The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
There is a reading which also alters the words within the parenthesis,
but this hardly affects the gist of the passage.
[8] There are two reasons why the characters are not necessarily
coincident. He is a good citizen, who does his best to carry out the
[Greek: politeia] under which he lives, but this may be faulty, so
therefore _pro tanto_ is he.
Again, it is sufficient, so far as the Community is concerned, that he
does the _facts_ of a good man but for the perfection of his own
individual character, he must do them virtuously. A man may move
rightly in his social orbit, without revolving rightly on his own axis.
The question is debated in the Politics, III. 2. Compare also the
distinction between the brave man, and good soldier (supra, Book III.
chap. xii.), and also Bishop Butler’s first Sermon.
[9] Terms used for persons.
[10] By [Greek:——] is meant numbers themselves, 4, 20, 50, etc, by
[Greek:——] these numbers exemplified, 4 horses, 20 sheep, etc.
[11] The profits of a mercantile transaction (say £1000) are to be
divided between A and B, in the ratio of 2 to 3 (which is the real
point to be settled); then,
A : B :: 400 : 600.
A : 400 :: B : 600 (permutando, and assuming a value for A and B, so as
to make them commensurable with the respectiy sums).
A+400 : B+600 :: A : B. This represents the actual distribution; its
fairness depending entirely on that of the first proportion.
[12] _i.e._ where the ratio is that of equality, thus 2 : 2 :: 40 : 40
[13] Her Majesty’s “Justices.”
[14] I have omitted the next three lines, as they seem to be out of
place here, and to occur much more naturally afterwards; it not being
likely that they were originally twice written, one is perhaps at
liberty to give Aristotle the benefit of the doubt, and conclude that
he put them where they made the best sense.
[15] This I believe to be the meaning of the passage but do not pretend
to be able to get it out of the words.
[16] This is apparently contrary to what was said before, but not
really so. Aristotle does not mean that the man in authority struck
wrongfully, but he takes the extreme case of simple Reciprocation, and
in the second case, the man who strikes one in authority commits two
offences, one against the person (and so far they are equal), and
another against the office.
[17] χάρις denotes, 1st, a kindly feeling issuing in a gratuitous act
of kindness, 2ndly, the effect of this act of kindness on a generous
mind; 3rdly, this effect issuing in a requital of the kindness.
[18] The Shoemaker would get a house while the Builder only had (say)
one pair of shoes, or at all events not so many as he ought to have.
Thus the man producing the least valuable ware would get the most
valuable, and _vice versa_.
Adopting, as I have done, the reading which omits [Greek:——] at
[Greek:——], we have simply a repetition of the caution, that before
Reciprocation is attempted, there must be the same ratio between the
wares as between the persons, _i.e._ the ratio of equality.
If we admit [Greek: ou], the meaning may be, that you must not bring
into the proportion the difference mentioned above [Greek: eteron kai
ouk ison], since for the purposes of commerce all men are equal.
Say that the Builder is to the Shoemaker as 10:1. Then there must be
the same ratio between the wares, consequently the highest artist will
carry off the most valuable wares, thus combining in himself both
[Greek: uperochai]. The following are the three cases, given 100 pr.
shoes = 1 house.
Builder : Shoemaker : : 1 pr. shoes : 1 house—_wrong_.
—— —— 100 pr. shoes : 1 house—_right_
—— —— 10 (100 pr. shoes) : 1 house—_wrong_.
[19] [Greek] Compare a similar use of [Greek]. De Interpretatione, II.
2. [Greek].
[20] Every unjust act embodies [Greek: to adikon], which is a violation
of [Greek: to ison], and so implies a greater and a less share, the
former being said to fall to the doer, the latter to the sufferer, of
injury.
[21] This passage certainly occurs awkwardly here. If attached to the
close of the preceding Chapter it would leave that Chapter incomplete,
for the question is not gone into, but only stated. As the commencement
of this Chapter it is yet more out of place; I should propose to insert
it at the commencement of the following Chapter, to which it forms an
appropriate introduction.
[22] In a pure democracy men are absolutely, _i.e._ numerically, equal,
in other forms only proportionately equal. Thus the meanest British
subject is proportionately equal to the Sovereign, that is to say, is
as fully secured in his rights as the Sovereign in hers.
[23] Or, according to Cardwell’s reading ([Greek: kineton ou mentoi
pan]) “but amongst ourselves there is Just, which is naturally
variable, but certainly all Just is not such.” The sense of the passage
is not affected by the reading. In Bekker’s text we must take [Greek:
kineton] to mean the same as [Greek: kinoumenon], _i.e._ “we admit
there is no Just which has not been sometimes disallowed, still,” etc.
With Cardwell’s, [Greek: kineton] will mean “which not only _does_ but
naturally _may_ vary.”
[24] Murder is unjust by the law of nature, Smuggling by enactment.
Therefore any act which can be referred to either of these heads is an
unjust act, or, as Bishop Butler phrases it, an act _materially_
unjust. Thus much may be decided without reference to the agent. See
the note on page 32, l. 16.
[25] “As distinct from pain or loss.” Bishop Butler’s Sermon on
Resentment. See also, Rhet. 11. 2 Def. of [Greek: orgae].
[26] This method of reading the passage is taken from Zell as quoted in
Cardwell’s Notes, and seems to yield the best sense. The Paraphrast
gives it as follows:
“But the aggressor is not ignorant that he began, and so he feels
himself to be wrong [and will not acknowledge that he is the
aggressor], but the other does not.”
[27] As when a man is “_justified_ at the Grass Market,” _i.e._ hung.
[28] Where the stock of good is limited, if any individual takes more
than his share some one else must have less than his share; where it is
infinite, or where there is no good at all this cannot happen.
[29] The reference is to chap. vii. where it was said that the law
views the parties in a case of particular injustice as originally
equal, but now unequal, the wrong doer the gainer and the sufferer the
loser by the wrong, but in the case above supposed there is but _one_
party.
[30] So in the Politics, 1. 2.
_Hae men gar psuchae tou somatos archei despotikaen archaen, o de nous
taes orexeos politikaen kai despotikaev._
Compare also Bishop Butler’s account of human nature as a system—of the
different authority of certain principles, and specially the supremacy
of Conscience.
BOOK VI
[1] I understand the illustration to be taken from the process of
lowering a weight into its place; a block of marble or stone, for
instance, in a building.
[2] Called for convenience sake Necessary and Contingent matter.
[3] One man learns Mathematics more easily than another, in common
language, _he has a turn for_ Mathematics, _i e_ something in his
mental conformation answers to that science The Phrenologist shows the
bump denoting this aptitude.
[4] And therefore the question resolves itself into this, “What is the
work of the Speculative, and what of the Practical, faculty of Reason.”
See the description of _apetae_ II. 5.
[5] _praxis_ is here used in its strict and proper meaning.
[6] That is to say, the Will waits upon deliberation in which Reason is the
judge; when the decision is pronounced, the Will must act accordingly.
The question at issue always is, _Is this Good?_ because the Will is
only moved by an impression of Good; the Decision then will be always
_Aye or No_, and the mental hand is put forth to grasp in the former
case, and retracted in the later.
So far as what must take place in _every_ Moral Action, right or wrong,
the Machinery of the mind being supposed uninjured but to constitute a
good Moral Choice, _i e._. a good Action, the Reason must have said Aye
when it ought.
The cases of faulty action will be, either when the Machinery is
perfect but wrongly directed, as in the case of a deliberate crime, or
when the direction given by the Reason is right but the Will does not
move in accordance with that direction, in other words, when the
Machinery is out of order; as in the case of the [Greek: akrates]—video
meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.
[7] See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.
[8] The cobbler is at his last, why? to make shoes, which are to clothe
the feet of someone and the price to be paid, _i.e._ the produce of his
industry, is to enable him to support his wife and children; thus his
production is subordinate to Moral Action.
[9] It may be fairly presumed that Aristotle would not thus have varied
his phrase without some real difference of meaning. That difference is
founded, I think, on the two senses of [Greek: orexis] before alluded
to (note, p. 53, l. 33). The first impulse of the mind towards Action
may be given either by a vague desire or by the suggestion of Reason.
The vague desire passing through the deliberate stage would issue in
Moral Choice. Reason must enlist the Will before any Action can take
place.
Reason ought to be the originator in all cases, as Bishop Butler
observes that Conscience should be. If this were so, every act of Moral
Choice would be [Greek: orektikos nous].
But one obvious function of the feelings and passions in our composite
nature is to instigate Action, when Reason and Conscience by themselves
do not: so that as a matter of fact our Moral Choice is, in general,
fairly described as [Greek: orexis dianoetike]. See Bishop Butler’s
Sermon II. and the First upon Compassion.
[10] The mind attains truth, either for the sake of truth itself
([Greek: aplos]), or for the sake of something further ([Greek: eneka
tinos]). If the first then either syllogistically ([Greek: episteme]),
non-syllogistically ([Greek: nous]), or by union of the two methods
([Greek: sophla]). If the second, either with a view to _act_ ([Greek:
phronesis]), or with a view to _make_ ([Greek: techne]).
Otherwise. The mind contemplates Matter Necessary or Contingent. If
necessary, Principles ([Greek: nous]), Deductions ([Greek: episteme]),
or Mixed ([Greek: sophla]). If Contingent, Action ([Greek: phronesis]),
Production ([Greek: techen]). (Giphanius quoted in Cardwell’s notes.)
[11] It is the opening statement of the Post Analytics.
[12] Aristotle in his logical analysis of Induction, Prior. Analytics
II. 25, defines it to be “the proving the inherence of the major term
in the middle (_i.e._ proving the truth of the major premiss in fig. 1)
through the minor term.” He presupposes a Syllogism in the first Figure
with an universal affirmative conclusion, which reasons, of course,
from an universal, which universal is to be taken as proved by
Induction. His doctrine turns upon a canon which he there quotes. “If
of one and the same term two others be predicated, one of which is
coextensive with that one and the same, the other may be predicated of
that which is thus coextensive.” The fact of this coextensiveness must
be ascertained by [Greek: nous], in other words, by the Inductive
Faculty. We will take Aldrich’s instance.
All Magnets attract iron
A B C are Magnets
A B C attract iron.
Presupposed Syllogism reasoning from an universal.
A B C attract iron (Matter of observation and experiment)
All Magnets are A B C (Assumed by [Greek: nous], i.e. the Inductive
faculty)
All Magnets attract iron (Major premiss of the last Syllogism proved by