Timaeus
air; and once more, air, when collected and condensed, produces
cloud and mist; and from these, when still more compressed, comes
flowing water, and from water comes earth and stones once more;
and thus generation appears to be transmitted from one to the
other in a circle. Thus, then, as the several elements never
present themselves in the same form, how can any one have the
assurance to assert positively that any of them, whatever it may
be, is one thing rather than another? No one can. But much the
safest plan is to speak of them as follows:—Anything which we see
to be continually changing, as, for example, fire, we must not
call ‘this’ or ‘that,’ but rather say that it is ‘of such a
nature’; nor let us speak of water as ‘this’; but always as
‘such’; nor must we imply that there is any stability in any of
those things which we indicate by the use of the words ‘this’ and
‘that,’ supposing ourselves to signify something thereby; for
they are too volatile to be detained in any such expressions as
‘this,’ or ‘that,’ or ‘relative to this,’ or any other mode of
speaking which represents them as permanent. We ought not to
apply ‘this’ to any of them, but rather the word ‘such’; which
expresses the similar principle circulating in each and all of
them; for example, that should be called ‘fire’ which is of such
a nature always, and so of everything that has generation. That
in which the elements severally grow up, and appear, and decay,
is alone to be called by the name ‘this’ or ‘that’; but that
which is of a certain nature, hot or white, or anything which
admits of opposite qualities, and all things that are compounded
of them, ought not to be so denominated. Let me make another
attempt to explain my meaning more clearly. Suppose a person to
make all kinds of figures of gold and to be always transmuting
one form into all the rest;—somebody points to one of them and
asks what it is. By far the safest and truest answer is, That is
gold; and not to call the triangle or any other figures which are
formed in the gold ‘these,’ as though they had existence, since
they are in process of change while he is making the assertion;
but if the questioner be willing to take the safe and indefinite
expression, ‘such,’ we should be satisfied. And the same argument
applies to the universal nature which receives all bodies—that
must be always called the same; for, while receiving all things,
she never departs at all from her own nature, and never in any
way, or at any time, assumes a form like that of any of the
things which enter into her; she is the natural recipient of all
impressions, and is stirred and informed by them, and appears
different from time to time by reason of them. But the forms
which enter into and go out of her are the likenesses of real
existences modelled after their patterns in a wonderful and
inexplicable manner, which we will hereafter investigate. For the
present we have only to conceive of three natures: first, that
which is in process of generation; secondly, that in which the
generation takes place; and thirdly, that of which the thing
generated is a resemblance. And we may liken the receiving
principle to a mother, and the source or spring to a father, and
the intermediate nature to a child; and may remark further, that
if the model is to take every variety of form, then the matter in
which the model is fashioned will not be duly prepared, unless it
is formless, and free from the impress of any of those shapes
which it is hereafter to receive from without. For if the matter
were like any of the supervening forms, then whenever any
opposite or entirely different nature was stamped upon its
surface, it would take the impression badly, because it would
intrude its own shape. Wherefore, that which is to receive all
forms should have no form; as in making perfumes they first
contrive that the liquid substance which is to receive the scent
shall be as inodorous as possible; or as those who wish to
impress figures on soft substances do not allow any previous
impression to remain, but begin by making the surface as even and
smooth as possible. In the same way that which is to receive
perpetually and through its whole extent the resemblances of all
eternal beings ought to be devoid of any particular form.
Wherefore, the mother and receptacle of all created and visible
and in any way sensible things, is not to be termed earth, or
air, or fire, or water, or any of their compounds or any of the
elements from which these are derived, but is an invisible and
formless being which receives all things and in some mysterious
way partakes of the intelligible, and is most incomprehensible.
In saying this we shall not be far wrong; as far, however, as we
can attain to a knowledge of her from the previous
considerations, we may truly say that fire is that part of her
nature which from time to time is inflamed, and water that which
is moistened, and that the mother substance becomes earth and
air, in so far as she receives the impressions of them.
Let us consider this question more precisely. Is there any
self-existent fire? and do all those things which we call
self-existent exist? or are only those things which we see, or in
some way perceive through the bodily organs, truly existent, and
nothing whatever besides them? And is all that which we call an
intelligible essence nothing at all, and only a name? Here is a
question which we must not leave unexamined or undetermined, nor
must we affirm too confidently that there can be no decision;
neither must we interpolate in our present long discourse a
digression equally long, but if it is possible to set forth a
great principle in a few words, that is just what we want.
Thus I state my view:—If mind and true opinion are two distinct
classes, then I say that there certainly are these self-existent
ideas unperceived by sense, and apprehended only by the mind; if,
however, as some say, true opinion differs in no respect from
mind, then everything that we perceive through the body is to be
regarded as most real and certain. But we must affirm them to be
distinct, for they have a distinct origin and are of a different
nature; the one is implanted in us by instruction, the other by
persuasion; the one is always accompanied by true reason, the
other is without reason; the one cannot be overcome by
persuasion, but the other can: and lastly, every man may be said
to share in true opinion, but mind is the attribute of the gods
and of very few men. Wherefore also we must acknowledge that
there is one kind of being which is always the same, uncreated
and indestructible, never receiving anything into itself from
without, nor itself going out to any other, but invisible and
imperceptible by any sense, and of which the contemplation is
granted to intelligence only. And there is another nature of the
same name with it, and like to it, perceived by sense, created,
always in motion, becoming in place and again vanishing out of
place, which is apprehended by opinion and sense. And there is a
third nature, which is space, and is eternal, and admits not of
destruction and provides a home for all created things, and is
apprehended without the help of sense, by a kind of spurious
reason, and is hardly real; which we beholding as in a dream, say
of all existence that it must of necessity be in some place and
occupy a space, but that what is neither in heaven nor in earth
has no existence. Of these and other things of the same kind,
relating to the true and waking reality of nature, we have only
this dreamlike sense, and we are unable to cast off sleep and
determine the truth about them. For an image, since the reality,
after which it is modelled, does not belong to it, and it exists
ever as the fleeting shadow of some other, must be inferred to be
in another (i.e. in space), grasping existence in some way or
other, or it could not be at all. But true and exact reason,
vindicating the nature of true being, maintains that while two
things (i.e. the image and space) are different they cannot exist
one of them in the other and so be one and also two at the same
time.
Thus have I concisely given the result of my thoughts; and my
verdict is that being and space and generation, these three,
existed in their three ways before the heaven; and that the nurse
of generation, moistened by water and inflamed by fire, and
receiving the forms of earth and air, and experiencing all the
affections which accompany these, presented a strange variety of
appearances; and being full of powers which were neither similar
nor equally balanced, was never in any part in a state of
equipoise, but swaying unevenly hither and thither, was shaken by
them, and by its motion again shook them; and the elements when
moved were separated and carried continually, some one way, some
another; as, when grain is shaken and winnowed by fans and other
instruments used in the threshing of corn, the close and heavy
particles are borne away and settle in one direction, and the
loose and light particles in another. In this manner, the four
kinds or elements were then shaken by the receiving vessel,
which, moving like a winnowing machine, scattered far away from
one another the elements most unlike, and forced the most similar
elements into close contact. Wherefore also the various elements
had different places before they were arranged so as to form the
universe. At first, they were all without reason and measure. But
when the world began to get into order, fire and water and earth
and air had only certain faint traces of themselves, and were
altogether such as everything might be expected to be in the
absence of God; this, I say, was their nature at that time, and
God fashioned them by form and number. Let it be consistently
maintained by us in all that we say that God made them as far as
possible the fairest and best, out of things which were not fair
and good. And now I will endeavour to show you the disposition
and generation of them by an unaccustomed argument, which I am
compelled to use; but I believe that you will be able to follow
me, for your education has made you familiar with the methods of
science.
In the first place, then, as is evident to all, fire and earth
and water and air are bodies. And every sort of body possesses
solidity, and every solid must necessarily be contained in
planes; and every plane rectilinear figure is composed of
triangles; and all triangles are originally of two kinds, both of
which are made up of one right and two acute angles; one of them
has at either end of the base the half of a divided right angle,
having equal sides, while in the other the right angle is divided
into unequal parts, having unequal sides. These, then, proceeding