The Riddle of the Sands
districts, a vigorous raid on which is, the writer urges, the true
policy of an invader. He reports positively that there exist (in a
proper military sense) no preparations whatever to meet such an attack.
East Holland is also the nearest point on the British shores to
Germany, excepting the coast of Norfolk; much nearer, indeed, than the
Essex flats alluded to, and reached by a simple deep-sea passage,
without any dangerous region to navigate, like the mouth of the Channel
and the estuary of the Thames from Harwich westwards. The distance is
240 sea-miles, west by south roughly, from Borkum Island, and 280 from
Wangeroog. The time estimated for transit after the flotillas had been
assembled outside the islands is from thirty to thirty-four hours.
Embarkation is the next topic. This could and must be effected in one
tide. At the six _siels_ there was a mean period of two and a half
hours in every twelve, during which the water was high enough. At
Norden a rather longer time was available. But this should be amply
sufficient if the machinery were in good working order and were
punctually set in motion. High water occurs approximately at the same
time at all seven outlets, the difference between the two farthest
apart, Carolinensiel and Greetsiel, being only half an hour.
Lastly, the special risks attendant on such an expedition are
dispassionately weighed. X——, though keenly anxious to recommend his
scheme, writes in no blindly sanguine spirit. There are no modern
precedents for any invasion in the least degree comparable to that of
England by Germany. Any such attempt will be a hazardous experiment.
But he argues that the advantages of his method outweigh the risks, and
that most of the risks themselves would attach equally to any other
method. Whatever skill in prediction was used, bad weather might
overtake the expedition. Yes; but if transports were used transhipment
into boats for landing would in bad weather be fraught with the same
and a greater peril. But transports could stand off and wait. Delay is
fatal in any case; unswerving promptitude is the essence of such an
enterprise. The lighters would be in danger of foundering? Beside the
point; if the end is worth gaining the risks must be faced. Soldiers’
lives are sacrificed in tens of thousands on battlefields. The flotilla
would be demoralised during transit by the assault of a few
torpedo-boats? Granted; but the same would apply to a fleet of
transports, with the added certainty that one lucky shot would send to
the bottom ten times the number of soldiers, with less hope of rescue.
In both cases reliance must be placed on the efficiency and vigilance
of the escort. It is admitted, however, in a passage which might well
make my two adventurers glow with triumph, that if by any mischance the
British discovered what was afoot in good time, and were able to send
over a swarm of light-draught boats, which could elude the German
warships and get amongst the flotillas while they were still in process
of leaving the siels; it is admitted that in that case the expedition
was doomed. But it is held that such an event was not to be feared.
Reckless pluck is abundant in the British Navy, but expert knowledge of
the tides and shoals in these waters is utterly lacking. The British
charts are of no value, and there is no evidence (he reports) that the
subject has been studied in any way by the British Admiralty. Let me
remark here, that I believe Mr “Davies’s” views, as expressed in the
earlier chapters, when they were still among the great estuaries, are
all absolutely sound. The “channel theory”, though it only bore
indirectly on the grand issue before them, was true, and should be laid
to heart, or I should not have wasted space on it.
One word more, in conclusion. There is an axiom, much in fashion now,
that there is no fear of an invasion of the British Isles, because if
we lose command of the sea, we can be starved—a cheaper and surer way
of reducing us to submission. It is a loose, valueless axiom, but by
sheer repetition it is becoming an article of faith. It implies that
“command of the sea” is a thing to be won or lost definitely; that we
may have it to-day and lose it for ever to-morrow. On the contrary, the
chances are that in anything like an even struggle the command of the
sea will hang in the balance for an indefinite time. And even against
great odds, it would probably be impossible for our enemies so to bar
the avenues of our commerce, so to blockade the ports of our extensive
coast-line, and so to overcome the interest which neutrals will have in
supplying us, as to bring us to our knees in less than two years,
during which time we can be recuperating and rebuilding from our unique
internal resources, and endeavouring to regain command.
No; the better axiom is that nothing short of a successful invasion
could finally compel us to make peace. Our hearts are stout, we hope;
but facts are facts; and a successful raid, such as that here sketched,
if you will think out its consequences, must appal the stoutest heart.
It was checkmated, but others may be conceived. In any case, we know
the way in which they look at these things in Germany.
Postscript (March 1903)
It so happens that while this book was in the press a number of
measures have been taken by the Government to counteract some of the
very weaknesses and dangers which are alluded to above. A Committee of
National Defence has been set up, and the welcome given to it was a
truly extraordinary comment on the apathy and confusion which it is
designed to supplant. A site on the Forth has been selected for a new
North Sea naval base—an excellent if tardy decision; for ten years or
so must elapse before the existing anchorage becomes in any sense a
“base”. A North Sea fleet has also been created—another good measure;
but it should be remembered that its ships are not modern, or in the
least capable of meeting the principal German squadrons under the
circumstances supposed above.
Lastly, a Manning Committee has (among other matters) reported vaguely
in favour of a Volunteer Reserve. There is no means of knowing what
this recommendation will lead to; let us hope not to the fiasco of the
last badly conceived experiment. Is it not becoming patent that the
time has come for training all Englishmen systematically either for the
sea or for the rifle?