The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
be the objects of as intense a feeling as they themselves entertain: of
course if they are equally fit objects of Friendship they are perhaps
entitled to claim this, but if they have nothing of the kind it is
ridiculous.
Perhaps, moreover, the contrary does not aim at its contrary for its
own sake but incidentally: the mean is really what is grasped at; it
being good for the dry, for instance, not to become wet but to attain
the mean, and so of the hot, etc.
However, let us drop these questions, because they are in fact somewhat
foreign to our purpose.
Chapter IX.
It seems too, as was stated at the commencement, that Friendship and
Justice have the same object-matter, and subsist between the same
persons: I mean that in every Communion there is thought to be some
principle of Justice and also some Friendship: men address as friends,
for instance, those who are their comrades by sea, or in war, and in
like manner also those who are brought into Communion with them in
other ways: and the Friendship, because also the Justice, is
co-extensive with the Communion, This justifies the common proverb,
“the goods of friends are common,” since Friendship rests upon
Communion.
Now brothers and intimate companions have all in common, but other
people have their property separate, and some have more in common and
others less, because the Friendships likewise differ in degree. So too
do the various principles of Justice involved, not being the same
between parents and children as between brothers, nor between
companions as between fellow-citizens merely, and so on of all the
other conceivable Friendships. Different also are the principles of
Injustice as regards these different grades, and the acts become
intensified by being done to friends; for instance, it is worse to rob
your companion than one who is merely a fellow-citizen; to refuse help
to a brother than to a stranger; and to strike your father than any one
else. So then the Justice naturally increases with the degree of
Friendship, as being between the same parties and of equal extent.
All cases of Communion are parts, so to say, of the great Social one,
since in them men associate with a view to some advantage and to
procure some of those things which are needful for life; and the great
Social Communion is thought originally to have been associated and to
continue for the sake of some advantage: this being the point at which
legislators aim, affirming that to be just which is generally
expedient.
All the other cases of Communion aim at advantage in particular points;
the crew of a vessel at that which is to result from the voyage which
is undertaken with a view to making money, or some such object;
comrades in war at that which is to result from the war, grasping
either at wealth or victory, or it may be a political position; and
those of the same tribe, or Demus, in like manner.
Some of them are thought to be formed for pleasure’s sake, those, for
instance, of bacchanals or club-fellows, which are with a view to
Sacrifice or merely company. But all these seem to be ranged under the
great Social one, inasmuch as the aim of this is, not merely the
expediency of the moment but, for life and at all times; with a view to
which the members of it institute sacrifices and their attendant
assemblies, to render honour to the gods and procure for themselves
respite from toil combined with pleasure. For it appears that
sacrifices and religious assemblies in old times were made as a kind of
first-fruits after the ingathering of the crops, because at such
seasons they had most leisure.
So then it appears that all the instances of Communion are parts of the
great Social one: and corresponding Friendships will follow upon such
Communions.
Chapter X.
Of Political Constitutions there are three kinds; and equal in number
are the deflections from them, being, so to say, corruptions of them.
The former are Kingship, Aristocracy, and that which recognises the
principle of wealth, which it seems appropriate to call Timocracy (I
give to it the name of a political constitution because people commonly
do so). Of these the best is Monarchy, and Timocracy the worst.
From Monarchy the deflection is Despotism; both being Monarchies but
widely differing from each other; for the Despot looks to his own
advantage, but the King to that of his subjects: for he is in fact no
King who is not thoroughly independent and superior to the rest in all
good things, and he that is this has no further wants: he will not then
have to look to his own advantage but to that of his subjects, for he
that is not in such a position is a mere King elected by lot for the
nonce.
But Despotism is on a contrary footing to this Kingship, because the
Despot pursues his own good: and in the case of this its inferiority is
most evident, and what is worse is contrary to what is best. The
Transition to Despotism is made from Kingship, Despotism being a
corrupt form of Monarchy, that is to say, the bad King comes to be a
Despot.
From Aristocracy to Oligarchy the transition is made by the fault of
the Rulers in distributing the public property contrary to right
proportion; and giving either all that is good, or the greatest share,
to themselves; and the offices to the same persons always, making
wealth their idol; thus a few bear rule and they bad men in the place
of the best.
From Timocracy the transition is to Democracy, they being contiguous:
for it is the nature of Timocracy to be in the hands of a multitude,
and all in the same grade of property are equal. Democracy is the least
vicious of all, since herein the form of the constitution undergoes
least change.
Well, these are generally the changes to which the various
Constitutions are liable, being the least in degree and the easiest to
make.
Likenesses, and, as it were, models of them, one may find even in
Domestic life: for instance, the Communion between a Father and his
Sons presents the figure of Kingship, because the children are the
Father’s care: and hence Homer names Jupiter Father because Kingship is
intended to be a paternal rule. Among the Persians, however, the
Father’s rule is Despotic, for they treat their Sons as slaves. (The
relation of Master to Slaves is of the nature of Despotism because the
point regarded herein is the Master’s interest): this now strikes me to
be as it ought, but the Persian custom to be mistaken; because for
different persons there should be different rules.
Between Husband and Wife the relation takes the form of Aristocracy,
because he rules by right and in such points only as the Husband
should, and gives to the Wife all that befits her to have. Where the
Husband lords it in everything he changes the relation into an
Oligarchy; because he does it contrary to right and not as being the
better of the two. In some instances the Wives take the reins of
government, being heiresses: here the rule is carried on not in right
of goodness but by reason of wealth and power, as it is in Oligarchies.
Timocracy finds its type in the relation of Brothers: they being equal
except as to such differences as age introduces: for which reason, if
they are very different in age, the Friendship comes to be no longer a
fraternal one: while Democracy is represented specially by families
which have no head (all being there equal), or in which the proper head
is weak and so every member does that which is right in his own eyes.
Chapter XI.
Attendant then on each form of Political Constitution there plainly is
Friendship exactly co-extensive with the principle of Justice; that
between a King and his Subjects being in the relation of a superiority
of benefit, inasmuch as he benefits his subjects; it being assumed that
he is a good king and takes care of their welfare as a shepherd tends
his flock; whence Homer (to quote him again) calls Agamemnon, “shepherd
of the people.” And of this same kind is the Paternal Friendship, only
that it exceeds the former in the greatness of the benefits done;
because the father is the author of being (which is esteemed the
greatest benefit) and of maintenance and education (these things are
also, by the way, ascribed to ancestors generally): and by the law of
nature the father has the right of rule over his sons, ancestors over
their descendants, and the king over his subjects.
These friendships are also between superiors and inferiors, for which
reason parents are not merely loved but also honoured. The principle of
Justice also between these parties is not exactly the same but
according to proportiton, because so also is the Friendship.
Now between Husband and Wife there is the same Friendship as in
Aristocracy: for the relation is determined by relative excellence, and
the better person has the greater good and each has what befits: so too
also is the principle of Justice between them.
The Fraternal Friendship is like that of Companions, because brothers
are equal and much of an age, and such persons have generally like
feelings and like dispositions. Like to this also is the Friendship of
a Timocracy, because the citizens are intended to be equal and
equitable: rule, therefore, passes from hand to hand, and is
distributed on equal terms: so too is the Friendship accordingly.
In the deflections from the constitutional forms, just as the principle
of Justice is but small so is the Friendship also: and least of all in
the most perverted form: in Despotism there is little or no Friendship.
For generally wherever the ruler and the ruled have nothing in common
there is no Friendship because there is no Justice; but the case is as
between an artisan and his tool, or between soul and body, and master
and slave; all these are benefited by those who use them, but towards
things inanimate there is neither Friendship nor Justice: nor even
towards a horse or an ox, or a slave _quâ_ slave, because there is
nothing in common: a slave as such is an animate tool, a tool an
inanimate slave. _Quâ_ slave, then, there is no Friendship towards him,
only _quâ_ man: for it is thought that there is some principle of
Justice between every man, and every other who can share in law and be
a party to an agreement; and so somewhat of Friendship, in so far as he
is man. So in Despotisms the Friendships and the principle of Justice
are inconsiderable in extent, but in Democracies they are most
considerable because they who are equal have much in common.
Chapter XII.
Now of course all Friendship is based upon Communion, as has been
already stated: but one would be inclined to separate off from the rest
the Friendship of Kindred, and that of Companions: whereas those of men
of the same city, or tribe, or crew, and all such, are more peculiarly,
it would seem, based upon Communion, inasmuch as they plainly exist in
right of some agreement expressed or implied: among these one may rank
also the Friendship of Hospitality,
The Friendship of Kindred is likewise of many kinds, and appears in all
its varieties to depend on the Parental: parents, I mean, love their
children as being a part of themselves, children love their parents as
being themselves somewhat derived from them. But parents know their
offspring more than these know that they are from the parents, and the
source is more closely bound to that which is produced than that which
is produced is to that which formed it: of course, whatever is derived
from one’s self is proper to that from which it is so derived (as, for
instance, a tooth or a hair, or any other thing whatever to him that
has it): but the source to it is in no degree proper, or in an inferior
degree at least.
Then again the greater length of time comes in: the parents love their
offspring from the first moment of their being, but their offspring