The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
resolves to deny himself, he “feels her sweetness, yet defies her
thrall.”
[24] Αἴσθησις is here used as an analogous noun, to denote the faculty
which, in respect of moral matters, discharges the same function that
bodily sense does in respect of physical objects. It is worth while to
notice how in our colloquial language we carry out the same analogy. We
say of a transaction, that it “looks ugly,” “sounds oddly,” is a “nasty
job,” “stinks in our nostrils,” is a “hard dealing.”
BOOK III
[1] A man is not responsible for being [Greek: theratos], because
“particular propensions, from their very nature, must be felt, the
objects of them being present, though they cannot be gratified at all,
or not with the allowance of the moral principle.” But he is
responsible for being [Greek: eutheratos], because, though thus formed,
he “might have improved and raised himself to an higher and more secure
state of virtue by the contrary behaviour, by steadily following the
moral principle, supposed to be one part of his nature, and thus
withstanding that unavoidable danger of defection which necessarily
arose from propension, the other part of it. For by thus preserving his
integrity for some time, his danger would lessen, since propensions, by
being inured to submit, would do it more easily and of course and his
security against this lessening danger would increase, since the moral
principle would gain additional strength by exercise, both which things
are implied in the notion of virtuous habits.” (From the chapter on
Moral Discipline m the Analogy, sect. iv.) The purpose of this
disquisition is to refute the Necessitarians; it is resumed in the
third chapter of this Book.
[2] Virtue is not only the duty, but (by the laws of the Moral
Government of the World) also the interest of Man, or to express it in
Bishop Butler’s manner, Conscience and Reasonable self-love are the two
principles in our nature which of right have supremacy over the rest,
and these two lead in point of fact the same course of action. (Sermon
II.)
[3] Any ignorance of particular facts affects the rightness not of the
[Greek: praxis], but of the [Greek: pragma], but ignorance of _i.e._
incapacity to discern, Principles, shows the Moral Constitution to have
been depraved, _i.e._ shows Conscience to be perverted, or the sight of
Self-love to be impaired.
[4] [Greek: eneka] primarily denotes the relation of cause and effect
all circumstances which in any way contribute to a cert result are
[Greek: eneka] that result.
From the power which we have or acquire of deducing future results from
present causes we are enabled to act towards, with a view to produce,
these results thus [Greek: eneka] comes to mean not causation merely,
but _designed_ causation and so [Greek: on eneka] is used for Motive,
or final cause.
It is the primary meaning which is here intended, it would be a
contradiction in terms to speak of a man’s being ignorant of his own
Motive of action.
When the man “drew a bow at a venture and smote the King of Israel
between the joints of the harnesss” (i Kings xxii 34) he did it [Greek:
eneka ton apdkteinai] the King of Israel, in the primary sense of
[Greek: eneka] that is to say, the King’s death was _in fact the
result_, but could not have been the motive, of the shot, because the
King was disguised and the shot was at a venture.
[5] Bishop Butler would agree to this: he says of settled deliberate
anger, “It seems in us plainly connected with a sense of virtue and
vice, of moral good and evil.” See the whole Sermon on Resentment.
[6] Aristotle has, I venture to think, rather quibbled here, by using
[Greek: epithumia] and its verb, equivocally as there is no following
his argument without condescending to the same device, I have used our
word lust in its ancient signification Ps. xxiv. 12, “What man is he
that lusteth to live?”
[7] The meaning is, that the _onus probandi_ is thrown upon the person
who maintains the distinction, Aristotle has a _prima facie_ case. The
whole passage is one of difficulty. Card wells text gives the passage
from [Greek: dokei de] as a separate argument Bekker’s seems to intend
al 81 ir/jd£eis as a separate argument but if so, the argument would be
a mere _petitio principii_. I have adopted Cardwell’s reading in part,
but retain the comma at [Greek: dmpho] and have translated the last
four words as applying to the whole discussion, whereas Cardwell’s
reading seems to restrict them to the last argument.
[8] _i.e._ on objects of Moral Choice, opinion of this kind is not the
same as Moral Choice, because actions alone form habits and constitute
character, opinions are in general _signs_ of character, but when they
begin to be acted on they cease to be opinions, and merge in Moral
Choice.
“Treason doth never prosper, what’s the reason?
When it doth prosper, none dare call it Treason.”
[9] The introduction of the words [Greek: dia tinos] seems a mere
useless repetition, as in the second chapter [Greek: en tini] added to
[Greek: peri ti]. These I take for some among the many indications that
the treatise is a collection of notes for lectures, and not a finished
or systematic one.
[10] Suppose that three alternatives lay before a man, each of the
three is of course an object of Deliberation; when he has made his
choice, the alternative chosen does not cease to be in nature an object
of Deliberation, but superadds the character of being chosen and so
distinguished. Three men are admitted candidates for an office, the one
chosen is the successful candidate, so of the three [Greek: bouleuta],
the one chosen is the [Greek: bouleuton proaireton].
[11] Compare Bishop Butler’s “System of Human Nature,” in the Preface
to the Sermons.
[12] These words, [Greek: ek tou bouleusasthai—bouleusin], contain the
account of the whole mental machinery of any action. The first step is
a Wish, implied in the first here mentioned, viz. Deliberation, for it
has been already laid down that Deliberation has for its object-matter
means to Ends supposed to be set before the mind, the next step is
Deliberation, the next Decision, the last the definite extending of the
mental hand towards the object thus selected, the two last constitute
[Greek: proairesis] in its full meaning. The word [Greek: orexis] means
literally “a grasping at or after” now as this physically may be either
vague or definite, so too may the mental act, consequently the term as
transferred to the mind has two uses, and denotes either the first
wish, [Greek: boulaesis], or the last definite movement, Will in its
strict and proper sense. These two uses are recognised in the Rhetoric
(I 10), where [Greek: orexis] is divided into [Greek: alogos] and
[Greek: logistikae].
The illustration then afforded by the polities alluded to is this, as
the Kings first decided and then announced their decision for
acceptance and execution by their subjects, so Reason, having decided
on the course to be taken, communicates its decision to the Will, which
then proceeds to move [Greek: ta organika merae]. To instance in an
action of the mixed kind mentioned in the first chapter, safe arrival
at land is naturally desired, two means are suggested, either a certain
loss of goods, or trying to save both lives and goods, the question
being debated, the former is chosen, this decision is communicated to
the Will, which causes the owner’s hands to throw overboard his goods:
the act is denominated voluntary, because the Will is consenting, but
in so denominating it, we leave out of sight how that consent was
obtained. In a purely compulsory case the never gets beyond the stage
of Wish, for no means are power and deliberation therefore is useless,
consequently there is neither Decision nor Will, in other words, no
Choice.
[13] Compare the statement in the Rhetoric, 1 10, [Greek: esti d hae
men boulaeis agathou orexis (oudeis gar bouletai all ae otan oiaetho
einai agathon)]
[14] A stone once set in motion cannot be recalled, because it is then
placed under the operation of natural laws which cannot be controlled
or altered, so too in Moral declension, there is a point at which
gravitation operates irretrievably, “there is a certain bound to
imprudence and misbehaviour which being transgressed, there remains no
place for repentance in the natural course of things.” Bishop Butler’s
Analogy, First Part, chap 11.
[15] Habits being formed by acting in a certain way under certain
circumstances we can only choose how we will act not what circumstances
we will have to act under.
[16] “_Moral_ Courage” is our phrase.
[17] The meaning of this passage can scarcely be conveyed except by a
paraphrase.
“The object of each separate act of working is that which accords with
the habit they go to form. Courage is the habit which separate acts of
bravery go to form, therefore the object of these is that which accords
with Courage, _i.e._ Courage itself. But Courage is honourable (which
implies that the end and object of it is honour, since things are
denominated according to their end and object), therefore the object of
each separate act of bravery is honour.”
[18] For true Courage is required, i. Exact appreciation of danger. 2.
A Proper motive for resisting fear. Each of the Spurious kinds will be
found to fail in one or other, or both.
[19] This may merely mean, “who give strict orders” not to flinch,
which would imply the necessity of compulsion The word is capable of
the sense given above, which seems more forcible.
[20] See Book VI. chap. xiii. near the end [Greek: sokrataes aehen oun
logous tas aretas oeto einai (epiotaemas gar einai pasas)]
[21] Such as the noise, the rapid movements, and apparent confusion
which to an inexperienced eye and ear would be alarming. So Livy says
of the Gauls, v. 37, Nata in _vanos_ tumultus gens.
[22]In Coronea in Bœotia, on the occasion of the citadel being betrayed
to some Phocians. “The regulars” were Boeotian troops, the [Greek:
politika] Coroneans.
[23] By the difference of tense it seems Aristotle has mixed up two
things, beginning to speak of the particular instance, and then carried
into the general statement again. This it is scarce worth while to
imitate.
[24] The meaning of the phrase [Greek: kata sumbebaekos], as here used,
in given in the Seventh Book, chap. X. [Greek: ei gar tis todi dia todi
aireitai ae diokei, kath ahuto men touto diokei kai aireitai, kata
sumbebaekos de to proteron].
BOOK V
[1] Each term is important to make up the character of Justice, men
must have the capacity, do the acts, and do them from moral choice.
[2] But not always. [Greek: Philein], for instance, has two senses, “to
love” and “to kiss,” [Greek: misein] but one. Topics, I. chap. XIII. 5.
[3] _Things_ are [Greek: homonuma] which have only their name in
common, being in themselves different. The [Greek: homonumia] is
_close_ therefore when the difference though real is but slight. There
is no English expression for [Greek: homonumia], “equivocal” being
applied to a term and not to its various significates.
[4] See Book I. chap. 1. [Greek: toiautaen de tina planaen echei kai
tagatha k.t.l.]
[5] A man habitually drunk in private is viewed by our law as confining
his vice to himself, and the law therefore does not attempt to touch
him; a religious hermit may be viewed as one who confines his virtue to
his own person.
[6] See the account of Sejanus and Livia. Tac. Annal. IV. 3.
[7] Cardwell’s text, which here gives [Greek: paranomon], yields a much
easier and more natural sense. All Injustice violates law, but only the
particular kinds violate equality; and therefore the unlawful : the
unequal :: universal Injustice the particular _i.e._ as whole to part.