The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
incapable of remorse, and so incurable, because he that has not remorse
is incurable. (He that has too little love of pleasure is the opposite
character, and the man of Perfected Self-Mastery the mean character.)
He is of a similar character who avoids the bodily pains, not because
he _cannot_, but because he _chooses not to_, withstand them.
But of the characters who go wrong without _choosing_ so to do, the one
is led on by reason of pleasure, the other because he avoids the pain
it would cost him to deny his lust; and so they are different the one
from the other. Now every one would pronounce a man worse for doing
something base without any impulse of desire, or with a very slight
one, than for doing the same from the impulse of a very strong desire;
for striking a man when not angry than if he did so in wrath: because
one naturally says, “What would he have done had he been under the
influence of passion?” (and on this ground, by the bye, the man utterly
void of Self-Control is worse than he who has it imperfectly). However,
of the two characters which have been mentioned,[16] [as included in
that of utter absence of Self-Control], the one is rather Softness, the
other properly the man of no Self-Control.
Furthermore, to the character of Imperfect Self-Control is opposed that
of Self-Control, and to that of Softness that of Endurance: because
Endurance consists in continued resistance but Self-Control in actual
mastery, and continued resistance and actual mastery are as different
as not being conquered is from conquering; and so Self-Control is more
choice-worthy than Endurance.
Again, he who fails when exposed to those temptations against which the
common run of men hold out, and are well able to do so, is Soft and
Luxurious (Luxury being a kind of Softness): the kind of man, I mean,
to let his robe drag in the dirt to avoid the trouble of lifting it,
and who, aping the sick man, does not however suppose himself wretched
though he is like a wretched man. So it is too with respect to
Self-Control and the Imperfection of it: if a man yields to pleasures
or pains which are violent and excessive it is no matter for wonder,
but rather for allowance if he made what resistance he could (instances
are, Philoctetes in Theodectes’ drama when wounded by the viper; or
Cercyon in the Alope of Carcinus, or men who in trying to suppress
laughter burst into a loud continuous fit of it, as happened, you
remember, to Xenophantus), but it is a matter for wonder when a man
yields to and cannot contend against those pleasures or pains which the
common herd are able to resist; always supposing his failure not to be
owing to natural constitution or disease, I mean, as the Scythian kings
are constitutionally Soft, or the natural difference between the sexes.
Again, the man who is a slave to amusement is commonly thought to be
destitute of Self-Control, but he really is Soft; because amusement is
an act of relaxing, being an act of resting, and the character in
question is one of those who exceed due bounds in respect of this.
Moreover of Imperfect Self-Control there are two forms, Precipitancy
and Weakness: those who have it in the latter form though they have
made resolutions do not abide by them by reason of passion; the others
are led by passion because they have never formed any resolutions at
all: while there are some who, like those who by tickling themselves
beforehand get rid of ticklishness, having felt and seen beforehand the
approach of temptation, and roused up themselves and their resolution,
yield not to passion; whether the temptation be somewhat pleasant or
somewhat painful. The Precipitate form of Imperfect Self-Control they
are most liable to who are constitutionally of a sharp or melancholy
temperament: because the one by reason of the swiftness, the other by
reason of the violence, of their passions, do not wait for Reason,
because they are disposed to follow whatever notion is impressed upon
their minds.
Again, the man utterly destitute of Self-Control, as was observed
before, is not given to remorse: for it is part of his character that
he abides by his moral choice: but the man of Imperfect Self-Control is
almost made up of remorse: and so the case is not as we determined it
before, but the former is incurable and the latter may be cured: for
depravity is like chronic diseases, dropsy and consumption for
instance, but Imperfect Self-Control is like acute disorders: the
former being a continuous evil, the latter not so. And, in fact,
Imperfect Self-Control and Confirmed Vice are different in kind: the
latter being imperceptible to its victim, the former not so.[17]
But, of the different forms of Imperfect Self-Control, those are better
who are carried off their feet by a sudden access of temptation than
they who have Reason but do not abide by it; these last being overcome
by passion less in degree, and not wholly without premeditation as are
the others: for the man of Imperfect Self-Control is like those who are
soon intoxicated and by little wine and less than the common run of
men.
Well then, that Imperfection of Self-Control is not Confirmed
Viciousness is plain: and yet perhaps it is such in a way, because in
one sense it is contrary to moral choice and in another the result of
it:[18] at all events, in respect of the actions, the case is much like
what Demodocus said of the Miletians. “The people of Miletus are not
fools, but they do just the kind of things that fools do;” and so they
of Imperfect Self-Control are not unjust, but they do unjust acts.
But to resume. Since the man of Imperfect Self-Control is of such a
character as to follow bodily pleasures in excess and in defiance of
Right Reason, without acting on any deliberate conviction, whereas the
man utterly destitute of Self-Control does act upon a conviction which
rests on his natural inclination to follow after these pleasures; the
former may be easily persuaded to a different course, but the latter
not: for Virtue and Vice respectively preserve and corrupt the moral
principle; now the motive is the principle or starting point in moral
actions, just as axioms and postulates are in mathematics: and neither
in morals nor mathematics is it Reason which is apt to teach the
principle; but Excellence, either natural or acquired by custom, in
holding right notions with respect to the principle. He who does this
in morals is the man of Perfected Self-Mastery, and the contrary
character is the man utterly destitute of Self-Control.
Again, there is a character liable to be taken off his feet in defiance
of Right Reason because of passion; whom passion so far masters as to
prevent his acting in accordance with Right Reason, but not so far as
to make him be convinced that it is his proper line to follow after
such pleasures without limit: this character is the man of Imperfect
Self- Control, better than he who is utterly destitute of it, and not a
bad man simply and without qualification: because in him the highest
and best part, i.e. principle, is preserved: and there is another
character opposed to him who is apt to abide by his resolutions, and
not to depart from them; at all events, not at the instigation of
passion.
It is evident then from all this, that Self-Control is a good state and
the Imperfection of it a bad one.
Chapter VIII.
Next comes the question, whether a man is a man of Self-Control for
abiding by his conclusions and moral choice be they of what kind they
may, or only by the right one; or again, a man of Imperfect
Self-Control for not abiding by his conclusions and moral choice be
they of whatever kind; or, to put the case we did before, is he such
for not abiding by false conclusions and wrong moral choice?
Is not this the truth, that _incidentally_ it is by conclusions and
moral choice of any kind that the one character abides and the other
does not, but _per se_ true conclusions and right moral choice:[19] to
explain what is meant by incidentally, and _per se_; suppose a man
chooses or pursues this thing for the sake of that, he is said to
pursue and choose that _per se_, but this only incidentally. For the
term _per se_ we use commonly the word “simply,” and so, in a way, it
is opinion of any kind soever by which the two characters respectively
abide or not, but he is “simply” entitled to the designations who
abides or not by the true opinion.
There are also people, who have a trick of abiding by their, own
opinions, who are commonly called Positive, as they who are hard to be
persuaded, and whose convictions are not easily changed: now these
people bear some resemblance to the character of Self-Control, just as
the prodigal to the liberal or the rash man to the brave, but they are
different in many points. The man of Self-Control does not change by
reason of passion and lust, yet when occasion so requires he will be
easy of persuasion: but the Positive man changes not at the call of
Reason, though many of this class take up certain desires and are led
by their pleasures. Among the class of Positive are the Opinionated,
the Ignorant, and the Bearish: the first, from the motives of pleasure
and pain: I mean, they have the pleasurable feeling of a kind of
victory in not having their convictions changed, and they are pained
when their decrees, so to speak, are reversed: so that, in fact, they
rather resemble the man of Imperfect Self-Control than the man of
Self-Control.
Again, there are some who depart from their resolutions not by reason
of any Imperfection of Self-Control; take, for instance, Neoptolemus in
the Philoctetes of Sophocles. Here certainly pleasure was the motive of
his departure from his resolution, but then it was one of a noble sort:
for to be truthful was noble in his eyes and he had been persuaded by
Ulysses to lie.
So it is not every one who acts from the motive of pleasure who is
utterly destitute of Self-Control or base or of Imperfect Self-Control,
only he who acts from the impulse of a base pleasure.
Chapter IX.
Moreover as there is a character who takes less pleasure than he ought
in bodily enjoyments, and he also fails to abide by the conclusion of
his Reason,[20] the man of Self-Control is the mean between him and the
man of Imperfect Self-Control: that is to say, the latter fails to
abide by them because of somewhat too much, the former because of
somewhat too little; while the man of Self-Control abides by them, and
never changes by reason of anything else than such conclusions.
Now of course since Self-Control is good both the contrary States must
be bad, as indeed they plainly are: but because the one of them is seen
in few persons, and but rarely in them, Self-Control comes to be viewed
as if opposed only to the Imperfection of it, just as Perfected
Self-Mastery is thought to be opposed only to utter want of
Self-Control.
Again, as many terms are used in the way of similitude, so people have
come to talk of the Self-Control of the man of Perfected Self-Mastery
in the way of similitude: for the man of Self-Control and the man of
Perfected Self-Mastery have this in common, that they do nothing
against Right Reason on the impulse of bodily pleasures, but then the
former has bad desires, the latter not; and the latter is so
constituted as not even to feel pleasure contrary to his Reason, the
former feels but does not yield to it.
Like again are the man of Imperfect Self-Control and he who is utterly
destitute of it, though in reality distinct: both follow bodily
pleasures, but the latter under a notion that it is the proper line for
him to take, his former without any such notion.
And it is not possible for the same man to be at once a man of
Practical Wisdom and of Imperfect Self-Control: because the character