The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
contradicts his notions; now his notion is that what is really good is
bad and ought not to be done; and so he will eventually do what is good
and not what is bad.
Again, on the same supposition, the man who acting on conviction
pursues and chooses things because they are pleasant must be thought a
better man than he who does so not by reason of a quasi-rational
conviction but of Imperfect Self-Control: because he is more open to
cure by reason of the possibility of his receiving a contrary
conviction. But to the man of Imperfect Self-Control would apply the
proverb, “when water chokes, what should a man drink then?” for had he
never been convinced at all in respect of what he does,[3] then by a
conviction in a contrary direction he might have stopped in his course;
but now though he has had convictions he notwithstanding acts against
them.
Again, if any and every thing is the object-matter of Imperfect and
Perfect Self-Control, who is the man of Imperfect Self-Control simply?
because no one unites all cases of it, and we commonly say that some
men are so simply, not adding any particular thing in which they are
so.
Well, the difficulties raised are pretty near such as I have described
them, and of these theories we must remove some and leave others as
established; because the solving of a difficulty is a positive act of
establishing something as true.
Chapter III.
Now we must examine first whether men of Imperfect Self-Control act
with a knowledge of what is right or not: next, if with such knowledge,
in what sense; and next what are we to assume is the object-matter of
the man of Imperfect Self-Control, and of the man of Self-Control; I
mean, whether pleasure and pain of all kinds or certain definite ones;
and as to Self-Control and Endurance, whether these are designations of
the same character or different. And in like manner we must go into all
questions which are connected with the present.
But the real starting point of the enquiry is, whether the two
characters of Self-Control and Imperfect Self-Control are distinguished
by their object-matter, or their respective relations to it. I mean,
whether the man of Imperfect Self-Control is such simply by virtue of
having such and such object-matter; or not, but by virtue of his being
related to it in such and such a way, or by virtue of both: next,
whether Self-Control and Imperfect Self-Control are unlimited in their
object-matter: because he who is designated without any addition a man
of Imperfect Self-Control is not unlimited in his object-matter, but
has exactly the same as the man who has lost all Self-Control: nor is
he so designated because of his relation to this object-matter merely
(for then his character would be identical with that just mentioned,
loss of all Self-Control), but because of his relation to it being such
and such. For the man who has lost all Self-Control is led on with
deliberate moral choice, holding that it is his line to pursue pleasure
as it rises: while the man of Imperfect Self-Control does not think
that he ought to pursue it, but does pursue it all the same.
Now as to the notion that it is True Opinion and not Knowledge in
contravention of which men fail in Self-Control, it makes no difference
to the point in question, because some of those who hold Opinions have
no doubt about them but suppose themselves to have accurate Knowledge;
if then it is urged that men holding Opinions will be more likely than
men who have Knowledge to act in contravention of their conceptions, as
having but a moderate belief in them; we reply, Knowledge will not
differ in this respect from Opinion: because some men believe their own
Opinions no less firmly than others do their positive Knowledge:
Heraclitus is a case in point.
Rather the following is the account of it: the term _knowing_ has two
senses; both the man who does not use his Knowledge, and he who does,
are said to _know_: there will be a difference between a man’s acting
wrongly, who though possessed of Knowledge does not call it into
operation, and his doing so who has it and actually exercises it: the
latter is a strange case, but the mere having, if not exercising,
presents no anomaly.
Again, as there are two kinds of propositions affecting action,[4]
universal and particular, there is no reason why a man may not act
against his Knowledge, having both propositions in his mind, using the
universal but not the particular, for the particulars are the objects
of moral action.
There is a difference also in universal propositions;[5] a universal
proposition may relate partly to a man’s self and partly to the thing
in question: take the following for instance; “dry food is good for
every man,” this may have the two minor premisses, “this is a man,” and
“so and so is dry food;” but whether a given substance is so and so a
man either has not the Knowledge or does not exert it. According to
these different senses there will be an immense difference, so that for
a man to _know_ in the one sense, and yet act wrongly, would be nothing
strange, but in any of the other senses it would be a matter for
wonder.
Again, men may have Knowledge in a way different from any of those
which have been now stated: for we constantly see a man’s state so
differing by having and not using Knowledge, that he has it in a sense
and also has not; when a man is asleep, for instance, or mad, or drunk:
well, men under the actual operation of passion are in exactly similar
conditions; for anger, lust, and some other such-like things,
manifestly make changes even in the body, and in some they even cause
madness; it is plain then that we must say the men of Imperfect
Self-Control are in a state similar to these.
And their saying what embodies Knowledge is no proof of their actually
then exercising it, because they who are under the operation of these
passions repeat demonstrations; or verses of Empedocles,[6] just as
children, when first learning, string words together, but as yet know
nothing of their meaning, because they must grow into it, and this is a
process requiring time: so that we must suppose these men who fail in
Self-Control to say these moral sayings just as actors do.
Furthermore, a man may look at the account of the phænomenon in the
following way, from an examination of the actual working of the mind:
All action may be analysed into a syllogism, in which the one premiss
is an universal maxim and the other concerns particulars of which Sense
[moral or physical, as the case may be] is cognisant: now when one
results from these two, it follows necessarily that, as far as theory
goes the mind must assert the conclusion, and in practical propositions
the man must act accordingly.
For instance, let the universal be, “All that is sweet should be
tasted,” the particular, “This is sweet;” it follows necessarily that
he who is able and is not hindered should not only draw, but put in
practice, the conclusion “This is to be tasted.” When then there is in
the mind one universal proposition forbidding to taste, and the other
“All that is sweet is pleasant” with its minor “This is sweet” (which
is the one that really works), and desire happens to be in the man, the
first universal bids him avoid this but the desire leads him on to
taste; for it has the power of moving the various organs: and so it
results that he fails in Self-Control, in a certain sense under the
influence of Reason and Opinion not contrary in itself to Reason but
only accidentally so; because it is the desire that is contrary to
Right Reason, but not the Opinion:[7] and so for this reason brutes are
not accounted of Imperfect Self-Control, because they have no power of
conceiving universals but only of receiving and retaining particular
impressions.
As to the manner in which the ignorance is removed and the man of
Imperfect Self-Control recovers his Knowledge, the account is the same
as with respect to him who is drunk or asleep, and is not peculiar to
this affection, so physiologists[8] are the right people to apply to.
But whereas the minor premiss of every practical syllogism is an
opinion on matter cognisable by Sense and determines the actions; he
who is under the influence of passion either has not this, or so has it
that his having does not amount to _knowing_ but merely saying, as a
man when drunk might repeat Empedocles’ verses; and because the minor
term[9] is neither universal, nor is thought to have the power of
producing Knowledge in like manner as the universal term: and so the
result which Socrates was seeking comes out, that is to say, the
affection does not take place in the presence of that which is thought
to be specially and properly Knowledge, nor is this dragged about by
reason of the affection, but in the presence of that Knowledge which is
conveyed by Sense.
Let this account then be accepted of the question respecting the
failure in Self-Control, whether it is with Knowledge, and the manner
in which such failure is possible or not, though a man possesses
Knowledge.
Chapter IV.
The next question to be discussed is whether there is a character to be
designated by the term “of Imperfect Self-Control” simply, or whether
all who are so are to be accounted such, in respect of some particular
thing; and, if there is such a character, what is his object-matter.
Now that pleasures and pains are the object-matter of men of
Self-Control and of Endurance, and also of men of Imperfect
Self-Control and Softness, is plain.
Further, things which produce pleasure are either necessary, or objects
of choice in themselves but yet admitting of excess. All bodily things
which produce pleasure are necessary; and I call such those which
relate to food and other grosser appetities, in short such bodily
things as we assumed were the Object-matter of absence of Self-Control
and of Perfected Self-Mastery.
The other class of objects are not necessary, but objects of choice in
themselves: I mean, for instance, victory, honour, wealth, and
such-like good or pleasant things. And those who are excessive in their
liking for such things contrary to the principle of Right Reason which
is in their own breasts we do not designate men of Imperfect
Self-Control simply, but with the addition of the thing wherein, as in
respect of money, or gain, or honour, or anger, and not simply; because
we consider them as different characters and only having that title in
right of a kind of resemblance (as when we add to a man’s name
“conqueror in the Olympic games” the account of him as Man differs but
little from the account of him as the Man who conquered in the Olympic
games, but still it is different). And a proof of the real difference
between these so designated with an addition and those simply so called
is this, that Imperfect Self-Control is blamed, not as an error merely
but also as being a vice, either wholly or partially; but none of these
other cases is so blamed.
But of those who have for their object-matter the bodily enjoyments,
which we say are also the object-matter of the man of Perfected
Self-Mastery and the man who has lost all Self-Control, he that pursues
excessive pleasures and too much avoids[10] things which are painful
(as hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and everything connected with
touch and taste), not from moral choice but in spite of his moral
choice and intellectual conviction, is termed “a man of Imperfect
Self-Control,” not with the addition of any particular object-matter as
we do in respect of want of control of anger but simply.
And a proof that the term is thus applied is that the kindred term
“Soft” is used in respect of these enjoyments but not in respect of any
of those others. And for this reason we put into the same rank the man