The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
permanence; and it is reasonable to suppose that the employment is more
pleasant to those who have mastered, than to those who are yet seeking
for, it.[14]
And the Self-Sufficiency which people speak of will attach chiefly to
the Contemplative Working: of course the actual necessaries of life are
needed alike by the man of science, and the just man, and all the other
characters; but, supposing all sufficiently supplied with these, the
just man needs people towards whom, and in concert with whom, to
practise his justice; and in like manner the man of perfected
self-mastery, and the brave man, and so on of the rest; whereas the man
of science can contemplate and speculate even when quite alone, and the
more entirely he deserves the appellation the more able is he to do so:
it may be he can do better for having fellow-workers but still he is
certainly most Self-Sufficient.
Again, this alone would seem to be rested in for its own sake, since
nothing results from it beyond the fact of having contemplated; whereas
from all things which are objects of moral action we do mean to get
something beside the doing them, be the same more or less.
Also, Happiness is thought to stand in perfect rest;[15] for we toil
that we may rest, and war that we may be at peace. Now all the
Practical Virtues require either society or war for their Working, and
the actions regarding these are thought to exclude rest; those of war
entirely, because no one chooses war, nor prepares for war, for war’s
sake: he would indeed be thought a bloodthirsty villain who should make
enemies of his friends to secure the existence of fighting and
bloodshed. The Working also of the statesman excludes the idea of rest,
and, beside the actual work of government, seeks for power and
dignities or at least Happiness for the man himself and his
fellow-citizens: a Happiness distinct[16] from the national Happiness,
which we evidently seek as being different and distinct.
If then of all the actions in accordance with the various virtues those
of policy and war are pre-eminent in honour and greatness, and these
are restless, and aim at some further End and are not choice-worthy for
their own sakes, but the Working of the Intellect, being apt for
contemplation, is thought to excel in earnestness, and to aim at no End
beyond itself and to have Pleasure of its own which helps to increase
the Working, and if the attributes of Self-Sufficiency, and capacity of
rest, and unweariedness (as far as is compatible with the infirmity of
human nature), and all other attributes of the highest Happiness,
plainly belong to this Working, this must be perfect Happiness, if
attaining a complete duration of life, which condition is added because
none of the points of Happiness is incomplete.
But such a life will be higher than mere human nature, because a man
will live thus, not in so far as he is man but in so far as there is in
him a divine Principle: and in proportion as this Principle excels his
composite nature so far does the Working thereof excel that in
accordance with any other kind of Excellence: and therefore, if pure
Intellect, as compared with human nature, is divine, so too will the
life in accordance with it be divine compared with man’s ordinary life.
Yet must we not give ear to those who bid one as man to mind only man’s
affairs, or as mortal only mortal things; but, so far as we can, make
ourselves like immortals and do all with a view to living in accordance
with the highest Principle in us, for small as it may be in bulk yet in
power and preciousness it far more excels all the others.
In fact this Principle would seem to constitute each man’s “Self,”
since it is supreme and above all others in goodness it _would_ be
absurd then for a man not to choose his own life but that of some
other.
And here will apply an observation made before, that whatever is proper
to each is naturally best and pleasantest to him: such then is to Man
the life in accordance with pure Intellect (since this Principle is
most truly Man), and if so, then it is also the happiest.
And second in degree of Happiness will be that Life which is in
accordance with the other kind of Excellence, for the Workings in
accordance with this are proper to Man: I mean, we do actions of
justice, courage, and the other virtues, towards one another, in
contracts, services of different kinds, and in all kinds of actions and
feelings too, by observing what is befitting for each: and all these
plainly are proper to man. Further, the Excellence of the Moral
character is thought to result in some points from physical
circumstances, and to be, in many, very closely connected with the
passions.
Again, Practical Wisdom[17] and Excellence of the Moral character are
very closely united; since the Principles of Practical Wisdom are in
accordance with the Moral Virtues and these are right when they accord
with Practical Wisdom.
These moreover, as bound up with the passions, must belong to the
composite nature, and the Excellences or Virtues of the composite
nature are proper to man: therefore so too will be the life and
Happiness which is in accordance with them. But that of the Pure
Intellect is separate and distinct: and let this suffice upon the
subject, since great exactness is beyond our purpose,
It would seem, moreover, to require supply of external goods to a small
degree, or certainly less than the Moral Happiness: for, as far as
necessaries of life are concerned, we will suppose both characters to
need them equally (though, in point of fact, the man who lives in
society does take more pains about his person and all that kind of
thing; there will really be some little difference), but when we come
to consider their Workings there will be found a great difference.
I mean, the liberal man must have money to do his liberal actions with,
and the just man to meet his engagements (for mere intentions are
uncertain, and even those who are unjust make a pretence of _wishing_
to do justly), and the brave man must have power, if he is to perform
any of the actions which appertain to his particular Virtue, and the
man of perfected self-mastery must have opportunity of temptation, else
how shall he or any of the others display his real character?
(By the way, a question is sometimes raised, whether the moral choice
or the actions have most to do with Virtue, since it consists in both:
it is plain that the perfection of virtuous action requires both: but
for the actions many things are required, and the greater and more
numerous they are the more.) But as for the man engaged in
Contemplative Speculation, not only are such things unnecessary for his
Working, but, so to speak, they are even hindrances: as regards the
Contemplation at least; because of course in so far as he is Man and
lives in society he chooses to do what Virtue requires, and so he will
need such things for maintaining his character as Man though not as a
speculative philosopher.
And that the perfect Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Working
may appear also from the following consideration: our conception of the
gods is that they are above all blessed and happy: now what kind of
Moral actions are we to attribute to them? those of justice? nay, will
they not be set in a ridiculous light if represented as forming
contracts, and restoring deposits, and so on? well then, shall we
picture them performing brave actions, withstanding objects of fear and
meeting dangers, because it is noble to do so? or liberal ones? but to
whom shall they be giving? and further, it is absurd to think they have
money or anything of the kind. And as for actions of perfected
self-mastery, what can theirs be? would it not be a degrading praise
that they have no bad desires? In short, if one followed the subject
into all details all the circumstances connected with Moral actions
would appear trivial and unworthy of Gods.
Still, every one believes that they live, and therefore that they Work
because it is not supposed that they sleep their time away like
Endymion: now if from a living being you take away Action, still more
if Creation, what remains but Contemplation? So then the Working of the
Gods, eminent in blessedness, will be one apt for Contemplative
Speculation; and of all human Workings that will have the greatest
capacity for Happiness which is nearest akin to this.
A corroboration of which position is the fact that the other animals do
not partake of Happiness, being completely shut out from any such
Working.
To the Gods then all their life is blessed; and to men in so far as
there is in it some copy of such Working, but of the other animals none
is happy because it in no way shares in Contemplative Speculation.
Happiness then is co-extensive with this Contemplative Speculation, and
in proportion as people have the act of Contemplation so far have they
also the being happy, not incidentally, but in the way of Contemplative
Speculation because it is in itself precious.
Chapter VII.
So Happiness must be a kind of Contemplative Speculation; but since it
is Man we are speaking of he will need likewise External Prosperity,
because his Nature is not by itself sufficient for Speculation, but
there must be health of body, and nourishment, and tendance of all
kinds.
However, it must not be thought, because without external goods a man
cannot enjoy high Happiness, that therefore he will require many and
great goods in order to be happy: for neither Self-sufficiency, nor
Action, stand in Excess, and it is quite possible to act nobly without
being ruler of sea and land, since even with moderate means a man may
act in accordance with Virtue.
And this may be clearly seen in that men in private stations are
thought to act justly, not merely no less than men in power but even
more: it will be quite enough that just so much should belong to a man
as is necessary, for his life will be happy who works in accordance
with Virtue.
Solon perhaps drew a fair picture of the Happy, when he said that they
are men moderately supplied with external goods, and who have achieved
the most noble deeds, as he thought, and who have lived with perfect
self-mastery: for it is quite possible for men of moderate means to act
as they ought.
Anaxagoras also seems to have conceived of the Happy man not as either
rich or powerful, saying that he should not wonder if he were accounted
a strange man in the judgment of the multitude: for they judge by
outward circumstances of which alone they have any perception.
And thus the opinions of the Wise seem to be accordant with our account
of the matter: of course such things carry some weight, but truth, in
matters of moral action, is judged from facts and from actual life, for
herein rests the decision. So what we should do is to examine the
preceding statements by referring them to facts and to actual life, and
when they harmonise with facts we may accept them, when they are at
variance with them conceive of them as mere theories.
Now he that works in accordance with, and pays observance to, Pure
Intellect, and tends this, seems likely to be both in the best frame of
mind and dearest to the Gods: because if, as is thought, any care is
bestowed on human things by the Gods then it must be reasonable to
think that they take pleasure in what is best and most akin to
themselves (and this must be the Pure Intellect); and that they requite
with kindness those who love and honour this most, as paying observance
to what is dear to them, and as acting rightly and nobly. And it is
quite obvious that the man of Science chiefly combines all these: he is
therefore dearest to the Gods, and it is probable that he is at the
same time most Happy.
Thus then on this view also the man of Science will be most Happy.