The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
for to every Movement are thought to belong swiftness and slowness, and
if not in itself, as to that of the universe, yet relatively: but to
Pleasure neither of these belongs: for though one may have got quickly
into the state Pleasure, as into that of anger, one cannot be in the
state quickly,[7] nor relatively to the state of any other person; but
we can walk or grow, and so on, quickly or slowly.
Of course it is possible to change into the state of Pleasure quickly
or slowly, but to act in the state (by which, I mean, have the
perception of Pleasure) quickly, is not possible.
And how can it be a Generation? because, according to notions generally
held, not _any_thing is generated from _any_thing, but a thing resolves
itself into that out of which it was generated: whereas of that of
which Pleasure is a Generation Pain is a Destruction.
Again, they say that Pain is a lack of something suitable to nature and
Pleasure a supply of it.
But these are affections of the body: now if Pleasure really is a
supplying of somewhat suitable to nature, that must feel the Pleasure
in which the supply takes place, therefore the body of course: yet this
is not thought to be so: neither then is Pleasure a supplying, only a
person of course will be pleased when a supply takes place just as he
will be pained when he is cut short.
This notion would seem to have arisen out of the Pains and Pleasures
connected with natural nourishment; because, when people have felt a
lack and so have had Pain first, they, of course, are pleased with the
supply of their lack.
But this is not the case with all Pleasures: those attendant on
mathematical studies, for instance, are unconnected with any Pain; and
of such as attend on the senses those which arise through the sense of
Smell; and again, many sounds, and sights, and memories, and hopes: now
of what can these be Generations? because there has been here no lack
of anything to be afterwards supplied.
And to those who bring forward disgraceful Pleasures we may reply that
these are not really pleasant things; for it does not follow because
they are pleasant to the ill-disposed that we are to admit that they
are pleasant except to them; just as we should not say that those
things are really wholesome, or sweet, or bitter, which are so to the
sick, or those objects really white which give that impression to
people labouring under ophthalmia.[8]
Or we might say thus, that the Pleasures are choice-worthy but not as
derived from these sources: just as wealth is, but not as the price of
treason; or health, but not on the terms of eating anything however
loathsome.
Or again, may we not say that Pleasures differ in kind? those derived
from honourable objects, for instance are different from those arising
from disgraceful ones; and it is not possible to experience the
Pleasure of the just man without being just, or of the musical man
without being musical; and so on of others.
The distinction commonly drawn between the friend and the flatterer
would seem to show clearly either that Pleasure is not a good, or that
there are different kinds of Pleasure: for the former is thought to
have good as the object of his intercourse, the latter Pleasure only;
and this last is reproached, but the former men praise as having
different objects in his intercourse.
Again, no one would choose to live with a child’s intellect all his
life through, though receiving the highest possible Pleasure from such
objects as children receive it from; or to take Pleasure in doing any
of the most disgraceful things, though sure never to be pained.
There are many things also about which we should be diligent even
though they brought no Pleasure; as seeing, remembering, knowing,
possessing the various Excellences; and the fact that Pleasures do
follow on these naturally makes no difference, because we should
certainly choose them even though no Pleasure resulted from them.
It seems then to be plain that Pleasure is not the Chief Good, nor is
every kind of it choice-worthy: and that there are some choice-worthy
in themselves, differing in kind, _i.e._ in the sources from which they
are derived. Let this then suffice by way of an account of the current
maxims respecting Pleasure and Pain.
Chapter III.
Now what it is, and how characterised, will be more plain if we take up
the subject afresh.
An act of Sight is thought to be complete at any moment; that is to
say, it lacks nothing the accession of which subsequently will complete
its whole nature.
Well, Pleasure resembles this: because it is a whole, as one may say;
and one could not at any moment of time take a Pleasure whose whole
nature would be completed by its lasting for a longer time. And for
this reason it is not a Movement: for all Movement takes place in time
of certain duration and has a certain End to accomplish; for instance,
the Movement of house-building[9] is then only complete when the
builder has produced what he intended, that is, either in the whole
time [necessary to complete the whole design], or in a given
portion.[10] But all the subordinate Movements are incomplete in the
parts of the time, and are different in kind from the whole movement
and from one another (I mean, for instance, that the fitting the stones
together is a Movement different from that of fluting the column, and
both again from the construction of the Temple as a whole: but this
last is complete as lacking nothing to the result proposed; whereas
that of the basement, or of the triglyph, is incomplete, because each
is a Movement of a part merely).
As I said then, they differ in kind, and you cannot at any time you
choose find a Movement complete in its whole nature, but, if at all, in
the whole time requisite.
And so it is with the Movement of walking and all others: for, if
motion be a Movement from one place to another place, then of it too
there are different kinds, flying, walking, leaping, and such-like. And
not only so, but there are different kinds even in walking: the
where-from and where-to are not the same in the whole Course as in a
portion of it; nor in one portion as in another; nor is crossing this
line the same as crossing that: because a man is not merely crossing a
line but a line in a given place, and this is in a different place from
that.
Of Movement I have discoursed exactly in another treatise. I will now
therefore only say that it seems not to be complete at any given
moment; and that most movements are incomplete and specifically
different, since the whence and whither constitute different species.
But of Pleasure the whole nature is complete at any given moment: it is
plain then that Pleasure and Movement must be different from one
another, and that Pleasure belongs to the class of things whole and
complete. And this might appear also from the impossibility of moving
except in a definite time, whereas there is none with respect to the
sensation of Pleasure, for what exists at the very present moment is a
kind of “whole.”
From these considerations then it is plain that people are not
warranted in saying that Pleasure is a Movement or a Generation:
because these terms are not applicable to all things, only to such as
are divisible and not “wholes:” I mean that of an act of Sight there is
no Generation, nor is there of a point, nor of a monad, nor is any one
of these a Movement or a Generation: neither then of Pleasure is there
Movement or Generation, because it is, as one may say, “a whole.”[11]
Chapter IV.
Now since every Percipient Faculty works upon the Object answering to
it, and perfectly the Faculty in a good state upon the most excellent
of the Objects within its range (for Perfect Working is thought to be
much what I have described; and we will not raise any question about
saying “the Faculty” works, instead of, “that subject wherein the
Faculty resides”), in each case the best Working is that of the Faculty
in its best state upon the best of the Objects answering to it. And
this will be, further, most perfect and most pleasant: for Pleasure is
attendant upon every Percipient Faculty, and in like manner on every
intellectual operation and speculation; and that is most pleasant which
is most perfect, and that most perfect which is the Working of the best
Faculty upon the most excellent of the Objects within its range.
And Pleasure perfects the Working. But Pleasure does not perfect it in
the same way as the Faculty and Object of Perception do, being good;
just as health and the physician are not in similar senses causes of a
healthy state.
And that Pleasure does arise upon the exercise of every Percipient
Faculty is evident, for we commonly say that sights and sounds are
pleasant; it is plain also that this is especially the case when the
Faculty is most excellent and works upon a similar Object: and when
both the Object and Faculty of Perception are such, Pleasure will
always exist, supposing of course an agent and a patient.
Furthermore, Pleasure perfects the act of Working not in the way of an
inherent state but as a supervening finish, such as is bloom in people
at their prime. Therefore so long as the Object of intellectual or
sensitive Perception is such as it should be and also the Faculty which
discerns or realises the Object, there will be Pleasure in the Working:
because when that which has the capacity of being acted on and that
which is apt to act are alike and similarly related, the same result
follows naturally.
How is it then that no one feels Pleasure continuously? is it not that
he wearies, because all human faculties are incapable of unintermitting
exertion; and so, of course, Pleasure does not arise either, because
that follows upon the act of Working. But there are some things which
please when new, but afterwards not in the like way, for exactly the
same reason: that at first the mind is roused and works on these
Objects with its powers at full tension; just as they who are gazing
stedfastly at anything; but afterwards the act of Working is not of the
kind it was at first, but careless, and so the Pleasure too is dulled.
Again, a person may conclude that all men grasp at Pleasure, because
all aim likewise at Life and Life is an act of Working, and every man
works at and with those things which also he best likes; the musical
man, for instance, works with his hearing at music; the studious man
with his intellect at speculative questions, and so forth. And Pleasure
perfects the acts of Working, and so Life after which men grasp. No
wonder then that they aim also at Pleasure, because to each it perfects
Life, which is itself choice-worthy. (We will take leave to omit the
question whether we choose Life for Pleasure’s sake of Pleasure for
Life’s sake; because these two plainly are closely connected and admit
not of separation; since Pleasure comes not into being without Working,
and again, every Working Pleasure perfects.)
And this is one reason why Pleasures are thought to differ in kind,
because we suppose that things which differ in kind must be perfected
by things so differing: it plainly being the case with the productions
of Nature and Art; as animals, and trees, and pictures, and statues,
and houses, and furniture; and so we suppose that in like manner acts
of Working which are different in kind are perfected by things
differing in kind. Now Intellectual Workings differ specifically from
those of the Senses, and these last from one another; therefore so do
the Pleasures which perfect them.
This may be shown also from the intimate connection subsisting between
each Pleasure and the Working which it perfects: I mean, that the
Pleasure proper to any Working increases that Working; for they who
work with Pleasure sift all things more closely and carry them out to a