The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
Since then those who have preceded us have left uninvestigated the
subject of Legislation, it will be better perhaps for us to investigate
it ourselves, and, in fact, the whole subject of Polity, that thus what
we may call Human Philosophy may be completed as far as in us lies.
First then, let us endeavour to get whatever fragments of good there
may be in the statements of our predecessors, next, from the Polities
we have collected, ascertain what kind of things preserve or destroy
Communities, and what, particular Constitutions; and the cause why some
are well and others ill managed, for after such enquiry, we shall be
the better able to take a concentrated view as to what kind of
Constitution is best, what kind of regulations are best for each, and
what laws and customs.
NOTES
BOOK I
[1] For this term, as here employed, our language contains no
equivalent expression except an inconvenient paraphrase.
There are three senses which it bears in this treatise: the first (in
which it is here employed) is its strict etymological signfication “The
science of Society,” and this includes everything which can bear at all
upon the well-being of Man in his social capacity, “Quicquid agunt
homines nostri est farrago libelli.” It is in this view that it is
fairly denominated most commanding and inclusive.
The second sense (in which it occurs next, just below) is “Moral
Philosophy.” Aristotle explains the term in this sense in the Rhetoric
(1 2) [Greek: hae peri ta aethae pragmateia aen dikaion esti
prosagoreuen politikaen]. He has principally in view in this treatise
the moral training of the Individual, the branch of the Science of
Society which we call Ethics Proper, bearing the same relation to the
larger Science as the hewing and squaring of the stones to the building
of the Temple, or the drill of the Recruit to the manoeuvres of the
field. Greek Philosophy viewed men principally as constituent parts of
a [Greek: polis], considering this function to be the real End of each,
and this state as that in which the Individual attained his highest and
most complete development.
The third sense is “The detail of Civil Government,” which Aristotle
expressly states (vi. 8) was the most common acceptation of the term.
[2] Matters of which a man is to judge either belong to some
definite art or science, or they do not. In the former case he is the
best judge who has thorough acquaintance with that art or science, in
the latter, the man whose powers have been developed and matured by
education. A lame horse one would show to a farmer, not to the best and
wisest man of one’s acquaintance; to the latter, one would apply in a
difficult case of conduct.
Experience answers to the first, a state of self-control to the latter.
[3] In the last chapter of the third book of this treatise it
is said of the fool, that his desire of pleasure is not only
insatiable, but indiscriminate in its objects, πανταχόθεν.
[4] Ἀρχὴ is a word used in this treatise in various significations. The
primary one is “beginning or first cause,” and this runs through all
its various uses.
“Rule,” and sometimes “Rulers,” are denoted by this term the initiative
being a property of Rule.
“Principle” is a very usual signification of it, and in fact the most
characteristic of the Ethics. The word Principle means
“starting-point.” Every action has two beginnings, that of Resolve οὗ
ἕνεκα, and that of Action (ὅθεν ἡ κινήσις). I desire praise of men this
then is the beginning of Resolve. Having considered how it is to be
attained, I resolve upon some course and this Resolve is the beginning
of Action.
The beginnings of Resolve, Ἀρχὶ or Motives, when formally stated, are
the major premisses of what Aristotle calls the συλλογίσμοι τῶν
πρακτῶν, i.e. the reasoning into which actions may be analysed.
Thus we say that the desire of human praise was the motive of the
Pharisees, or the principle on which they acted.
Their practical syllogism then would stand thus:
Whatever gains human praise is to be done;
Public praying and almsgiving gave human praise:
[ergo] Public praying and almsgiving are to be done.
The major premisses may be stored up in the mind as rules of action,
and this is what is commonly meant by having principles good or bad.
[5] The difficulty of this passage consists in determining the
signification of the terms [Greek: gnorima aemin] and [Greek: gnorima
aplos]
I have translated them without reference to their use elsewhere, as
denoting respectively what _is_ and what _may_ be known. All truth is
[Greek: gnorimon aplos], but that alone [Greek: aemin] which we
individually realise, therefore those principles alone are [Greek:
gnorima aemin] which _we have received as true_. From this appears
immediately the necessity of good training as preparatory to the study
of Moral Philosophy for good training in habits will either work
principles into our nature, or make us capable of accepting them as
soon as they are put before us; which no mere intellectual training can
do. The child who has been used to obey his parents may never have
heard the fifth Commandment but it is in the very texture of his
nature, and the first time he hears it he will recognise it as morally
true and right the principle is in his case a fact, the reason for
which he is as little inclined to ask as any one would be able to prove
its truth if he should ask.
But these terms are employed elsewhere (Analytica Post I cap. 11. sect.
10) to denote respectively particulars and universals The latter are so
denominated, because principles or laws must be supposed to have
existed before the instances of their operation. Justice must have
existed before just actions, Redness before red things, but since what
we meet with are the concrete instances (from which we gather the
principles and laws), the particulars are said to be [Greek:
gnorimotera aemin]
Adopting this signification gives greater unity to the whole passage,
which will then stand thus. The question being whether we are to assume
principles, or obtain them by an analysis of facts, Aristotle says, “We
must begin of course with what is known but then this term denotes
either particulars or universals perhaps we then must begin with
particulars and hence the necessity of a previous good training in
habits, etc. (which of course is beginning with particular facts), for
a fact is a starting point, and if this be sufficiently clear, there
will be no want of the reason for the fact in addition”
The objection to this method of translation is, that [Greek: archai]
occurs immediately afterwards in the sense of “principles.”
Utere tuo judicio nihil enim impedio.
[6] Or “prove themselves good,” as in the Prior Analytics, ii 25,
[Greek: apanta pisteuomen k.t l] but the other rendering is supported
by a passage in Book VIII. chap. ix. [Greek: oi d’ upo ton epieikon kai
eidoton oregomenoi timaes bebaiosai ten oikeian doxan ephientai peri
auton chairousi de oti eisin agathoi, pisteuontes te ton legonton
krisei]
[7] [Greek: thesis] meant originally some paradoxical statement by any
philosopher of name enough to venture on one, but had come to mean any
dialectical question. Topics, I. chap. ix.
[8] A lost work, supposed to have been so called, because
containing miscellaneous questions.
[9] It is only quite at the close of the treatise that Aristotle refers
to this, and allows that [Greek: theoria] constitutes the highest
happiness because it is the exercise of the highest faculty in man the
reason of thus deferring the statement being that till the lower, that
is the moral, nature has been reduced to perfect order, [Greek:
theoria] cannot have place, though, had it been held out from the
first, men would have been for making the experiment at once, without
the trouble of self-discipline.
[10] Or, as some think, “many theories have been founded on them.”
[11] The ἰδέα is the archetype, the εἶδος the concrete embodying the
resemblance of it; hence Aristotle alludes to the theory under both
names, and this is the reason for retaining the Greek terms.
[12] The list ran thus—
[Greek:
to peras to apeiron | to euthu
to perisson to artion | to phos
to en to plethos | to tetragonon
to dexion to aristeron | to aeremoun
to arren to thelu | to agathon
]
[13] Plato’s sister’s son.
[14] This is the capital defect in Aristotle’s eyes, who being
eminently practical, could not like a theory which not only did not
necessarily lead to action, but had a tendency to discourage it by
enabling unreal men to talk finely. If true, the theory is merely a way
of stating facts, and leads to no action.
[15] _i.e._ the identification of Happiness with the Chief Good.
[16] _i.e._ without the capability of addition.
[17] And then Happiness would at once be shown not to be the Chief
Good. It is a contradiction in terms to speak of adding to the Chief
Good. See Book X. chap. 11. [Greek: delon os oud allo ouden tagathon an
eiae o meta tenos ton kath’ auto agathon airetoteron ginetai.]
[18] Compare Bishop Butler’s account of “Human Nature as a System” in
the Preface to his Sermons.
[19] _i.e._ as working or as quiescent.
[20] The mere translation of this term would convey no idea of its
meaning, I have therefore retained the Greek term. It is afterwards
explained to include space of time and external appliances requisite
for the full development of Man’s energies; here the time only is
alluded to.
[21] This principle is more fully stated, with illustrations,
in the Topics, I. chap. ix.
[22] Either that of the bodily senses, or that of the moral senses.
“Fire burns,” is an instance of the former, “Treason is odious,” of the
latter.
[23] I have thought it worthwhile to vary the interpretation of this
word, because though “habitus” may be equivalent to all the senses of
[Greek: exis], “habit” is not, at least according to our colloquial
usage we commonly denote by “habit” a state formed by habituation.
[24] Another and perhaps more obvious method of rendering this passage
is to apply [Greek: kalon kagathon] to things, and let them depend
grammatically on [Greek: epaeboli]. It is to be remembered, however,
that [Greek: kalos kagathos] bore a special and well-known meaning also
the comparison is in the text more complete, and the point of the
passage seems more completely brought out.
[25] “Goodness always implies the love of itself, an affection to
goodness.” (Bishop Butler, Sermon xiii ) Aristotle describes pleasure
in the Tenth Book of this Treatise as the result of any faculty of
perception meeting with the corresponding object, vicious pleasure
being as truly pleasure as the most refined and exalted. If Goodness
then implies the love of itself, the percipient will always have its
object present, and pleasure continually result.
[26] In spite of theory, we know as a matter of fact that external
circumstances are necessary to complete the idea of Happiness not that
Happiness is capable of addition, but that when we assert it to be
identical with virtuous action we must understand that it is to have a
fair field; in fact, the other side of [Greek: bios teleios].
[27] It is remarkable how Aristotle here again shelves what he
considers an unpractical question. If Happiness were really a direct
gift from Heaven, independently of human conduct, all motive to
self-discipline and moral improvement would vanish He shows therefore
that it is no depreciation of the value of Happiness to suppose it to
come partly at least from ourselves, and he then goes on with other
reasons why we should think with him.
[28] This term is important, what has been maimed was once perfect; he