The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
offices; all these things he will give up to his friend, because this
reflects honour and praise on himself: and so with good reason is he
esteemed a fine character since he chooses the honourable before all
things else. It is possible also to give up the opportunities of action
to a friend; and to have caused a friend’s doing a thing may be more
noble than having done it one’s self.
In short, in all praiseworthy things the good man does plainly give to
himself a larger share of the honourable. In this sense it is right to
be Self-loving, in the vulgar acceptation of the term it is not.
Chapter IX.
A question is raised also respecting the Happy man, whether he will
want Friends, or no?
Some say that they who are blessed and independent have no need of
Friends, for they already have all that is good, and so, as being
independent, want nothing further: whereas the notion of a friend’s
office is to be as it were a second Self and procure for a man what he
cannot get by himself: hence the saying,
“When Fortune gives us good, what need we Friends?”
On the other hand, it looks absurd, while we are assigning to the Happy
man all other good things, not to give him Friends, which are, after
all, thought to be the greatest of external goods.
Again, if it is more characteristic of a friend to confer than to
receive kindnesses, and if to be beneficent belongs to the good man and
to the character of virtue, and if it is more noble to confer
kindnesses on friends than strangers, the good man will need objects
for his benefactions. And out of this last consideration springs a
question whether the need of Friends be greater in prosperity or
adversity, since the unfortunate man wants people to do him kindnesses
and they who are fortunate want objects for their kind acts.
Again, it is perhaps absurd to make our Happy man a solitary, because
no man would choose the possession of all goods in the world on the
condition of solitariness, man being a social animal and formed by
nature for living with others: of course the Happy man has this
qualification since he has all those things which are good by nature:
and it is obvious that the society of friends and good men must be
preferable to that of strangers and ordinary people, and we conclude,
therefore, that the Happy man does need Friends.
But then, what do they mean whom we quoted first, and how are they
right? Is it not that the mass of mankind mean by Friends those who are
useful? and of course the Happy man will not need such because he has
all good things already; neither will he need such as are Friends with
a view to the pleasurable, or at least only to a slight extent; because
his life, being already pleasurable, does not want pleasure imported
from without; and so, since the Happy man does not need Friends of
these kinds, he is thought not to need any at all.
But it may be, this is not true: for it was stated originally, that
Happiness is a kind of Working; now Working plainly is something that
must come into being, not be already there like a mere piece of
property.
If then the being happy consists in living and working, and the good
man’s working is in itself excellent and pleasurable (as we said at the
commencement of the treatise), and if what is our own reckons among
things pleasurable, and if we can view our neighbours better than
ourselves and their actions better than we can our own, then the
actions of their Friends who are good men are pleasurable to the good;
inasmuch as they have both the requisites which are naturally pleasant.
So the man in the highest state of happiness will need Friends of this
kind, since he desires to contemplate good actions, and actions of his
own, which those of his friend, being a good man, are.
Again, common opinion requires that the Happy man live with pleasure to
himself: now life is burthensome to a man in solitude, for it is not
easy to work continuously by one’s self, but in company with, and in
regard to others, it is easier, and therefore the working, being
pleasurable in itself will be more continuous (a thing which should be
in respect of the Happy man); for the good man, in that he is good
takes pleasure in the actions which accord with Virtue and is annoyed
at those which spring from Vice, just as a musical man is pleased with
beautiful music and annoyed by bad. And besides, as Theognis says,
Virtue itself may be improved by practice, from living with the good.
And, upon the following considerations more purely metaphysical, it
will probably appear that the good friend is naturally choice-worthy to
the good man. We have said before, that whatever is naturally good is
also in itself good and pleasant to the good man; now the fact of
living, so far as animals are concerned, is characterised generally by
the power of sentience, in man it is characterised by that of
sentience, or of rationality (the faculty of course being referred to
the actual operation of the faculty, certainly the main point is the
actual operation of it); so that living seems mainly to consist in the
act of sentience or exerting rationality: now the fact of living is in
itself one of the things that are good and pleasant (for it is a
definite totality, and whatever is such belongs to the nature of good),
but what is naturally good is good to the good man: for which reason it
seems to be pleasant to all. (Of course one must not suppose a life
which is depraved and corrupted, nor one spent in pain, for that which
is such is indefinite as are its inherent qualities: however, what is
to be said of pain will be clearer in what is to follow.)
If then the fact of living is in itself good and pleasant (and this
appears from the fact that all desire it, and specially those who are
good and in high happiness; their course of life being most
choice-worthy and their existence most choice-worthy likewise), then
also he that sees perceives that he sees; and he that hears perceives
that he hears; and he that walks perceives that he walks; and in all
the other instances in like manner there is a faculty which reflects
upon and perceives the fact that we are working, so that we can
perceive that we perceive and intellectually know that we
intellectually know: but to perceive that we perceive or that we
intellectually know is to perceive that we exist, since existence was
defined to be perceiving or intellectually knowing. Now to perceive
that one lives is a thing pleasant in itself, life being a thing
naturally good, and the perceiving of the presence in ourselves of
things naturally good being pleasant.
Therefore the fact of living is choice-worthy, and to the good
specially so since existence is good and pleasant to them: for they
receive pleasure from the internal consciousness of that which in
itself is good.
But the good man is to his friend as to himself, friend being but a
name for a second Self; therefore as his own existence is choice-worthy
to each so too, or similarly at least, is his friend’s existence. But
the ground of one’s own existence being choice-worthy is the perceiving
of one’s self being good, any such perception being in itself pleasant.
Therefore one ought to be thoroughly conscious of one’s friend’s
existence, which will result from living with him, that is sharing in
his words and thoughts: for this is the meaning of the term as applied
to the human species, not mere feeding together as in the case of
brutes.
If then to the man in a high state of happiness existence is in itself
choice-worthy, being naturally good and pleasant, and so too a friend’s
existence, then the friend also must be among things choice-worthy. But
whatever is choice-worthy to a man he should have or else he will be in
this point deficient. The man therefore who is to come up to our notion
“Happy” will need good Friends.
Chapter X.
Are we then to make our friends as numerous as possible? or, as in
respect of acquaintance it is thought to have been well said “have not
thou many acquaintances yet be not without;” so too in respect of
Friendship may we adopt the precept, and say that a man should not be
without friends, nor again have exceeding many friends?
Now as for friends who are intended for use, the maxim I have quoted
will, it seems, fit in exceedingly well, because to requite the
services of many is a matter of labour, and a whole life would not be
long enough to do this for them. So that, if more numerous than what
will suffice for one’s own life, they become officious, and are
hindrances in respect of living well: and so we do not want them. And
again of those who are to be for pleasure a few are quite enough, just
like sweetening in our food.
But of the good are we to make as many as ever we can, or is there any
measure of the number of friends, as there is of the number to
constitute a Political Community? I mean, you cannot make one out of
ten men, and if you increase the number to one hundred thousand it is
not any longer a Community. However, the number is not perhaps some one
definite number but any between certain extreme limits.
Well, of friends likewise there is a limited number, which perhaps may
be laid down to be the greatest number with whom it would be possible
to keep up intimacy; this being thought to be one of the greatest marks
of Friendship, and it being quite obvious that it is not possible to be
intimate with many, in other words, to part one’s self among many. And
besides it must be remembered that they also are to be friends to one
another if they are all to live together: but it is a matter of
difficulty to find this in many men at once.
It comes likewise to be difficult to bring home to one’s self the joys
and sorrows of many: because in all probability one would have to
sympathise at the same time with the joys of this one and the sorrows
of that other.
Perhaps then it is well not to endeavour to have very many friends but
so many as are enough for intimacy: because, in fact, it would seem not
to be possible to be very much a friend to many at the same time: and,
for the same reason, not to be in love with many objects at the same
time: love being a kind of excessive Friendship which implies but one
object: and all strong emotions must be limited in the number towards
whom they are felt.
And if we look to facts this seems to be so: for not many at a time
become friends in the way of companionship, all the famous Friendships
of the kind are between _two_ persons: whereas they who have many
friends, and meet everybody on the footing of intimacy, seem to be
friends really to no one except in the way of general society; I mean
the characters denominated as over-complaisant.
To be sure, in the way merely of society, a man may be a friend to many
without being necessarily over-complaisant, but being truly good: but
one cannot be a friend to many because of their virtue, and for the
persons’ own sake; in fact, it is a matter for contentment to find even
a few such.
Chapter XI.
Again: are friends most needed in prosperity or in adversity? they are
required, we know, in both states, because the unfortunate need help
and the prosperous want people to live with and to do kindnesses to:
for they have a desire to act kindly to some one.
To have friends is more necessary in adversity, and therefore in this
case useful ones are wanted; and to have them in prosperity is more
honourable, and this is why the prosperous want good men for friends,
it being preferable to confer benefits on, and to live with, these. For
the very presence of friends is pleasant even in adversity: since men
when grieved are comforted by the sympathy of their friends.
And from this, by the way, the question might be raised, whether it is