The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
taking the minor term of that for the middle term of this.)
Or, according to the canon quoted above: A B C are Magnets. A B C
attract iron.
But [Greek: nous] tells me that the term Magnets is coextensive with
the term A B C, therefore of all Magnets I may predicate that they
attract iron.
Induction is said by Aristotle to be [Greek: hoia phanton], but he says
in the same place that for this reason we must _conceive_ ([Greek:
noehin]) the term containing the particular Instances (as A B C above)
as composed of all the Individuals.
If Induction implied actual examination of all particular instances it
would cease to be Reasoning at all and sink into repeated acts of
Simple Apprehension it is really the bridging over of a chasm, not the
steps cut in the rock on either side to enable us to walk down into and
again out of it. It is a branch of probable Reasoning, and its validity
depends _entirely_ upon the quality of the particular mind which
performs it. Rapid Induction has always been a distinguishing mark of
Genius the certainty produced by it is Subjective and not Objective. It
may be useful to exhibit it Syllogistically, but the Syllogism which
exhibits it is either nugatory, or contains a premiss _literally_
false. It will be found useful to compare on the subject of Induction
_as the term is used by Aristotle_, Analytica Prior. II 25 26 Analytica
Post. I. 1, 3, and I. Topics VI I and X.
[13] The reference is made to the Post Analyt I II and it is impossible
to understand the account of [Greek: epistaemae] without a perusal of
the chapter, the additions to the definition referred to relate to the
nature of the premisses from which [Greek: epistaemae] draws its
conclusions they are to be “true, first principles incapable of any
syllogistic proof, better known than the conclusion, prior to it, and
causes of it.” (See the appendix to this Book.)
[14] This is the test of correct logical division, that the _membra
dividentia_ shall be opposed, _i.e._ not included the one by the other.
[15] The meaning of the [Greek: hepehi] appears to be this: the appeal
is made in the first instance to popular language, just as it the case
of [Greek: epistaemae], and will be in those of [Greek: phronaesis] and
[Greek: sophia]. We commonly call Architecture an Art, and it is so and
so, therefore the name Art and this so and so are somehow connected to
prove that connection to be “coextensiveness,” we predicate one of the
other and then simply convert the proposition, which is the proper test
of any logical definition, or of any specific property. See the Topics,
1. vi.
[16] See the parable of the unjust Steward, in which the popular sense
of [Greek: phronaesis] is strongly brought out; [Greek: ephaenesen ho
kurios ton oikonomon taes adikias oti phronimos epoiaesen hoti ohi
viohi tou aionos toutou phronimoteroi, k.t.l.]—Luke xvi. 8.
[17] Compare the [Greek: aplos] and [Greek: kath’ ekasta pepaideumenos]
of Book I. chap. 1.
[18] The two aspects under which Virtue may be considered as claiming
the allegiance of moral agents are, that of being right, and that of
being truly expedient, because Conscience and Reasonable Self-Love are
the two Principles of our moral constitution naturally supreme and
“Conscience and Self-Love, _if we understand our true happiness_,
always lead us the same way.” Bishop Butler, end of Sermon III.
And again:
“If by _a sense of interest_ is meant a practical regard to what is
upon the whole our Happiness this is not only coincident with the
principle of Virtue or Moral Rectitude, but is a part of the idea
itself. And it is evident this Reasonable Self-Love wants to be
improved as really as any principle in our nature. So little cause is
there for Moralists to disclaim this principle.” From the note on sect.
iv. of the chapter on Moral Discipline, Analogy, part I chap. v.
[19] See the note on [Greek: Arche] on page 4, l. 30.
The student will find it worth while to compare this passage with the
following—Chap. xiii. of this book beginning [Greek: e d’ exis to
ommati touto k. t. l]—vii. 4. [Greek: eti kai ode physikos. k.t.l.]
vii. 9.—[Greek: ae gar arethae kai ae mochthaeria. k.t.l.]—iii. 7 _ad
finem_. [Greek: ei de tis legoi. k.t.l.]
[20] This is not quite fair. Used in its strict sense, Art does not
admit of degrees of excellence any more than Practical Wisdom. In
popular language we use the term “wiser man,” as readily as “better
artist” really denoting in each case different degrees of approximation
to Practical Wisdom and Art respectively, [Greek: dia to ginesthai tous
epainous di anaphoras]. I. 12.
[21] He would be a _better Chymist_ who should poison intentionally,
than he on whose mind the prevailing impression was that “Epsom Salts
mean Oxalic Acid, and Syrup of Senna Laudanum.”
[22]The term Wisdom is used in our English Translation of the Old
Testament in the sense first given to [Greek:——] here. “Then wrought
Bezaleel and Ahohab, and every _wise-hearted man, in whom the Lord put
wisdom and understanding_ to know how to work all manner of work for
the service of the Sanctuary” Exodus xxxvi. i.
[23] [Greek:——] and [Greek:——], (in the strict sense, for it is used in
many different senses in this book) are different parts of the whole
function [Greek:——], [Greek:——] takes in conclusions, drawn by strict
reasoning from Principles of a certain kind which [Greek: ——] supplies.
It is conceivable that a man might go on gaining these principles by
Intuition and never reasoning from them, and so [Greek: ——] might exist
independent of [Greek:——], but not this without that. Put the two
together, the head to the trunk, and you form the living being
[Greek:——]. There are three branches of [Greek:——] according to Greek
Philosophy, [Greek:——], [Greek:——], [Greek:——]. Science is perhaps the
nearest English term, but we have none really equivalent.
[24][Greek:——] is here used in its most extensive sense, [Greek:——]
would be its chief Instrument.
[25] The faculty concerned with which is [Greek:——].
[26] In every branch of Moral Action in which Practical Wisdom is
employed there will be general principles, and the application of them,
but in some branches there are distinct names appropriated to the
operations of Practical Wisdom, in others there are not.
Thus Practical Wisdom, when employed on the general principles of Civil
Government, is called Legislation, as administering its particular
functions it is called simply Government. In Domestic Management, there
are of course general Rules, and also the particular application of
them; but here the faculty is called only by one name. So too when
Self-Interest is the object of Practical Wisdom.
[27] [Greek:——], “our mere Operatives in Public business.” (Chalmers.)
[28] Practical Wisdom may be employed either respecting Self, (which is
[Greek:——] proper) or not-Self, _i.e._ either one’s family=[Greek:——],
or one’s community=[Greek:——], but here the supreme and subordinate are
distinguished, the former is [Greek:——], the latter [Greek:——] proper,
whose functions are deliberation and the administration of justice.
[29] But where can this be done, if there be no community? see Horace’s
account of the way in which his father made him reap instruction from
the examples in the society around him. 1. Sat. iv. 105, etc. See also
Bishop Butler, Analogy, part I. chap. v. sect. iii.
The whole question of the Selfish Morality is treated in Bishop
Butler’s first three and the eleventh Sermons, in which he shows the
coincidence in _fact_ of enlightened Self-Love and Benevolence _i.e._
love of others. Compare also what is said in the first Book of this
treatise, chap. v., about [Greek: autarkeia].
[30] More truly “implied,” namely, that Practical Wisdom results from
experience.
[31] This observation seems to be introduced, simply because suggested
by the last, and not because at all relevant to the matter in hand.
[32] An instance of Principles gained [Greek: aisthesei]. (Book 1.
chap. viii.)
[33] Particulars are called [Greek: eschata] because they are last
arrived at in the deliberative process, but a little further on we have
the term applied to first principles, because they stand at one
extremity, and facts at the other, of the line of action.
[34] I prefer the reading [Greek: e phronesis], which gives this sense,
“Well, as I have said, Practical Wisdom is this kind of sense, and the
other we mentioned is different in kind.” In a passage so utterly
unimportant, and thrown in almost colloquially, it is not worth while
to take much trouble about such a point.
[35] The definition of it in the Organon (Post Analyt. 1. xxiv.), “a
happy conjecture of the middle term without time to consider of it.”
The quaestio states the phenomena, and the middle term the causation
the rapid ascertaining of which constitutes [Greek: anchinoia]. All
that receives light from the sun is bright on the side next to the sun.
The moon receives light from the sun, The moon is bright on the side
next the sun. The [Greek: anchinoia] consists in rapidly and correctly
accounting for the observed fact, that the moon is bright on the side
next to the sun.
[36] Opinion is a complete, deliberation an incomplete, mental act.
[37] The End does not sanctify the Means.
[38] The meaning is, there is one End including all others; and in this
sense [Greek: phronesis] is concerned with means, not Ends but there
are also many subordinate Ends which are in fact Means to the Great End
of all. Good counsel has reference not merely to the grand End, but to
the subordinate Ends which [Greek: phronesis] selects as being right
means to the Grand End of all.
[39] The relative [Greek: on] might be referred to [Greek: sumpheron],
but that [Greek: eubonlia] has been already divided into two kinds, and
this construction would restrict the name to one of them, namely that
[Greek: pros ti telos] as opposed to that [Greek: pros to telos aplos].
[40] We have no term which at all approximates to the meaning of this
word, much less will our language admit of the play upon it which
connects it with [Greek: suggnomae].
[41] Meaning, of course, all those which relate to Moral Action.
[Greek: psronaesis ] is equivalent to [Greek: euboulia, ounesis,
gnomae, and nous] (in the new sense here given to it).
The faculty which guides us truly in all matters of Moral Action is
[Greek: phronaesis], i.e. Reason directed by Goodness or Goodness
informed by Reason. But just as every faculty of body and soul is not
actually in operation at the same time, though the Man is acting, so
proper names are given to the various Functions of Practical Wisdom.
Is the [Greek: phronimos] forming plans to attain some particular End?
he is then [Greek: euboulos]—is he passing under review the suggestions
of others? he is [Greek: sunetos]—is he judging of the acts of others?
he admits [Greek: gnomae] to temper the strictness of justness—is he
applying general Rules to particular cases? he is exercising [Greek:
nous praktikos] or [Greek: agsthaesis]—while in each and all he is
[Greek: phronimos]?
[42] See note, on p. 140.
[43] There are cases where we must simply accept or reject without
proof: either when Principles are propounded which are prior to all
reasoning, or when particular facts are brought before us which are
simply matters of [Greek: agsthaesis]. Aristotle here brings both these
cases within the province of [Greek: nous], _i.e._ he calls by this
name the Faculty which attains Truth in each.
[44] _i.e._ of the [Greek: syllogisimai ton prakton].
[45] See the note on [Greek: Archae] on p. 4,1 30. As a matter of fact
and mental experience the Major Premiss of the Practica Syllogism is
wrought into the mind by repeatedly acting upon the Minor Premiss