The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
them only after a lapse of time when they have attained intelligence or
instinct. These considerations serve also to show why mothers have
greater strength of affection than fathers.
Now parents love their children as themselves (since what is derived
from themselves becomes a kind of other Self by the fact of
separation), but children their parents as being sprung from them. And
brothers love one another from being sprung from the same; that is,
their sameness with the common stock creates a sameness with one
another;[7] whence come the phrases, “same blood,” “root,” and so on.
In fact they are the same, in a sense, even in the separate distinct
individuals.
Then again the being brought up together, and the nearness of age, are
a great help towards Friendship, for a man likes one of his own age and
persons who are used to one another are companions, which accounts for
the resemblance between the Friendship of Brothers and that of
Companions.
And cousins and all other relatives derive their bond of union from
these, that is to say, from their community of origin: and the strength
of this bond varies according to their respective distances from the
common ancestor.
Further: the Friendship felt by children towards parents, and by men
towards the gods, is as towards something good and above them; because
these have conferred the greatest possible benefits, in that they are
the causes of their being and being nourished, and of their having been
educated after they were brought into being.
And Friendship of this kind has also the pleasurable and the profitable
more than that between persons unconnected by blood, in proportion as
their life is also more shared in common. Then again in the Fraternal
Friendship there is all that there is in that of Companions, and more
in the good, and generally in those who are alike; in proportion as
they are more closely tied and from their very birth have a feeling of
affection for one another to begin with, and as they are more like in
disposition who spring from the same stock and have grown up together
and been educated alike: and besides this they have the greatest
opportunities in respect of time for proving one another, and can
therefore depend most securely upon the trial.
Between Husband and Wife there is thought to be Friendship by a law of
nature: man being by nature disposed to pair, more than to associate in
Communities: in proportion as the family is prior in order of time and
more absolutely necessary than the Community. And procreation is more
common to him with other animals; all the other animals have Communion
thus far, but human creatures cohabit not merely for the sake of
procreation but also with a view to life in general::[8] because in
this connection the works are immediately divided, and some belong to
the man, others to the woman: thus they help one the other, putting
what is peculiar to each into the common stock.
And for these reasons this Friendship is thought to combine the
profitable and the pleasurable: it will be also based upon virtue if
they are good people; because each has goodness and they may take
delight in this quality in each other. Children too are thought to be a
tie: accordingly the childless sooner separate, for the children are a
good common to both and anything in common is a bond of union.
The question how a man is to live with his wife, or (more generally)
one friend with another, appears to be no other than this, how it is
just that they should: because plainly there is not the same principle
of Justice between a friend and friend, as between strangers, or
companions, or mere chance fellow-travellers.
Chapter XIII.
There are then, as was stated at the commencement of this book, three
kinds of Friendship, and in each there may be friends on a footing of
equality and friends in the relation of superior and inferior; we find,
I mean, that people who are alike in goodness, become friends, and
better with worse, and so also pleasant people; again, because of
advantage people are friends, either balancing exactly their mutual
profitableness or differing from one another herein. Well then, those
who are equal should in right of this equality be equalised also by the
degree of their Friendship and the other points, and those who are on a
footing of inequality by rendering Friendship in proportion to the
superiority of the other party.
Fault-finding and blame arises, either solely or most naturally, in
Friendship of which utility is the motive: for they who are friends by
reason of goodness, are eager to do kindnesses to one another because
this is a natural result of goodness and Friendship; and when men are
vying with each other for this End there can be no fault-finding nor
contention: since no one is annoyed at one who entertains for him the
sentiment of Friendship and does kindnesses to him, but if of a refined
mind he requites him with kind actions. And suppose that one of the two
exceeds the other, yet as he is attaining his object he will not find
fault with his friend, for good is the object of each party.
Neither can there well be quarrels between men who are friends for
pleasure’s sake: because supposing them to delight in living together
then both attain their desire; or if not a man would be put in a
ridiculous light who should find fault with another for not pleasing
him, since it is in his power to forbear intercourse with him. But the
Friendship because of advantage is very liable to fault-finding;
because, as the parties use one another with a view to advantage, the
requirements are continually enlarging, and they think they have less
than of right belongs to them, and find fault because though justly
entitled they do not get as much as they want: while they who do the
kindnesses, can never come up to the requirements of those to whom they
are being done.
It seems also, that as the Just is of two kinds, the unwritten and the
legal, so Friendship because of advantage is of two kinds, what may be
called the Moral, and the Legal: and the most fruitful source of
complaints is that parties contract obligations and discharge them not
in the same line of Friendship. The Legal is upon specified conditions,
either purely tradesmanlike from hand to hand or somewhat more
gentlemanly as regards time but still by agreement a _quid pro quo_.
In this Legal kind the obligation is clear and admits of no dispute,
the friendly element is the delay in requiring its discharge: and for
this reason in some countries no actions can be maintained at Law for
the recovery of such debts, it being held that they who have dealt on
the footing of credit must be content to abide the issue.
That which may be termed the Moral kind is not upon specified
conditions, but a man gives as to his friend and so on: but still he
expects to receive an equivalent, or even more, as though he had not
given but lent: he also will find fault, because he does not get the
obligation discharged in the same way as it was contracted.
Now this results from the fact, that all men, or the generality at
least, _wish_ what is honourable, but, when tested, _choose_ what is
profitable; and the doing kindnesses disinterestedly is honourable
while receiving benefits is profitable. In such cases one should, if
able, make a return proportionate to the good received, and do so
willingly, because one ought not to make a disinterested friend[9] of a
man against his inclination: one should act, I say, as having made a
mistake originally in receiving kindness from one from whom one ought
not to have received it, he being not a friend nor doing the act
disinterestedly; one should therefore discharge one’s self of the
obligation as having received a kindness on specified terms: and if
able a man would engage to repay the kindness, while if he were unable
even the doer of it would not expect it of him: so that if he is able
he ought to repay it. But one ought at the first to ascertain from whom
one is receiving kindness, and on what understanding, that on that same
understanding one may accept it or not.
A question admitting of dispute is whether one is to measure a kindness
by the good done to the receiver of it, and make this the standard by
which to requite, or by the kind intention of the doer?
For they who have received kindnesses frequently plead in depreciation
that they have received from their benefactors such things as were
small for them to give, or such as they themselves could have got from
others: while the doers of the kindnesses affirm that they gave the
best they had, and what could not have been got from others, and under
danger, or in such-like straits.
May we not say, that as utility is the motive of the Friendship the
advantage conferred on the receiver must be the standard? because he it
is who requests the kindness and the other serves him in his need on
the understanding that he is to get an equivalent: the assistance
rendered is then exactly proportionate to the advantage which the
receiver has obtained, and he should therefore repay as much as he
gained by it, or even more, this being more creditable.
In Friendships based on goodness, the question, of course, is never
raised, but herein the motive of the doer seems to be the proper
standard, since virtue and moral character depend principally on
motive.
Chapter XIV.
Quarrels arise also in those Friendships in which the parties are
unequal because each party thinks himself entitled to the greater
share, and of course, when this happens, the Friendship is broken up.
The man who is better than the other thinks that having the greater
share pertains to him of right, for that more is always awarded to the
good man: and similarly the man who is more profitable to another than
that other to him: “one who is useless,” they say, “ought not to share
equally, for it comes to a tax, and not a Friendship, unless the fruits
of the Friendship are reaped in proportion to the works done:” their
notion being, that as in a money partnership they who contribute more
receive more so should it be in Friendship likewise.
On the other hand, the needy man and the less virtuous advance the
opposite claim: they urge that “it is the very business of a good
friend to help those who are in need, else what is the use of having a
good or powerful friend if one is not to reap the advantage at all?”
Now each seems to advance a right claim and to be entitled to get more
out of the connection than the other, only _not more of the same
thing_: but the superior man should receive more respect, the needy man
more profit: respect being the reward of goodness and beneficence,
profit being the aid of need.
This is plainly the principle acted upon in Political Communities: he
receives no honour who gives no good to the common stock: for the
property of the Public is given to him who does good to the Public, and
honour is the property of the Public; it is not possible both to make
money out of the Public and receive honour likewise; because no one
will put up with the less in every respect: so to him who suffers loss
as regards money they award honour, but money to him who can be paid by
gifts: since, as has been stated before, the observing due proportion
equalises and preserves Friendship.
Like rules then should be observed in the intercourse of friends who
are unequal; and to him who advantages another in respect of money, or
goodness, that other should repay honour, making requital according to
his power; because Friendship requires what is possible, not what is
strictly due, this being not possible in all cases, as in the honours
paid to the gods and to parents: no man could ever make the due return
in these cases, and so he is thought to be a good man who pays respect