict and proper sense
of the word) when we suppose ourselves to know the cause by reason of
which the thing is to be the cause of it; and that this cannot be
otherwise. It is plain that the idea intended to be conveyed by the
term _knowing_ is something of this kind; because they who do not
really know suppose themselves thus related to the matter in hand and
they who do know really are so that of whatsoever there is properly
speaking Knowledge this cannot be otherwise than it is Whether or no
there is another way of knowing we will say afterwards, but we do say
that we know through demonstration, by which I mean a syllogism apt to
produce Knowledge, i.e. in right of which through having it, we know.
If Knowledge then is such as we have described it, the Knowledge
produced by demonstrative reasoning must be drawn from premisses _true_
and _first_, and _incapable of syllogistic proof_, and _better known_,
and _prior in order of time_, and _causes of the conclusion_, for so
the principles will be akin to the conclusion demonstrated.
(Syllogism, of course there may be without such premisses, but it will
not be demonstration because it will not produce knowledge).
_True_, they must be, because it is impossible to know that which is
not.
_First_, that is indemonstrable, because, if demonstrable, he cannot be
said to _know_ them who has no demonstration of them for knowing such
things as are demonstrable is the same as having demonstration of them.
_Causes_ they must be, and _better known_, and _prior_ in time,
_causes_, because we then know when we are acquainted with the cause,
and _prior_, if causes, and _known beforehand_, not merely comprehended
in idea but known to exist (The terms prior, and better known, bear two
senses for _prior by nature_ and _prior relatively to ourselves_ are
not the same, nor _better known by nature_, and _better known to us_ I
mean, by _prior_ and _better known relatively to ourselves_, such
things as are nearer to sensation, but abstractedly so such as are
further Those are furthest which are most universal those nearest which
are particulars, and these are mutually opposed.)
And by _first_, I mean _principles akin to the conclusion_, for
principle means the same as first And the principle or first step in
demonstration is a proposition incapable of syllogistic proof, _i.e._
one to which there is none prior. Now of such syllogistic principles I
call that a θέσις which you cannot demonstrate, and which is
unnecessary with a view to learning something else. That which is
necessary in order to learn something else is an Axiom.
Further, since one is to believe and know the thing by having a
syllogism of the kind called demonstration, and what constitutes it to
be such is the nature of the premisses, it is necessary not merely to
_know before_, but to _know better than the conclusion_, either all or
at least some of, the principles, because that which is the cause of a
quality inhering in something else always inheres itself more as the
cause of our loving is itself more lovable. So, since the principles
are the cause of our knowing and behoving we know and believe them
more, because by reason of them we know also the conclusion following.
Further: the man who is to have the Knowledge which comes through
demonstration must not merely know and believe his principles better
than he does his conclusion, but he must believe nothing more firmly
than the contradictories of those principles out of which the contrary
fallacy may be constructed: since he who _knows_, is to be simply and
absolutely infallible.
BOOK VII
Chapter I.
Next we must take a different point to start from,[1] and observe that
of what is to be avoided in respect of moral character there are three
forms; Vice, Imperfect Self-Control, and Brutishness. Of the two former
it is plain what the contraries are, for we call the one Virtue, the
other Self-Control; and as answering to Brutishness it will be most
suitable to assign Superhuman, i.e. heroical and godlike Virtue, as, in
Homer, Priam says of Hector “that he was very excellent, nor was he
like the offspring of mortal man, but of a god.” and so, if, as is
commonly said, men are raised to the position of gods by reason of very
high excellence in Virtue, the state opposed to the Brutish will
plainly be of this nature: because as brutes are not virtuous or
vicious so neither are gods; but the state of these is something more
precious than Virtue, of the former something different in kind from
Vice.
And as, on the one hand, it is a rare thing for a man to be godlike (a
term the Lacedæmonians are accustomed to use when they admire a man
exceedingly; σεῖος ἀνὴρ they call him), so the brutish man is rare;
the character is found most among barbarians, and some cases of it are
caused by disease or maiming; also such men as exceed in vice all
ordinary measures we therefore designate by this opprobrious term.
Well, we must in a subsequent place make some mention of this
disposition, and Vice has been spoken of before: for the present we
must speak of Imperfect Self-Control and its kindred faults of Softness
and Luxury, on the one hand, and of Self-Control and Endurance on the
other; since we are to conceive of them, not as being the same states
exactly as Virtue and Vice respectively, nor again as differing in
kind.
And we should adopt the same course as before, i.e. state the
phenomena, and, after raising and discussing difficulties which suggest
themselves, then exhibit, if possible, all the opinions afloat
respecting these affections of the moral character; or, if not all, the
greater part and the most important: for we may consider we have
illustrated the matter sufficiently when the difficulties have been
solved, and such theories as are most approved are left as a residuum.
The chief points may be thus enumerated. It is thought,
I. That Self-Control and Endurance belong to the class of things good
and praiseworthy, while Imperfect Self-Control and Softness belong to
that of things low and blameworthy.
II. That the man of Self-Control is identical with the man who is apt
to abide by his resolution, and the man of Imperfect Self-Control with
him who is apt to depart from his resolution.
III. That the man of Imperfect Self-Control does things at the
instigation of his passions, knowing them to be wrong, while the man of
Self-Control, knowing his lusts to be wrong, refuses, by the influence
of reason, to follow their suggestions.
IV. That the man of Perfected Self-Mastery unites the qualities of
Self-Control and Endurance, and some say that every one who unites
these is a man of Perfect Self-Mastery, others do not.
V. Some confound the two characters of the man who has _no_
Self-Control, and the man of _Imperfect Self-Control_, while others
distinguish between them.
VI. It is sometimes said that the man of Practical Wisdom cannot be a
man of Imperfect Self-Control, sometimes that men who are Practically
Wise and Clever are of Imperfect Self-Control.
VII. Again, men are said to be of Imperfect Self-Control, not simply
but with the addition of the thing wherein, as in respect of anger, of
honour, and gain.
These then are pretty well the common statements.
Chapter II.
Now a man may raise a question as to the nature of the right conception
in violation of which a man fails of Self-Control.
That he can so fail when _knowing_ in the strict sense what is right
some say is impossible: for it is a strange thing, as Socrates thought,
that while Knowledge is present in his mind something else should
master him and drag him about like a slave. Socrates in fact contended
generally against the theory, maintaining there is no such state as
that of Imperfect Self-Control, for that no one acts contrary to what
is best conceiving it to be best but by reason of ignorance what is
best.
With all due respect to Socrates, his account of the matter is at
variance with plain facts, and we must enquire with respect to the
affection, if it be caused by ignorance what is the nature of the
ignorance: for that the man so failing does not suppose his acts to be
right before he is under the influence of passion is quite plain.[2]
There are people who partly agree with Socrates and partly not: that
nothing can be stronger than Knowledge they agree, but that no man acts
in contravention of his conviction of what is better they do not agree;
and so they say that it is not Knowledge, but only Opinion, which the
man in question has and yet yields to the instigation of his pleasures.
But then, if it is Opinion and not Knowledge, that is it the opposing
conception be not strong but only mild (as in the case of real doubt),
the not abiding by it in the face of strong lusts would be excusable:
but wickedness is not excusable, nor is anything which deserves blame.
Well then, is it Practical Wisdom which in this case offers opposition:
for that is the strongest principle? The supposition is absurd, for we
shall have the same man uniting Practical Wisdom and Imperfect
Self-Control, and surely no single person would maintain that it is
consistent with the character of Practical Wisdom to do voluntarily
what is very wrong; and besides we have shown before that the very mark
of a man of this character is aptitude to act, as distinguished from
mere knowledge of what is right; because he is a man conversant with
particular details, and possessed of all the other virtues.
Again, if the having strong and bad lusts is necessary to the idea of
the man of Self-Control, this character cannot be identical with the
man of Perfected Self-Mastery, because the having strong desires or bad
ones does not enter into the idea of this latter character: and yet the
man of Self-Control must have such: for suppose them good; then the
moral state which should hinder a man from following their suggestions
must be bad, and so Self-Control would not be in all cases good:
suppose them on the other hand to be weak and not wrong, it would be
nothing grand; nor anything great, supposing them to be wrong and weak.
Again, if Self-Control makes a man apt to abide by all opinions without
exception, it may be bad, as suppose the case of a false opinion: and
if Imperfect Self-Control makes a man apt to depart from all without
exception, we shall have cases where it will be good; take that of
Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles, for instance: he is to be
praised for not abiding by what he was persuaded to by Ulysses, because
he was pained at being guilty of falsehood.
Or again, false sophistical reasoning presents a difficulty: for
because men wish to prove paradoxes that they may be counted clever
when they succeed, the reasoning that has been used becomes a
difficulty: for the intellect is fettered; a man being unwilling to
abide by the conclusion because it does not please his judgment, but
unable to advance because he cannot disentangle the web of sophistical
reasoning.
Or again, it is conceivable on this supposition that folly joined with
Imperfect Self-Control may turn out, in a given case, goodness: for by
reason of his imperfection of self-control a man acts in a way which