The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
Chapter VIII.
Now then that we have said enough in our sketchy kind of way on these
subjects; I mean, on the Virtues, and also on Friendship and Pleasure;
are we to suppose that our original purpose is completed? Must we not
rather acknowledge, what is commonly said, that in matters of moral
action mere Speculation and Knowledge is not the real End but rather
Practice: and if so, then neither in respect of Virtue is Knowledge
enough; we must further strive to have and exert it, and take whatever
other means there are of becoming good.
Now if talking and writing were of themselves sufficient to make men
good, they would justly, as Theognis observes have reaped numerous and
great rewards, and the thing to do would be to provide them: but in
point of fact, while they plainly have the power to guide and stimulate
the generous among the young and to base upon true virtuous principle
any noble and truly high-minded disposition, they as plainly are
powerless to guide the mass of men to Virtue and goodness; because it
is not their nature to be amenable to a sense of shame but only to
fear; nor to abstain from what is low and mean because it is
disgraceful to do it but because of the punishment attached to it: in
fact, as they live at the beck and call of passion, they pursue their
own proper pleasures and the means of securing them, and they avoid the
contrary pains; but as for what is noble and truly pleasurable they
have not an idea of it, inasmuch as they have never tasted of it.
Men such as these then what mere words can transform? No, indeed! it is
either actually impossible, or a task of no mean difficulty, to alter
by words what has been of old taken into men’s very dispositions: and,
it may be, it is a ground for contentment if with all the means and
appliances for goodness in our hands we can attain to Virtue.
The formation of a virtuous character some ascribe to Nature, some to
Custom, and some to Teaching. Now Nature’s part, be it what it may,
obviously does not rest with us, but belongs to those who in the truest
sense are fortunate, by reason of certain divine agency,
Then, as for Words and Precept, they, it is to be feared, will not
avail with all; but it may be necessary for the mind of the disciple to
have been previously prepared for liking and disliking as he ought;
just as the soil must, to nourish the seed sown. For he that lives in
obedience to passion cannot hear any advice that would dissuade him,
nor, if he heard, understand: now him that is thus how can one reform?
in fact, generally, passion is not thought to yield to Reason but to
brute force. So then there must be, to begin with, a kind of affinity
to Virtue in the disposition; which must cleave to what is honourable
and loath what is disgraceful. But to get right guidance towards Virtue
from the earliest youth is not easy unless one is brought up under laws
of such kind; because living with self-mastery and endurance is not
pleasant to the mass of men, and specially not to the young. For this
reason the food, and manner of living generally, ought to be the
subject of legal regulation, because things when become habitual will
not be disagreeable.
Yet perhaps it is not sufficient that men while young should get right
food and tendance, but, inasmuch as they will have to practise and
become accustomed to certain things even after they have attained to
man’s estate, we shall want laws on these points as well, and, in fine,
respecting one’s whole life, since the mass of men are amenable to
compulsion rather than Reason, and to punishment rather than to a sense
of honour.
And therefore some men hold that while lawgivers should employ the
sense of honour to exhort and guide men to Virtue, under the notion
that they will then obey who have been well trained in habits; they
should impose chastisement and penalties on those who disobey and are
of less promising nature; and the incurable expel entirely: because the
good man and he who lives under a sense of honour will be obedient to
reason; and the baser sort, who grasp at pleasure, will be kept in
check, like beasts of burthen by pain. Therefore also they say that the
pains should be such as are most contrary to the pleasures which are
liked.
As has been said already, he who is to be good must have been brought
up and habituated well, and then live accordingly under good
institutions, and never do what is low and mean, either against or with
his will. Now these objects can be attained only by men living in
accordance with some guiding Intellect and right order, with power to
back them.
As for the Paternal Rule, it possesses neither strength nor compulsory
power, nor in fact does the Rule of any one man, unless he is a king or
some one in like case: but the Law has power to compel, since it is a
declaration emanating from Practical Wisdom and Intellect. And people
feel enmity towards their fellow-men who oppose their impulses, however
rightly they may do so: the Law, on the contrary, is not the object of
hatred, though enforcing right rules.
The Lacedæmonian is nearly the only State in which the framer of the
Constitution has made any provision, it would seem, respecting the food
and manner of living of the people: in most States these points are
entirely neglected, and each man lives just as he likes, ruling his
wife and children Cyclops-Fashion.
Of course, the best thing would be that there should be a right Public
System and that we should be able to carry it out: but, since as a
public matter those points are neglected, the duty would seem to
devolve upon each individual to contribute to the cause of Virtue with
his own children and friends, or at least to make this his aim and
purpose: and this, it would seem, from what has been said, he will be
best able to do by making a Legislator of himself: since all public
systems, it is plain, are formed by the instrumentality of laws and
those are good which are formed by that of good laws: whether they are
written or unwritten, whether they are applied to the training of one
or many, will not, it seems, make any difference, just as it does not
in music, gymnastics, or any other such accomplishments, which are
gained by practice.
For just as in Communities laws and customs prevail, so too in families
the express commands of the Head, and customs also: and even more in
the latter, because of blood-relationship and the benefits conferred:
for there you have, to begin with, people who have affection and are
naturally obedient to the authority which controls them.
Then, furthermore, Private training has advantages over Public, as in
the case of the healing art: for instance, as a general rule, a man who
is in a fever should keep quiet, and starve; but in a particular case,
perhaps, this may not hold good; or, to take a different illustration,
the boxer will not use the same way of fighting with all antagonists.
It would seem then that the individual will be most exactly attended to
under Private care, because so each will be more likely to obtain what
is expedient for him. Of course, whether in the art of healing, or
gymnastics, or any other, a man will treat individual cases the better
for being acquainted with general rules; as, “that so and so is good
for all, or for men in such and such cases:” because general maxims are
not only said to be but are the object-matter of sciences: still this
is no reason against the possibility of a man’s taking excellent care
of some _one_ case, though he possesses no scientific knowledge but
from experience is exactly acquainted with what happens in each point;
just as some people are thought to doctor themselves best though they
would be wholly unable to administer relief to others. Yet it may seem
to be necessary nevertheless, for one who wishes to become a real
artist and well acquainted with the theory of his profession, to have
recourse to general principles and ascertain all their capacities: for
we have already stated that these are the object-matter of sciences.
If then it appears that we may become good through the instrumentality
of laws, of course whoso wishes to make men better by a system of care
and training must try to make a Legislator of himself; for to treat
skilfully just any one who may be put before you is not what any
ordinary person can do, but, if any one, he who has knowledge; as in
the healing art, and all others which involve careful practice and
skill.
Will not then our next business be to enquire from what sources, or how
one may acquire this faculty of Legislation; or shall we say, that, as
in similar cases, Statesmen are the people to learn from, since this
faculty was thought to be a part of the Social Science? Must we not
admit that the Political Science plainly does not stand on a similar
footing to that of other sciences and faculties? I mean, that while in
all other cases those who impart the faculties and themselves exert
them are identical (physicians and painters for instance) matters of
Statesmanship the Sophists profess to teach, but not one of them
practises it, that being left to those actually engaged in it: and
these might really very well be thought to do it by some singular knack
and by mere practice rather than by any intellectual process: for they
neither write nor speak on these matters (though it might be more to
their credit than composing speeches for the courts or the assembly),
nor again have they made Statesmen of their own sons or their friends.
One can hardly suppose but that they would have done so if they could,
seeing that they could have bequeathed no more precious legacy to their
communities, nor would they have preferred, for themselves or their
dearest friends, the possession of any faculty rather than this.
Practice, however, seems to contribute no little to its acquisition;
merely breathing the atmosphere of politics would never have made
Statesmen of them, and therefore we may conclude that they who would
acquire a knowledge of Statesmanship must have in addition practice.
But of the Sophists they who profess to teach it are plainly a long way
off from doing so: in fact, they have no knowledge at all of its nature
and objects; if they had, they would never have put it on the same
footing with Rhetoric or even on a lower: neither would they have
conceived it to be “an easy matter to legislate by simply collecting
such laws as are famous because of course one could select the best,”
as though the selection were not a matter of skill, and the judging
aright a very great matter, as in Music: for they alone, who have
practical knowledge of a thing, can judge the performances rightly or
understand with what means and in what way they are accomplished, and
what harmonises with what: the unlearned must be content with being
able to discover whether the result is good or bad, as in painting.
Now laws may be called the performances or tangible results of
Political Science; how then can a man acquire from these the faculty of
Legislation, or choose the best? we do not see men made physicians by
compilations: and yet in these treatises men endeavour to give not only
the cases but also how they may be cured, and the proper treatment in
each case, dividing the various bodily habits. Well, these are thought
to be useful to professional men, but to the unprofessional useless. In
like manner it may be that collections of laws and Constitutions would
be exceedingly useful to such as are able to speculate on them, and
judge what is well, and what ill, and what kind of things fit in with
what others: but they who without this qualification should go through
such matters cannot have right judgment, unless they have it by
instinct, though they may become more intelligent in such matters.