The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
(Bohn’s Classical Library), 1848 Organon, with Porphyry’s Introduction,
by O F Owen (Bohn’s Classical Library), 1848 Posterior Analytics, E
Poste, 1850, E S Bourchier, 1901, On Fallacies, E Poste, 1866 Parva
Naturaha (Greek and English), by G R T Ross, 1906, with De Anima, by W
A Hammond, 1902 Youth and Old Age, Life and Death and Respiration, W
Ogle 1897 Poetica, with Notes from the French of D Acier, 1705, by H J
Pye, 1788, 1792, T Twining, 1789, 1812, with Preface and Notes by H
Hamilton, 1851, Treatise on Rhetorica and Poetica, by T Hobbes (Bohn’s
Classical Library), 1850, by Wharton, 1883 (see Greek version), S H
Butcher, 1895, 1898, 3rd edition, 1902, E S Bourchier, 1907, by Ingram
Bywater, 1909 De Partibus Animalium, W Ogle, 1882 De Republica
Athenientium, by E Poste, 1891, F G Kenyon, 1891, T J Dymes, 1891 De
Virtutibus et Vitus, by W Bridgman, 1804 Politica, from the French of
Regius, 1598, by W Ellis, 1776, 1778, 1888 (Morley’s Universal
Library), 1893 (Lubbock’s Hundred Books) by E Walford (with Æconomics,
and Life by Dr Gillies), (Bohn’s Classical Library), 1848, J E. C.
Welldon, 1883, B Jowett, 1885, with Introduction and Index by H W C
Davis, 1905, Books i iii iv (vii) from Bekker’s text by W E Bolland,
with Introduction by A Lang, 1877. Problemata (with writings of other
philosophers), 1597, 1607, 1680, 1684, etc. Rhetorica, A summary by T
Hobbes, 1655 (?), new edition, 1759, by the translators of the Art of
Thinking, 1686, 1816, by D M Crimmin, 1812, J Gillies, 1823, Anon 1847,
J E C Welldon, 1886, R C Jebb, with Introduction and Supplementary
Notes by J E Sandys, 1909 (see under Poetica and Ethica). Secreta
Secretorum (supposititious work), Anon 1702, from the Hebrew version by
M Gaster, 1907, 1908. Version by Lydgate and Burgh, edited by R Steele
(E E T S), 1894, 1898.
LIFE, ETC J W Blakesley, 1839, A Crichton (Jardine’s Naturalist’s
Library), 1843, JS Blackie, Four Phases of Morals, Socrates, Aristotle,
etc, 1871, G Grote, Aristotle, edited by A Bain and G C Robertson,
1872, 1880, E Wallace, Outlines of the Philosophy of Aristotle, 1875,
1880, A Grant (Ancient Classics for English readers), 1877, T Davidson,
Aristotle and Ancient Educational Ideals (Great Educators), 1892, F
Sewall, Swedenborg and Aristotle, 1895, W A Heidel, The Necessary and
the Contingent of the Aristotelian System (University of Chicago
Contributions to Philosophy), 1896, F W Bain, On the Realisation of the
Possible, and the Spirit of Aristotle, 1899, J H Hyslop, The Ethics of
the Greek Philosophers, etc (Evolution of Ethics), 1903, M V Williams,
Six Essays on the Platonic Theory of Knowledge as expounded in the
later dialogues and reviewed by Aristotle, 1908, J M Watson,
Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato, 1909 A E Taylor, Aristotle, 1919, W D
Ross, Aristotle, 1923.
ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS
BOOK I
Chapter I.
Every art, and every science reduced to a teachable form, and in like
manner every action and moral choice, aims, it is thought, at some
good: for which reason a common and by no means a bad description of
the Chief Good is, “that which all things aim at.”
Now there plainly is a difference in the Ends proposed: for in some
cases they are acts of working, and in others certain works or tangible
results beyond and beside the acts of working: and where there are
certain Ends beyond and beside the actions, the works are in their
nature better than the acts of working. Again, since actions and arts
and sciences are many, the Ends likewise come to be many: of the
healing art, for instance, health; of the ship-building art, a vessel;
of the military art, victory; and of domestic management, wealth; are
respectively the Ends.
And whatever of such actions, arts, or sciences range under some one
faculty (as under that of horsemanship the art of making bridles, and
all that are connected with the manufacture of horse-furniture in
general; this itself again, and every action connected with war, under
the military art; and in the same way others under others), in all
such, the Ends of the master-arts are more choice-worthy than those
ranging under them, because it is with a view to the former that the
latter are pursued.
(And in this comparison it makes no difference whether the acts of
working are themselves the Ends of the actions, or something further
beside them, as is the case in the arts and sciences we have been just
speaking of.)
Since then of all things which may be done there is some one End which
we desire for its own sake, and with a view to which we desire
everything else; and since we do not choose in all instances with a
further End in view (for then men would go on without limit, and so the
desire would be unsatisfied and fruitless), this plainly must be the
Chief Good, _i.e._ the best thing of all.
Surely then, even with reference to actual life and conduct, the
knowledge of it must have great weight; and like archers, with a mark
in view, we shall be more likely to hit upon what is right: and if so,
we ought to try to describe, in outline at least, what it is and of
which of the sciences and faculties it is the End.
Now one would naturally suppose it to be the End of that which is most
commanding and most inclusive: and to this description, πολιτικὴ[1]
plainly answers: for this it is that determines which of the sciences
should be in the communities, and which kind individuals are to learn,
and what degree of proficiency is to be required. Again; we see also
ranging under this the most highly esteemed faculties, such as the art
military, and that of domestic management, and Rhetoric. Well then,
since this uses all the other practical sciences, and moreover lays
down rules as to what men are to do, and from what to abstain, the End
of this must include the Ends of the rest, and so must be The Good of
Man. And grant that this is the same to the individual and to the
community, yet surely that of the latter is plainly greater and more
perfect to discover and preserve: for to do this even for a single
individual were a matter for contentment; but to do it for a whole
nation, and for communities generally, were more noble and godlike.
Such then are the objects proposed by our treatise, which is of the
nature of πολιτικὴ: and I conceive I shall have spoken on them
satisfactorily, if they be made as distinctly clear as the nature of
the subject-matter will admit: for exactness must not be looked for in
all discussions alike, any more than in all works of handicraft. Now
the notions of nobleness and justice, with the examination of which
πολιτικὴ is concerned, admit of variation and error to such a degree,
that they are supposed by some to exist conventionally only, and not in
the nature of things: but then, again, the things which are allowed to
be goods admit of a similar error, because harm comes to many from
them: for before now some have perished through wealth, and others
through valour.
We must be content then, in speaking of such things and from such data,
to set forth the truth roughly and in outline; in other words, since we
are speaking of general matter and from general data, to draw also
conclusions merely general. And in the same spirit should each person
receive what we say: for the man of education will seek exactness so
far in each subject as the nature of the thing admits, it being plainly
much the same absurdity to put up with a mathematician who tries to
persuade instead of proving, and to demand strict demonstrative
reasoning of a Rhetorician.
Now each man judges well what he knows, and of these things he is a
good judge: on each particular matter then he is a good judge who has
been instructed in _it_, and in a general way the man of general mental
cultivation.[2]
Hence the young man is not a fit student of Moral Philosophy, for he
has no experience in the actions of life, while all that is said
presupposes and is concerned with these: and in the next place, since
he is apt to follow the impulses of his passions, he will hear as
though he heard not, and to no profit, the end in view being practice
and not mere knowledge.
And I draw no distinction between young in years, and youthful in
temper and disposition: the defect to which I allude being no direct
result of the time, but of living at the beck and call of passion, and
following each object as it rises.[3] For to them that are such the
knowledge comes to be unprofitable, as to those of imperfect
self-control: but, to those who form their desires and act in
accordance with reason, to have knowledge on these points must be very
profitable.
Let thus much suffice by way of preface on these three points, the
student, the spirit in which our observations should be received, and
the object which we propose.
Chapter II.
And now, resuming the statement with which we commenced, since all
knowledge and moral choice grasps at good of some kind or another, what
good is that which we say πολιτικὴ aims at? or, in other words, what is
the highest of all the goods which are the objects of action?
So far as name goes, there is a pretty general agreement: for HAPPINESS
both the multitude and the refined few call it, and “living well” and
“doing well” they conceive to be the same with “being happy;” but about
the Nature of this Happiness, men dispute, and the multitude do not in
their account of it agree with the wise. For some say it is some one of
those things which are palpable and apparent, as pleasure or wealth or
honour; in fact, some one thing, some another; nay, oftentimes the same
man gives a different account of it; for when ill, he calls it health;
when poor, wealth: and conscious of their own ignorance, men admire
those who talk grandly and above their comprehension. Some again held
it to be something by itself, other than and beside these many good
things, which is in fact to all these the cause of their being good.
Now to sift all the opinions would be perhaps rather a fruitless task;
so it shall suffice to sift those which are most generally current, or
are thought to have some reason in them.
And here we must not forget the difference between reasoning from
principles, and reasoning to principles: for with good cause did Plato
too doubt about this, and enquire whether the right road is from
principles or to principles, just as in the racecourse from the judges
to the further end, or _vice versâ_.
Of course, we must begin with what is known; but then this is of two
kinds, what we _do_ know, and what we _may_ know:[5] perhaps then as
individuals we must begin with what we _do_ know. Hence the necessity
that he should have been well trained in habits, who is to study, with
any tolerable chance of profit, the principles of nobleness and justice
and moral philosophy generally. For a principle is a matter of fact,
and if the fact is sufficiently clear to a man there will be no need in
addition of the reason for the fact. And he that has been thus trained
either has principles already, or can receive them easily: as for him
who neither has nor can receive them, let him hear his sentence from
Hesiod:
He is best of all who of himself conceiveth all things;
Good again is he too who can adopt a good suggestion;
But whoso neither of himself conceiveth nor hearing from another
Layeth it to heart;—he is a useless man.
Chapter III.
But to return from this digression.
Now of the Chief Good (_i.e._ of Happiness) men seem to form their
notions from the different modes of life, as we might naturally expect:
the many and most low conceive it to be pleasure, and hence they are
content with the life of sensual enjoyment. For there are three lines
of life which stand out prominently to view: that just mentioned, and
the life in society, and, thirdly, the life of contemplation.