The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle

does not contemplate as possible the case of a man being born incapable of virtue, and so of happiness. [29] [Greek] Plato. Phædon. xlvi. [30] But why give materials and instruments, if there is no work to do? [31] The supposed pair of ancestors. [32] Solon says, “Call no man happy till he is dead.” He must mean either, The man when dead _is_ happy (a), or, The man when dead _may be said to have been happy_ (b). If the former, does he mean positive happiness (a)? or only freedom from unhappiness (β)? _We_ cannot allow (a), Men’s opinions disallow (β), We revert now to the consideration of (b). [33] The difficulty was raised by the clashing of a notion commonly held, and a fact universally experienced. Most people conceive that Happiness should be abiding, every one knows that fortune is changeable. It is the notion which supports the definition, because we have therein based Happiness on the most abiding cause. [34] I have taken τούτον αὐτῶν to refer to ἐπιστημῶν, against Magirus and the Paraphrase of Andronicus Rhodius. I would refer to Aristotle’s account of θεωρία in the Tenth Book, chap. vii. where he expressly says of the working of νοῦς or pure intelect, that it is “most continuous.” [35] The term seems to be employed advisedly. The Choragus, of course, dressed his actors _for their parts;_ not according to their fancies or his own. Hooker has (E. P. v. ixxvi. 5) a passage which seems to be an admirable paraphrase on this. “Again, that the measure of our outward prosperity be taken by proportion with that which every man’s estate in this present life requireth. External abilities are instruments of action. It contenteth wise artificers to have their instruments proportionable to their work, rather fit for use than huge and goodly to please the eye. Seeing then the actions of a servant do not need that which may be necessary for men of calling and place in the world, neither men of inferior condition many things which greater personages can hardly want; surely they are blessed in worldly respects who have wherewith to perform what their station and place asketh, though they have no more.” [36] Always bearing in mind that man “never continueth in one stay.” [37] The meaning is this: personal fortunes, we have said, must be in certain weight and number to affect our own happiness, this will be true, of course, of those which are reflected on us from our friends: and these are the only ones to which the dead are supposed to be liable? add then the difference of sensibility which it is fair to presume, and there is a very small residuum of joy or sorrow. [38] This is meant for an exhaustive division of goods, which are either so _in esse_ or _in posse_. If _in esse_, they are either above praise, or subjects of praise. Those _in posse_, here called faculties, are good only when rightly used. Thus Rhetoric is a faculty which may be used to promote justice or abused to support villainy. Money in like way. [39] The doubt is, whether [Greek] or [Greek] is the subject of the sentence. It is translated as above, not merely with reference to the sense of this passage, but on a comparison with a similar one in Book X. chap 8. [Greek]. [40] Eudoxus, a philosopher holding the doctrine afterwards adopted by Epicurus respecting pleasure, but (as Aristotle testifies in the Tenth Book) of irreproachable character. [41] See the Rhetoric, Book I. chap ix. [42] The unseen is at least as real as the seen. [43] The terms are borrowed from the Seventh Book and are here used in their strict philosophical meaning. The [Greek: enkrates] is he who has bad or unruly appetites, but whose reason is strong enough to keep them under. The [Greek: akrates] is he whose appetites constantly prevail over his reason and previous good resolutions. By the law of habits the former is constantly approximating to a state in which the appetites are wholly quelled. This state is called [Greek: sophrosyne], and the man in it [Greek: sophron]. By the same law the remonstrances of reason in the latter grow fainter and fainter till they are silenced for ever. This state is called [Greek: akolasia], and the man in it [Greek: akolastos]. [44] This is untranslateable. As the Greek phrase, [Greek: echein logon tinos], really denotes substituting that person’s [Greek: logos] for one’s own, so the Irrational nature in a man of self-control or perfected self-mastery substitutes the orders of Reason for its own impulses. The other phrase means the actual possession of mathematical truths as part of the mental furniture, _i.e._ knowing them. [45] [Greek: xin] may be taken as opposed to [Greek: energeian], and the meaning will be, to show a difference between Moral and Intellectual Excellences, that men are commended for merely having the latter, but only for exerting and using the former. BOOK II [1] Which we call simply virtue. [2] For nature must of course supply the capacity. [3] Or “as a simple result of nature.” [4] This is done in the Sixth Book. [5] It is, in truth, in the application of rules to particular details of practice that our moral Responsibility chiefly lies no rule can be so framed, that evasion shall be impossible. See Bishop Butler’s Sermon on the character of Balaam, and that on Self-Deceit. [6] The words ἀκόλαστος and δειλὸς are not used here in their strict significations to denote confirmed states of vice: the ἐγκρατὴς necessarily feels pain, because he must always be thwarting passions which are a real part of his nature; though this pain will grow less and less as he nears the point of σωφροσύνη or perfected Self-Mastery, which being attained the pain will then and then only cease entirely. So a certain degree of fear is necessary to the _formation_ of true courage. All that is meant here is, that no habit of courage or self-mastery can be said to be matured, until pain altogether vanishes. [7] Virtue consists in the due regulation of _all_ the parts of our nature our passions are a real part of that nature, and as such have their proper office, it is an error then to aim at their extirpation. It is true that in a perfect moral state emotion will be rare, but then this will have been gained by regular process, being the legitimate result of the law that “passive impressions weaken as active habits are strengthened, by repetition.” If musical instruments are making discord, I may silence or I may bring them into harmony in either case I get rid of discord, but in the latter I have the positive enjoyment of music. The Stoics would have the passions rooted out, Aristotle would have them cultivated to use an apt figure (whose I know not), They would pluck the blossom off at once, he would leave it to fall in due course when the fruit was formed. Of them we might truly say, _Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant_. See on this point Bishop Butler’s fifth Sermon, and sect. 11. of the chapter on Moral Discipline in the first part of his Analogy. [8] I have adopted this word from our old writers, because our word _act_ is so commonly interchanged with _action_. [Greek: Praxis] (action) properly denotes the whole process from the conception to the performance. [Greek: Pragma] (fact) only the result. The latter may be right when the former is wrong if, for example, a murderer was killed by his accomplices. Again, the [Greek: praxis] may be _good_ though the [Greek: pragma] be wrong, as if a man under erroneous impressions does what would have been right if his impressions had been true (subject of course to the question how far he is guiltless of his original error), but in this case we could not call the [Greek: praxis] _right_. No repetition of [Greek: pragmata] goes to form a habit. See Bishop Butler on the Theory of Habits m the chapter on Moral Discipline, quoted above, sect. 11. “And in like manner as habits belonging to the body,” etc. [9] Being about to give a strict logical definition of Virtue, Aristotle ascertains first what is its genus [Greek: ti estin]. [10] That is, not for _merely having_ them, because we did not make ourselves. See Bishop Butler’s account of our nature as containing “particular propensions,” in sect. iv. of the chapter on Moral discipline, and in the Preface to the Sermons. [11] This refers to the division of quantity ([Greek: poson]) in the Categories. Those Quantities are called by Aristotle Continuous whose parts have position relatively to one another, as a line, surface, or solid, those discrete, whose parts have no such relation, as numbers themselves, or any string of words grammatically unconnected. [12] Numbers are in arithmetical proportion (more usually called progression), when they increase or decrease by a common difference thus, 2, 6, 10 are so, because 2 + 4 = 6, 6 + 4= 10, or _vice versa_, 10 - 4 = 6, 6 - 4 = 2. [13] If the mina be taken at 15 oz. avoirdupois, (Dict. of G. and R. Antiquities, article _Talentum_,) we must be sadly degenerate in our gastric capacity. [14] The two are necessary, because since the reason itself may be perverted, a man must have recourse to an external standard; we may suppose his [Greek: logos] originally to have been a sufficient guide, but when he has injured his moral perceptions in any degree, he must go out of himself for direction. [15] This is one of the many expressions which seem to imply that this treatise is rather a collection of notes of a _vivâ voce_ lecture than a set formal treatise. “The table” of virtues and vices probably was sketched out and exhibited to the audience. [16] Afterwards defined as “All things whose value is measured by money.” [17] We have no term exactly equivalent; it may be illustrated by Horace’s use of the term _hiatus_: “Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu?” Opening the mouth wide gives a promise of something great to come, if nothing great does come, this is a case of [Greek: chaunotes] or fruitless and unmeaning _hiatus_; the transference to the present subject is easy. [18] In like manner _we_ talk of laudable ambition, implying of course there may be that which is not laudable. [19] An expression of Bishop Butler’s, which corresponds exactly to the definition of [Greek: nemesis] in the Rhetoric. [20] That is, in the same genus; to be contraries, things must be generically connected: [Greek: ta pleiston allelon diestekota ton en to auto genei enantia orizontai]. Categories, iv. 15. [21] “[Greek: Deuteros plous] is a proverb,” says the Scholiast on the Phaedo, “used of those who do anything safely and cautiously inasmuch as they who have miscarried in their first voyage, set about then: preparations for the second cautiously,” and he then alludes to this passage. [22] That is, you must allow for the _recoil_. “Naturam expellas furca tamen usque recurret.” P. 43, l. 2. This illustration sets in so clear a light the doctrines entertained respectively by Aristotle, Eudoxus, and the Stoics regarding pleasure, that it is worth while to go into it fully. The reference is to Iliad iii. 154-160. The old counsellors, as Helen comes upon the city wall, acknowledge her surpassing beauty, and have no difficulty in understanding how both nations should have incurred such suffering for her sake still, fair as she is, home she must go, that she bring not ruin on themselves and their posterity. This exactly represents Aristotle’s relation to Pleasure he does not, with Eudoxus and his followers, exalt it into the Summum Bonum (as Paris would risk all for Helen), nor does he the the Stoics call it wholly evil, as Hector might have said that the woes Helen had caused had “banished all the beauty from her cheek,” but, with the aged counsellors, admits its charms, but aware of their dangerousness