The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle
And by Human Excellence we mean not that of man’s body but that of his
soul; for we call Happiness a working of the Soul.
And if this is so, it is plain that some knowledge of the nature of the
Soul is necessary for the statesman, just as for the oculist a
knowledge of the whole body, and the more so in proportion as πολιτικὴ
is more precious and higher than the healing art: and in fact
physicians of the higher class do busy themselves much with the
knowledge of the body.
So then the statesman is to consider the nature of the Soul: but he
must do so with these objects in view, and so far only as may suffice
for the objects of his special enquiry: for to carry his speculations
to a greater exactness is perhaps a task more laborious than falls
within his province.
In fact, the few statements made on the subject in my popular treatises
are quite enough, and accordingly we will adopt them here: as, that the
Soul consists of two parts, the Irrational and the Rational (as to
whether these are actually divided, as are the parts of the body, and
everything that is capable of division; or are only metaphysically
speaking two, being by nature inseparable, as are convex and concave
circumferences, matters not in respect of our present purpose). And of
the Irrational, the one part seems common to other objects, and in fact
vegetative; I mean the cause of nourishment and growth (for such a
faculty of the Soul one would assume to exist in all things that
receive nourishment, even in embryos, and this the same as in the
perfect creatures; for this is more likely than that it should be a
different one).
Now the Excellence of this manifestly is not peculiar to the human
species but common to others: for this part and this faculty is thought
to work most in time of sleep, and the good and bad man are least
distinguishable while asleep; whence it is a common saying that during
one half of life there is no difference between the happy and the
wretched; and this accords with our anticipations, for sleep is an
inactivity of the soul, in so far as it is denominated good or bad,
except that in some wise some of its movements find their way through
the veil and so the good come to have better dreams than ordinary men.
But enough of this: we must forego any further mention of the nutritive
part, since it is not naturally capable of the Excellence which is
peculiarly human.
And there seems to be another Irrational Nature of the Soul, which yet
in a way partakes of Reason. For in the man who controls his appetites,
and in him who resolves to do so and fails, we praise the Reason or
Rational part of the Soul, because it exhorts aright and to the best
course: but clearly there is in them, beside the Reason, some other
natural principle which fights with and strains against the Reason.
(For in plain terms, just as paralysed limbs of the body when their
owners would move them to the right are borne aside in a contrary
direction to the left, so is it in the case of the Soul, for the
impulses of men who cannot control their appetites are to contrary
points: the difference is that in the case of the body we do see what
is borne aside but in the case of the soul we do not. But, it may be,
not the less[42] on that account are we to suppose that there is in the
Soul also somewhat besides the Reason, which is opposed to this and
goes against it; as to _how_ it is different, that is irrelevant.)
But of Reason this too does evidently partake, as we have said: for
instance, in the man of self-control it obeys Reason: and perhaps in
the man of perfected self-mastery,[43] or the brave man, it is yet
more obedient; in them it agrees entirely with the Reason.
So then the Irrational is plainly twofold: the one part, the merely
vegetative, has no share of Reason, but that of desire, or appetition
generally, does partake of it in a sense, in so far as it is obedient
to it and capable of submitting to its rule. (So too in common phrase
we say we have λόγος of our father or friends, and this in a different
sense from that in which we say we have λόγος of mathematics.)[44]
Now that the Irrational is in some way persuaded by the Reason,
admonition, and every act of rebuke and exhortation indicate. If then
we are to say that this also has Reason, then the Rational, as well as
the Irrational, will be twofold, the one supremely and in itself, the
other paying it a kind of filial regard.
The Excellence of Man then is divided in accordance with this
difference: we make two classes, calling the one Intellectual, and the
other Moral; pure science, intelligence, and practical
wisdom—Intellectual: liberality, and perfected self-mastery—Moral: in
speaking of a man’s Moral character, we do not say he is a scientific
or intelligent but a meek man, or one of perfected self-mastery: and we
praise the man of science in right of his mental state;[45] and of
these such as are praiseworthy we call Excellences.
BOOK II
Chapter I.
Well: human Excellence is of two kinds, Intellectual and Moral:[1] now
the Intellectual springs originally, and is increased subsequently,
from teaching (for the most part that is[2]), and needs therefore
experience and time; whereas the Moral comes from custom, and so the
Greek term denoting it is but a slight deflection from the term
denoting custom in that language.
From this fact it is plain that not one of the Moral Virtues comes to
be in us merely by nature: because of such things as exist by nature,
none can be changed by custom: a stone, for instance, by nature
gravitating downwards, could never by custom be brought to ascend, not
even if one were to try and accustom it by throwing it up ten thousand
times; nor could file again be brought to descend, nor in fact could
anything whose nature is in one way be brought by custom to be in
another. The Virtues then come to be in us neither by nature, nor in
despite of nature,[3] but we are furnished by nature with a capacity
for receiving themu and are perfected in them through custom.
Again, in whatever cases we get things by nature, we get the faculties
first and perform the acts of working afterwards; an illustration of
which is afforded by the case of our bodily senses, for it was not from
having often seen or heard that we got these senses, but just the
reverse: we had them and so exercised them, but did not have them
because we had exercised them. But the Virtues we get by first
performing single acts of working, which, again, is the case of other
things, as the arts for instance; for what we have to make when we have
learned how, these we learn how to make by making: men come to be
builders, for instance, by building; harp-players, by playing on the
harp: exactly so, by doing just actions we come to be just; by doing
the actions of self-mastery we come to be perfected in self-mastery;
and by doing brave actions brave.
And to the truth of this testimony is borne by what takes place in
communities: because the law-givers make the individual members good
men by habituation, and this is the intention certainly of every
law-giver, and all who do not effect it well fail of their intent; and
herein consists the difference between a good Constitution and a bad.
Again, every Virtue is either produced or destroyed from and by the
very same circumstances: art too in like manner; I mean it is by
playing the harp that both the good and the bad harp-players are
formed: and similarly builders and all the rest; by building well men
will become good builders; by doing it badly bad ones: in fact, if this
had not been so, there would have been no need of instructors, but all
men would have been at once good or bad in their several arts without
them.
So too then is it with the Virtues: for by acting in the various
relations in which we are thrown with our fellow men, we come to be,
some just, some unjust: and by acting in dangerous positions and being
habituated to feel fear or confidence, we come to be, some brave,
others cowards.
Similarly is it also with respect to the occasions of lust and anger:
for some men come to be perfected in self-mastery and mild, others
destitute of all self-control and passionate; the one class by behaving
in one way under them, the other by behaving in another. Or, in one
word, the habits are produced from the acts of working like to them:
and so what we have to do is to give a certain character to these
particular acts, because the habits formed correspond to the
differences of these.
So then, whether we are accustomed this way or that straight from
childhood, makes not a small but an important difference, or rather I
would say it makes all the difference.
Chapter II.
Since then the object of the present treatise is not mere speculation,
as it is of some others (for we are enquiring not merely that we may
know what virtue is but that we may become virtuous, else it would have
been useless), we must consider as to the particular actions how we are
to do them, because, as we have just said, the quality of the habits
that shall be formed depends on these.
Now, that we are to act in accordance with Right Reason is a general
maxim, and may for the present be taken for granted: we will speak of
it hereafter, and say both what Right Reason is, and what are its
relations to the other virtues.[4]
But let this point be first thoroughly understood between us, that all
which can be said on moral action must be said in outline, as it were,
and not exactly: for as we remarked at the commencement, such reasoning
only must be required as the nature of the subject-matter admits of,
and matters of moral action and expediency have no fixedness any more
than matters of health. And if the subject in its general maxims is
such, still less in its application to particular cases is exactness
attainable:[5] because these fall not under any art or system of rules,
but it must be left in each instance to the individual agents to look
to the exigencies of the particular case, as it is in the art of
healing, or that of navigating a ship. Still, though the present
subject is confessedly such, we must try and do what we can for it.
First then this must be noted, that it is the nature of such things to
be spoiled by defect and excess; as we see in the case of health and
strength (since for the illustration of things which cannot be seen we
must use those that can), for excessive training impairs the strength
as well as deficient: meat and drink, in like manner, in too great or
too small quantities, impair the health: while in due proportion they
cause, increase, and preserve it.
Thus it is therefore with the habits of perfected Self-Mastery and
Courage and the rest of the Virtues: for the man who flies from and
fears all things, and never stands up against anything, comes to be a
coward; and he who fears nothing, but goes at everything, comes to be
rash. In like manner too, he that tastes of every pleasure and abstains
from none comes to lose all self-control; while he who avoids all, as
do the dull and clownish, comes as it were to lose his faculties of
perception: that is to say, the habits of perfected Self-Mastery and
Courage are spoiled by the excess and defect, but by the mean state are
preserved.
Furthermore, not only do the origination, growth, and marring of the
habits come from and by the same circumstances, but also the acts of
working after the habits are formed will be exercised on the same: for
so it is also with those other things which are more directly matters
of sight, strength for instance: for this comes by taking plenty of
food and doing plenty of work, and the man who has attained strength is
best able to do these: and so it is with the Virtues, for not only do