The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
and choice-worthy, and to each individual whatever is such to him; and
the good man to the good man for both these reasons.
(Now the entertaining the sentiment is like a feeling, but Friendship
itself like a state: because the former may have for its object even
things inanimate, but requital of Friendship is attended with moral
choice which proceeds from a moral state: and again, men wish good to
the objects of their Friendship for their sakes, not in the way of a
mere feeling but of moral state.)
And the good, in loving their friend, love their own good (inasmuch as
the good man, when brought into that relation, becomes a good to him
with whom he is so connected), so that either party loves his own good,
and repays his friend equally both in wishing well and in the
pleasurable: for equality is said to be a tie of Friendship. Well,
these points belong most to the Friendship between good men.
But between morose or elderly men Friendship is less apt to arise,
because they are somewhat awkward-tempered, and take less pleasure in
intercourse and society; these being thought to be specially friendly
and productive of Friendship: and so young men become friends quickly,
old men not so (because people do not become friends with any, unless
they take pleasure in them); and in like manner neither do the morose.
Yet men of these classes entertain kindly feelings towards one another:
they wish good to one another and render mutual assistance in respect
of their needs, but they are not quite friends, because they neither
spend their time together nor take pleasure in one another, which
circumstances are thought specially to belong to Friendship.
To be a friend to many people, in the way of the perfect Friendship, is
not possible; just as you cannot be in love with many at once: it is,
so to speak, a state of excess which naturally has but one object; and
besides, it is not an easy thing for one man to be very much pleased
with many people at the same time, nor perhaps to find many really
good. Again, a man needs experience, and to be in habits of close
intimacy, which is very difficult.
But it _is_ possible to please many on the score of advantage and
pleasure: because there are many men of the kind, and the services may
be rendered in a very short time.
Of the two imperfect kinds that which most resembles the perfect is the
Friendship based upon pleasure, in which the same results accrue from
both and they take pleasure in one another or in the same objects; such
as are the Friendships of the young, because a generous spirit is most
found in these. The Friendship because of advantage is the connecting
link of shopkeepers.
Then again, the very happy have no need of persons who are profitable,
but of pleasant ones they have because they wish to have people to live
intimately with; and what is painful they bear for a short time indeed,
but continuously no one could support it, nay, not even the Chief Good
itself, if it were painful to him individually: and so they look out
for pleasant friends: perhaps they ought to require such to be good
also; and good moreover to themselves individually, because then they
will have all the proper requisites of Friendship.
Men in power are often seen to make use of several distinct friends:
for some are useful to them and others pleasurable, but the two are not
often united: because they do not, in fact, seek such as shall combine
pleasantness and goodness, nor such as shall be useful for honourable
purposes: but with a view to attain what is pleasant they look out for
men of easy-pleasantry; and again, for men who are clever at executing
any business put into their hands: and these qualifications are not
commonly found united in the same man.
It has been already stated that the good man unites the qualities of
pleasantness and usefulness: but then such a one will not be a friend
to a superior unless he be also his superior in goodness: for if this
be not the case, he cannot, being surpassed in one point, make things
equal by a proportionate degree of Friendship.[5] And characters who
unite superiority of station and goodness are not common.
Chapter VIII.
Now all the kinds of Friendship which have been already mentioned exist
in a state of equality, inasmuch as either the same results accrue to
both and they wish the same things to one another, or else they barter
one thing against another; pleasure, for instance, against profit: it
has been said already that Friendships of this latter kind are less
intense in degree and less permanent.
And it is their resemblance or dissimilarity to the same thing which
makes them to be thought to be and not to be Friendships: they show
like Friendships in right of their likeness to that which is based on
virtue (the one kind having the pleasurable, the other the profitable,
both of which belong also to the other); and again, they do not show
like Friendships by reason of their unlikeness to that true kind; which
unlikeness consists herein, that while that is above calumny and so
permanent these quickly change and differ in many other points.
But there is another form of Friendship, that, namely, in which the one
party is superior to the other; as between father and son, elder and
younger, husband and wife, ruler and ruled. These also differ one from
another: I mean, the Friendship between parents and children is not the
same as between ruler and the ruled, nor has the father the same
towards the son as the son towards the father, nor the husband towards
the wife as she towards him; because the work, and therefore the
excellence, of each of these is different, and different therefore are
the causes of their feeling Friendship; distinct and different
therefore are their feelings and states of Friendship.
And the same results do not accrue to each from the other, nor in fact
ought they to be looked for: but, when children render to their parents
what they ought to the authors of their being, and parents to their
sons what they ought to their offspring, the Friendship between such
parties will be permanent and equitable.
Further; the feeling of Friendship should be in a due proportion in all
Friendships which are between superior and inferior; I mean, the better
man, or the more profitable, and so forth, should be the object of a
stronger feeling than he himself entertains, because when the feeling
of Friendship comes to be after a certain rate then equality in a
certain sense is produced, which is thought to be a requisite in
Friendship.
(It must be remembered, however, that the equal is not in the same case
as regards Justice and Friendship: for in strict Justice the exactly
proportioned equal ranks first, and the actual numerically equal ranks
second, while in Friendship this is exactly reversed.)
And that equality is thus requisite is plainly shown by the occurrence
of a great difference of goodness or badness, or prosperity, or
something else: for in this case, people are not any longer friends,
nay they do not even feel that they ought to be. The clearest
illustration is perhaps the case of the gods, because they are most
superior in all good things. It is obvious too, in the case of kings,
for they who are greatly their inferiors do not feel entitled to be
friends to them; nor do people very insignificant to be friends to
those of very high excellence or wisdom. Of course, in such cases it is
out of the question to attempt to define up to what point they may
continue friends: for you may remove many points of agreement and the
Friendship last nevertheless; but when one of the parties is very far
separated (as a god from men), it cannot continue any longer.
This has given room for a doubt, whether friends do really wish to
their friends the very highest goods, as that they may be gods:
because, in case the wish were accomplished, they would no longer have
them for friends, nor in fact would they have the good things they had,
because friends are good things. If then it has been rightly said that
a friend wishes to his friend good things for that friend’s sake, it
must be understood that he is to remain such as he now is: that is to
say, he will wish the greatest good to him of which as man he is
capable: yet perhaps not all, because each man desires good for himself
most of all.
It is thought that desire for honour makes the mass of men wish rather
to be the objects of the feeling of Friendship than to entertain it
themselves (and for this reason they are fond of flatterers, a
flatterer being a friend inferior or at least pretending to be such and
rather to entertain towards another the feeling of Friendship than to
be himself the object of it), since the former is thought to be nearly
the same as being honoured, which the mass of men desire. And yet men
seem to choose honour, not for its own sake, but incidentally:[6] I
mean, the common run of men delight to be honoured by those in power
because of the hope it raises; that is they think they shall get from
them anything they may happen to be in want of, so they delight in
honour as an earnest of future benefit. They again who grasp at honour
at the hands of the good and those who are really acquainted with their
merits desire to confirm their own opinion about themselves: so they
take pleasure in the conviction that they are good, which is based on
the sentence of those who assert it. But in being the objects of
Friendship men delight for its own sake, and so this may be judged to
be higher than being honoured and Friendship to be in itself
choice-worthy. Friendship, moreover, is thought to consist in feeling,
rather than being the object of, the sentiment of Friendship, which is
proved by the delight mothers have in the feeling: some there are who
give their children to be adopted and brought up by others, and knowing
them bear this feeling towards them never seeking to have it returned,
if both are not possible; but seeming to be content with seeing them
well off and bearing this feeling themselves towards them, even though
they, by reason of ignorance, never render to them any filial regard or
love.
Since then Friendship stands rather in the entertaining, than in being
the object of, the sentiment, and they are praised who are fond of
their friends, it seems that entertaining the sentiment is the
Excellence of friends; and so, in whomsoever this exists in due
proportion these are stable friends and their Friendship is permanent.
And in this way may they who are unequal best be friends, because they
may thus be made equal.
Equality, then, and similarity are a tie to Friendship, and specially
the similarity of goodness, because good men, being stable in
themselves, are also stable as regards others, and neither ask
degrading services nor render them, but, so to say, rather prevent
them: for it is the part of the good neither to do wrong themselves nor
to allow their friends in so doing.
The bad, on the contrary, have no principle of stability: in fact, they
do not even continue like themselves: only they come to be friends for
a short time from taking delight in one another’s wickedness. Those
connected by motives of profit, or pleasure, hold together somewhat
longer: so long, that is to say, as they can give pleasure or profit
mutually.
The Friendship based on motives of profit is thought to be most of all
formed out of contrary elements: the poor man, for instance, is thus a
friend of the rich, and the ignorant of the man of information; that is
to say, a man desiring that of which he is, as it happens, in want,
gives something else in exchange for it. To this same class we may
refer the lover and beloved, the beautiful and the ill-favoured. For
this reason lovers sometimes show in a ridiculous light by claiming to