The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
(_i.e._ by [Greek: ethismos]).
All that is pleasant is to be done,
This is pleasant,
This is to be done
By habitually acting on the Minor Premiss, _i.e._ on the suggestions of
[Greek: epithymia], a man comes really to hold the Major Premiss.
Aristotle says of the man destitute of all self-control that he is
firmly persuaded that it is his proper line to pursue the gratification
of his bodily appetites, [Greek: dia to toioytos einai oios diokein
aytas]. And his analysis of [Greek: akrasia] (the state of progress
towards this utter abandonment to passion) shows that each case of
previous good resolution succumbing to temptation is attributable to
[Greek: epithymia] suggesting its own Minor Premiss in place of the
right one. Book VII. 8 and 5.
[46] The _consequentia_ is this:
There are cases both of principles and facts which cannot admit of
reasoning, and must be authoritatively determined by [Greek: nous].
What makes [Greek: nous] to be a true guide? only practice, i.e.
Experience, and _therefore_, etc.
[47] This is a note to explain [Greek: hygieina] and [Greek: euektika],
he gives these three uses of the term [Greek: hygieinon] in the Topics,
I. xiii. 10,
{ [Greek: to men hygieias poiætikon], [Greek: hygieinon legetai]
{ [Greek: to de phylaktikon],
{ [Greek: to de sæmantikon].
Of course the same will apply to [Greek: euektikon].
[48] Healthiness is the formal cause of health.
Medicine is the efficient cause of health.
See Book X. chap. iv. [Greek: hosper oud hæ hygieia kai ho iatros
homoios aitia esti tou ugiainein].
[49] [Greek: phronæsis] is here used in a partial sense to signify the
Intellectual, as distinct from the Moral, element of Practical Wisdom.
[50] This is another case of an observation being thrown in _obiter_,
not relevant to, but suggested by, the matter in hand.
[51] See Book II. chap. iii. and V. xiii.
[52]The article is supplied at [Greek: panourgous], because the
abstract word has just been used expressly in a bad sense. “Up to
anything” is the nearest equivalent to [Greek: panourgos], but too
nearly approaches to a colloquial vulgarism.
[53] See the note on [Greek: Archæ] on page 4, l. 30.
P. 147, l. 14. And for the Minor, of course,
“This particular action is———.”
We may paraphrase [Greek: to telos] by [Greek: ti dei prattein—ti gar
dei prattein hæ mæ, to telos autæs estin] i.e. [Greek: tæs
phronæseos].—(Chap. xi. of this Book.)
[55] “Look asquint on the face of truth.” Sir T. Browne, Religio
Medici.
[56] The term [Greek: sophronikoi] must be understood as governing the
signification of the other two terms, there being no single Greek term
to denote in either case mere dispositions towards these Virtues.
[57] Compare the passage at the commencement of Book X. [Greek: nun de
phainontai] [Greek: katokochimon ek tæs aretæs].
[58] It must be remembered, that [Greek: phronæsis] is used throughout
this chapter in two senses, its proper and complete sense of Practical
Wisdom, and its incomplete one of merely the Intellectual Element of
it.
BOOK VII
[1] The account of Virtue and Vice hitherto given represents rather
what men _may be_ than what they _are_. In this book we take a
practical view of Virtue and Vice, in their ordinary, every day
development.
[2] This illustrates the expression, “_Deceits_ of the Flesh.”
[3] Another reading omits the [Greek:——]; the meaning of the whole
passage would be exactly the same—it would then run, “if he had been
convinced of the rightness of what he does, _i.e._ if he were now
acting on conviction, he might stop in his course on a change of
conviction.”
[4] Major and minor Premises of the [Greek:——] [Greek——]
[5]Some necessarily implying knowledge of the particular, others not.
[6] As a modern parallel, take old Trumbull in Scott’s “Red Gauntlet.”
[7] That is, as I understand it, either the major or the minor premise,
it is true, that “all that is sweet is pleasant,” it is true also, that
“this is sweet,” what is contrary to Right Reason is the bringing in
this minor to the major _i.e._ the universal maxim, forbidding to
taste. Thus, a man goes to a convivial meeting with the maxim in his
mind “All excess is to be avoided,” at a certain time his [Greek:——]
tells him “This glass is excess.” As a matter of mere reasoning, he
cannot help receiving the conclusion “This glass is to be avoided,” and
supposing him to be morally sound he would accordingly abstain. But
[Greek:——], being a simple tendency towards indulgence suggests, in
place of the minor premise “This is excess,” its own premise “This is
sweet,” this again suggests the self-indulgent maxim or principle
(‘[Greek:——]), “All that is sweet is to be tasted,” and so, by strict
logical sequence, proves “This glass is to be tasted.”
The solution then of the phænomenon of [Greek:——] is this that
[Greek:——], by its direct action on the animal nature, swamps the
suggestions of Right Reason.
On the high ground of Universals, [Greek:——] i.e. [Greek:——] easily
defeats [Greek:——]. The [Greek:——], an hour before he is in temptation,
would never deliberately prefer the maxim “All that is sweet is to be
tasted” to “All excess is to be avoided.” The [Greek:——] would.
Horace has a good comment upon this (II Sat 2):
Quæ virtus et quanta, bom, sit vivere parvo
Discite, _non inter lances mensasque nitentes_
Verum hic _impransi_ mecum disquirite
Compare also Proverbs XXIII. 31. “Look not thou upon the wine when it
is red,” etc.
[8] As we commonly speak, Metaphysicians. Physiology of course includes
Metaphysics.
[9] [Greek: oron]. Aristotle’s own account of this word (Prior Analyt
ii. 1) is [Greek: eis on dialuetai hae protasis], but both in the
account of [Greek: nous] and here it seems that the proposition itself
is really indicated by it.
[10] The Greek would give “avoids excessive pain,” but this is not
true, for the excess of pain would be ground for excuse the warrant for
translating as in the text, is the passage occurring just below [Greek:
diokei tas uperbolas kai pheugei metrias lupas].
[11] Compare Bishop Butler on Particular Propensions, Analogy, Part I
chap v sect. iv.
[12] That is, they are to the right states as Vice to Virtue.
[14] Consult in connection with this Chapter the Chapter on [Greek:
orgae] in the Rhetoric, II. 2, and Bishop Butler’s Sermon on
Resentment.
[15] The reasoning here being somewhat obscure from the concisement of
expression, the following exposition of it is subjoined.
Actions of Lust are wrong actions done with pleasure,
Wrong actions done with pleasure are more justly objects of wrath,[*]
Such as are more justly objects of wrath are more unjust,
Actions of Lust are more unjust
[*] [Greek: hubpis] is introduced as the single instance from
which this premiss is proved inductively. See the account of it in
the Chapter of the Rhetoric referred to in the preceding note.
[16][Greek: ton dae lechthenton]. Considerable difference of opinion
exists as to the proper meaning of these words. The emendation which
substitutes [Greek: akrataes] for [Greek: akolastos] removes all
difficulty, as the clause would then naturally refer to [Greek: ton mae
proairoumenon] but Zell adheres to the reading in the text of Bekker,
because the authority of MSS and old editions is all on this side.
I understand [Greek: mallon] as meant to modify the word [Greek:
malakias], which properly denotes that phase of [Greek: akrasia] (not
[Greek: akolasia]) which is caused by pain.
The [Greek: akolastos] _deliberately_ pursues pleasure and declines
pain if there is to be a distinct name for the latter phase, it comes
under [Greek: malakia] more nearly than any other term, though perhaps
not quite properly.
Or the words may be understood as referring to the class of wrong acts
caused by avoidance of pain, whether deliberate or otherwise, and then
of course the names of [Greek: malakia] and [Greek: akolasia] may be
fitly given respectively.
[17] “If we went into a hospital where all were sick or dying, we
should think those least ill who were insensible to pain; a physician
who knew the whole, would behold them with despair. And there is a
mortification of the soul as well as of the body, in which the first
symptoms of returning hope are pain and anguish” Sewell, Sermons to
Young Men (Sermon xii.)
[18] Before the time of trial comes the man deliberately makes his
Moral Choice to act rightly, but, at the moment of acting, the powerful
strain of desire makes him contravene this choice his Will does not act
in accordance with the affirmation or negation of his Reason. His
actions are therefore of the mixed kind. See Book III. chap. i, and
note on page 128.
[19] Let a man be punctual _on principle_ to any one engagement in the
day, and he must, as a matter of course, keep all his others in their
due places relatively to this one; and so will often wear an appearance
of being needlessly punctilious in trifles.
[20] Because he is destitute of these minor springs of action, which
are intended to supply the defects of the higher principle.
See Bishop Butler’s first Sermon on Compassion, and the conclusion of
note on p. 129.
BOOK VIII
[1] “Owe no man anything, but to _love_ one another for he that loveth
another _hath fulfilled the Law_.” Romans XIII. 8.
[2] [Greek: kerameis]. The Proverb in full is a line from Hesiod,
[Greek: kahi keramehus keramei koteei kai tektoni tekton].
[3] In this sense, therefore, is it sung of Mrs. Gilpin that she
“two stone bottles found,
To hold the liquor that she _loved_,
And keep it safe and sound.”
[4] Cardwell’s reading, [Greek: tautae gar omoioi, kai ta loipa] is
here adopted, as yielding a better sense than Bekker’s.
[5]The Great man will have a right to look for more Friendship than he
bestows, but the Good man _can_ feel Friendship only for, and in
proportion to, the goodness of the other.
[6] See note on page 68, 1. 8.
[7] See I. Topics, Chap. v. on the various senses of [Greek: tauton].
[8] “For the mutual society, help, and comfort that the one ought to
have of the other, both in prosperity and adversity.”
[9] Which one would be assuming he was, if one declined to recognise
the obligation to requite the favour or kindness.
BOOK IX
[1] “Neither the Son of man, that He should _repent_.” Numbers xxiii.
19.
“In a few instances the Second Intention, or Philosophical employment
of a Term, is more extensive than the First Intention, or popular use.”
Whately, Logic, iii. 10.
[2] “I have sometimes considered in what troublesome case is that
Chamberlain in an Inn who being but one is to give attendance to many
guests. For suppose them all in one chamber, yet, if one shall command
him to come to the window, and the other to the table, and another to
the bed, and another to the chimney, and another to come upstairs, and
another to go downstairs, and all in the same instant, how would he be
distracted to please them all? And yet such is the sad condition of nay
soul by nature, not only a servant but a slave unto sin. Pride calls me
to the window, gluttony to the table, wantonness to the bed, laziness
to the chimney, ambition commands me to go upstairs, and covetousness
to come down. Vices, I see, are as well contrary to themselves as to
Virtue.” (Fuller’s Good Thoughts in Bad Times. Mix’t Contemplations,
viii.)
BOOK X
[1] See note, p. 43.
[2] See Book II. chap. ix.
[3] See Book I. chap. v. ad finem.
[4] The notion alluded to is that of the [greek: idea]: that there is
no real substantial good except the [greek: auto agathon], and
therefore whatever is so called is so named in right of its